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9PREFACE
This book contains a revised collection of previously published articles 
spanning a period of five years (2004-2009) during which my seminal 
thoughts on democratic citizenship education have been developed. 
I  situate myself in relation to these works on democratic citizenship 
education as well as on (un)pedagogical encounters throughout the 
major part of my life, to make a case for a communitarian conception of 
democratic citizenship education.
Central to this book is the notion that democratic citizenship education 
ought to be deliberative, compassionate and friendly in order that teachers 
and students (learners) may respect one another and take risks in and 
through their pedagogical encounters. In this way, hopefully, students and 
teachers may become more critical, explorative and engaging, thus making 
democratic citizenship education a highly pragmatic experience for the 
sake of cultivating our civility and humanity.
INTRODUCTION
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Introduction
My academic intellectual journey was enhanced as a postgraduate student 
in the early 1990s when I completed the Master’s in Philosophy of 
Education (Democracy and Education) at a local university – a programme 
which at the time was considered to be amongst the most rigorous in 
the country, partly due to its uniquely analytical orientation, but also 
because the presenters of the programme considered higher education as 
an enabling condition for transformation in this country. At that time, 
I had not encountered serious South African theoretical contributions 
about democratic citizenship education and relied (as did some of the 
programme presenters) mostly on the intellectual contributions of some 
Anglo‑Saxon philosophers of education whose leading thoughts on the 
subject can now be found in the monumental four‑volume classic on the 
philosophy of education edited by Paul Hirst and Patricia White in 1998 
entitled, Philosophy of Education: Major Themes in the Analytic Tradition. 
My exposure to theories in and about democratic citizenship education 
was also enhanced through my attendance of conferences organised by 
the International Network of Philosophers of Education (INPE) and 
the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain (PESGB), which 
published two major journals in the field, namely Studies in Philosophy 
and Education and Journal of Philosophy of Education. These two journals, 
together with Educational Theory and Educational Philosophy and Theory, 
are the publications which most articulated defensible liberal forms of 
democratic citizenship education – a subject area which to my knowledge 
had not been thoroughly explored in South Africa. So, I consider my 
contribution through the publication of this book as foregrounding 
another liberal voice in the pursuit of a plausible conception of democratic 
citizenship education mostly using my own pedagogical encounters in my 
native country as a springboard to articulate my position. In a way, my 
voice (which is partly narratival) offers a different take on the subject – one 
that (re)shapes current theories on democratic citizenship education on 
the basis of an autobiographical account of (un)pedagogical moments of 
practice. Put differently, I endeavour to foreground current understandings 
of democratic citizenship education with the intention of extending some 
of its meanings on the basis of personal pedagogical experiences. 
The main aim of the book is to advance arguments in defence of 
democratic citizenship education that can engender opportunities for the 
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achievement of democratic educational justice, in particular by making a 
case for deliberative engagement, compassionate imagining, and connecting 
with the other and its otherness, whether locally (through ubuntu), globally 
and/or sceptically (through cosmopolitanism). Whereas most theoretical 
accounts of democratic citizenship education seem to be somewhat biased 
towards the significance of deliberation and connecting with the other, 
my view is that democratic citizenship education also has to consider the 
connecting with the other (albeit sceptically) in a compassionate way – 
invariably then, the possibility for democratic educational justice might 
become a reality. In doing the aforementioned, I have organised this book 
into nine interconnected chapters.
In the first chapter, I connect the practice of deliberation to belligerence 
and storytelling. My reason for doing so is premised on two considerations: 
firstly, if one cannot create spaces for others to narrate their stories (about 
their life experiences), one would not have established conditions for 
deliberation – that is, listening to and creating conditions for the other to 
‘talk back’; secondly, if one does not begin to challenge others belligerently 
in order to provoke and engender better forms of engagement, one would 
not establish conditions for ‘talking back’ at all. But it is, I argue, in the 
construction of the stories one listens to that deeper meanings could 
emanate through becoming more attentive to the stories of one another 
and actually reconstructing others’ stories of what one imagines others 
could possibly have articulated. In Chapter  2, I argue that deliberative 
engagements among human beings ought to create conditions for both 
belligerence and compassion. If belligerent engagement is always searched 
for and one does not take into account the vulnerabilities of others to 
whom one should compassionately respond, deliberation would have the 
potential to exclude rather than include others. In Chapter 3, I argue that 
democratic justice is possible through the enactment of deliberations which 
could engender friendships – only then would people hopefully take more 
risks and move towards unexplored possibilities. In Chapter  4, I argue 
that forgiveness and respect are preconditions for democratic citizenship 
education. People cannot begin to engage one another if they do not 
respect others as persons. What is more, they cannot deliberate equally 
and compassionately as friends if they do not forgive, which opens up an 
education for democratic citizenship open to unimaginable possibilities. 
15
Introduction
In Chapter 5, I show that democratic citizenship education provides the 
premise for cosmopolitan education, which to my mind can secure forms of 
local, cultural and global legitimacy and justice. In Chapter 6, I argue that 
any plausible understanding of democratic citizenship education should 
be delinked from violent actions. Any form of violence, I suggest, would 
be counterproductive to deliberative and compassionate engagement  – 
the possibility of friendship would always be undermined. In Chapter 7, 
I show how ubuntu (human decency and collective engagement) can be 
realised as an instance of African democratic citizenship education. In 
Chapter 8, I argue that expansive patriotism, which itself is attracted to 
the cultivation of open‑mindedness, pluralism, deliberation, connecting 
with the other, and peace‑building, can in fact create conditions for the 
realisation of democratic citizenship education. Expansive patriotism 
would invariably enable citizens to connect deliberatively with one another 
without the possibility of conflict in a context where conflicting groups 
can begin to consider peace, racism and other forms of segregation. In the 
last chapter I argue that democratic citizenship is not always a neat and 
tidy practice, but that it can and should also be messy and fractured. This 
opens up the possibility of talking about democratic citizenship education 
as a sceptical encounter with the other – that is, democratic citizenship 
should primarily be about being responsible towards the other, recognising 
the other’s humanity, and connecting with the other with a readiness for 
departure. In a way, I am somewhat suggesting that democratic citizenship 
is ongoing and that a particular understanding of the concept must always 
be troubled in order to ensure its fluidity and relevance. 
I invite readers to share in my thoughts about democratic citizenship 
education, in particular the multiple ways in which the concept can remain 
inexhaustibly (un)situated in practices that can ensure the advancement of 
pedagogical encounters.
CHAPTER
1 Democratic citizenship education in the making – belligerence, deliberation and belonging
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Undemocratic and uncitizenship encounters
This is not just another book on the theoretical dimensions of democratic 
citizenship education. There is an abundance of literature that comprehen-
sively elucidates the theory and practice of democratic citizenship education. 
In fact, I draw on (un) pedagogical encounters over the past forty years to 
explore and extend notions of democratic citizenship education. Often my 
personal testimonies are used to elucidate conceptions of democracy and 
citizenship in relation to educational discourses I have had the privilege to 
have experienced together with others – mostly my students and teachers. 
So, let me begin by offering my first story.
At the age of eleven, I witnessed with amazement how the bulldozers 
moved into District Six (a suburb in the heart of Cape Town, situated 
directly opposite the harbour) to destroy vacated and dilapidated buildings 
in my neighbourhood. I was always disappointed when these buildings 
were destroyed in such a manner, because as a child I was keen to acquire 
the cast iron pipes left behind, which friends and I then sold to the local 
scrap metal company so that we could have money to buy the ‘polonies’ 
(red meat sausages) which we heated over the fire so that we could enjoy 
a meal together. This was not just another meal, but more importantly, a 
gathering around a fire where we contemplated the happenings of the day. 
Frequently we spoke of the destruction of many peoples’ homes. These were 
people who were forcibly relocated to township areas, often far away from 
Cape Town, as part of the government’s Group Areas Act. This separation 
from their known environment had devastating consequences for many 
heartbroken families – their togetherness and friendships had instantly 
been annihilated. So, one day, as a brave young boy at the tender age of 
about eleven, I decided to question the building construction supervisor 
(a white man) in charge of a demolition job opposite my grandfather’s 
house. He simply dismissed me, scolded me for being too young to raise 
‘political issues’, and retorted that he was merely following orders. What 
a cliché this has become! For me this was my first pedagogical encounter 
with undemocratic and uncitizenship action. Let me elaborate. 
The building construction supervisor did not listen to my questioning. In 
fact, he ridiculed me to the extent that I left with a feeling of apathy. To say 
the least, I was scared of being physically manhandled. I did not have an 
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opportunity to hear his rejoinder about my speech act – that is, expressing 
my dissatisfaction with what I then considered as an unacceptable act 
on his part. I felt that I could actually do nothing but console myself 
with the thought that I did not belong to my tormentor’s life-world. To 
me, this initial encounter I had with undemocratic and uncitizenship 
actions foregrounds the despair and helplessness many people experienced 
as often demoralised victims of racial apartheid. Drawing on Seyla 
Benhabib’s (1996) and Eamonn Callan’s (1997) compelling expositions of 
democratic citizenship education theory, I shall now highlight some of the 
democratic and citizenship actions that were definitely absent during this 
pedagogical encounter.
Deliberation and attachment as conditions for democratic citizenship
To begin with, Benhabib (2002:169) argues that democracy and 
citizenship can co-exist, because the former frames education as a process 
of active consent and participation, whereas the latter designates the sense 
of belonging people demonstrate when socialised into educative practices. 
Active participation and belonging are both conceptually connected to 
some form of engagement in relation to someone else – I participate with 
others in a conversation, so I engage with them; and I belong to a group 
where members are in conversation with one another, so I engage with 
them by being attached to the conversation. On the one hand, by ‘active 
participation’ Benhabib (2002:133-134) means that people are free and 
equal moral beings who attempt to influence each other’s opinions by 
engaging in a public dialogue in which they examine and critique each 
other’s positions in a civil and considerate manner, while explaining reasons 
for their own. I cannot recall a moment when the building construction 
supervisor was in fact civil and considerate towards me and my concerns. 
On the other hand, ‘belonging’ means that people are committed to the 
task of education through being more accountable to the process and 
deepening their attachment to it. Moreover, for Benhabib democratic 
citizenship education (more specifically, educating people to become 
democratic citizens) would at least be constituted by three interrelated 
aspects: collective identity, privileges of membership, and social rights 
and benefits. 
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Firstly, educating people to be democratic citizens has to take into 
account people’s linguistic, cultural, ethnic and religious commonalities 
(Benhabib, 2002:162). The idea of finding a civil space for the sharing of 
different people’s commonalities is based on the understanding that people 
need to learn to live with the otherness of others whose ways of being 
may be deeply threatening to their own (Benhabib, 2002:130). And, by 
creating a civil space, referred to by Benhabib (2002:127) as ‘intercultural 
dialogue’, where people can enact what they have in common and at the 
same time make public their competing narratives and significations, 
people might have a real opportunity to co-exist. In this way, they would 
not only establish a community of conversation and interdependence 
(that is, they share commonalities), but also one of disagreement (that is, 
they do not share commonalities) without disrespecting others’ life-worlds 
(Benhabib, 2002:35 and 41). Put differently, when people are engaged 
in a conversation underpinned by interdependence and disagreement, 
they engage in an educative process with a collective identity – they share 
commonalities. And educating people to become democratic citizens 
involves creating civil spaces where they can learn to share commonalities 
and to respect the differences of others. 
Secondly, educating people to be democratic citizens involves making 
them aware of the right of political participation, the right to hold certain 
offices and perform certain tasks, and the right to deliberate and decide 
upon certain questions (Benhabib, 2002:162). The point is that people 
need to be educated to accept that they cannot be excluded from holding 
certain positions or performing certain tasks on the basis of their cultural 
differences. They have the right to participate, to be heard and to offer 
an account of their reasons ‘within a civil public space of multicultural 
understanding and confrontation’ (Benhabib, 2002:130). Of particular 
importance to this discussion on democratic citizenship education is 
the notion of educating people about the right to deliberate and decide 
on certain questions. What this implies is that we should recognise the 
right of people capable of speech and action to be participants in the 
moral conversation, whereby they should have the same rights to various 
speech acts, to initiate new topics and to ask for justification of the 
presuppositions of the conversation (Benhabib, 2002:107). Only then 
do people become participants in an educative process underpinned by 
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democratic citizenship. The building construction supervisor dismissed 
my rights to free speech and to initiate a discussion. His blunt refusal to 
engage me was a clear rejection of our collective rights to deliberate. 
Thirdly, democratic citizenship education also involves educating people 
about their civil, political and social rights. Such a process would educate 
people about the rights to protection of life, liberty and property, the right 
to freedom of conscience, and certain associational rights, such as those 
of contract and marriage – all civil rights. People would also be educated 
about the rights to self-determination, to run for and to hold office, to 
enjoy freedom of speech and opinion, and to establish political and non-
political associations, including a free press and free institutions of science 
and culture – that is, political rights. And they would be educated about 
the right to form trade unions as well as other professional and trade 
associations, health care rights, unemployment compensation, old-age 
pensions, child care, housing and educational subsidies – that is, social 
rights (Benhabib, 2002:163-164). Reflecting on my attempt to initiate 
discussion with the building construction supervisor, I can now obviously 
infer that my civil rights were deeply questioned and denied. 
In essence, following Benhabib, a democratic citizenship education aims to 
cultivate public pedagogical spaces (in associational and non-associational 
networks such as schools, universities, religious sites and clubs) where 
people can be educated about one another’s shared commonalities and 
to respect cultural differences (where culture represents people’s shared 
values, meanings, linguistic signs and symbols). A democratic citizenship 
education would also educate people to deliberate in such a way as to offer 
an account of one’s reasons and in turn listen to the reasons of others, 
and to recognise and respect people’s civil, political and social rights. 
An education which takes into account these issues is underpinned by 
democracy and citizenship. 
My encounter with the building construction supervisor who so crudely 
dismissed me on the grounds that my questioning did not merit any serious 
consideration, can be regarded as one that lacked any form of listening 
to the other and his or her reasons. Simply put, there did not exist an 
opportunity for deliberation, because in the first place it requires willing 
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participants who are free and equal to listen to one another’s rejoinders. 
There wasn’t even an iota of space to offer an account of one another’s 
judgements. Certainly my attachment to the existential spaces I occupied 
(where I lived) had been deeply threatened, thus putting my citizenship 
aspirations to sleep very early in my life. The issue remains: If I did not 
have the opportunity then to engage deliberatively with someone else 
(who was highly dismissive even of my presence), how could I actually 
reclaim the right to engage belligerently with others whose ways of being 
are immensely threatening to my own? This brings me to another poignant 
(un) pedagogical encounter during my lived experiences with the other. 
Exactly seven years after I came face to face with the wrath of apartheid 
politics in the form of a building construction supervisor, I found myself 
in the final year of my schooling career. In what ought to have been the 
year in which my promise as a hardworking, bright young learner should 
have been realised, I found myself immersed in the 1976 anti-apartheid 
liberatory politics. And of course, my grades suffered. Since my peers 
saw me as the natural leader of local school resistance initiatives in our 
neighbourhood – primarily because of the popularity I gained during 
my leading roles in two school plays – I set out together with some 
fellow learners to organise political rallies which would confirm the local 
community’s political support for the Soweto revolts. For these daring 
initiatives (our lives as learners were at stake and we could face unexpected 
imprisonment and torture at the time), the role of key communicator with 
my fellow learners and their parents (whom we had to persuade about 
our anti-apartheid education stance) was unexpectedly foisted on me. 
When one day I managed to disobey my strict headmaster by organising 
the first high school rally in the area in solidarity with those who suffered 
inhumane torture, imprisonment and murder as a consequence of 
learners’ political stand against the introduction of Afrikaans (the then 
language of the oppressor) in black schools, I experienced an extension 
of my earlier encounter with the building construction supervisor who 
uncompromisingly demolished our homes in the early 1970s. What 
I learned during my encounters with students and parents as a high 
school student was the art of persuasion through belligerence. How did 
this happen? And why is belligerence so important to deliberation, more 
specifically democratic citizenship education? 
24
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Belligerence and distress as provocative moments during 
deliberative engagement
Participating in clandestine political gatherings during the oppressive 
apartheid days was highly risky. Yet fellow students and I met frequently 
at different students’ homes (for fear of possible police harassment and 
arrests). At these local venues of political activism we plotted activities for 
the day. Often our deliberations were rough to the extent that we disagreed 
strongly with one another on our strategies of political resistance. Should 
we burn down the school, the local shop (whose owner we suspected of 
being a police informant), or the nearest police station and civic hall? 
These were drastic and quite ambitious initiatives, because at stake was 
possible recriminations as a result of our intentions to commit arson. 
After most of us had been persuaded not to burn down our school on the 
grounds that although it was government property it was still our physical 
place of learning, some of our group left and were caught red-handed with 
containers of fuel to burn down the school. Of course they were accosted by 
police and arrested, but later released on the grounds of their explanation 
that their vehicle had run out of fuel. What I remember well about our 
deliberative encounters in Aunty A’s home, is that we vehemently disagreed 
yet did not consider dialogical victory over the other as our primary reason 
for making important, life-threatening decisions. At times we also had 
to convince some parents (by visiting them) of the actual reasons for 
our political activism by explaining why our formal school education 
should momentarily take a back seat for the sake of liberation. Heated 
debates ensued, yet our anger did not cause us to alienate and abandon 
one another during these difficult and trying times. And so, the actual 
march from one high school to the other followed, based on a deliberative, 
belligerent decision taken the previous evening. We decided not to burn 
down our local high school, but to participate in a protest march which 
eventually ended up two train stations from our school before riot police 
and security personnel intervened (as usual), firing rubber bullets and tear 
gas, beating us up and arresting many students who eventually spent the 
night in jail. Again, at the police station we used our skills of negotiation 
to secure the release of some terrified students. Of course, as leader of 
the protest march, I also faced the anger of some parents and teachers 
who accused me of having endangered the careers of my fellow students. 
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The headmaster refused to allow me back at school, because of what he 
claimed to have been my disruptive behaviour during our times of political 
uncertainty. I never returned to school and wrote my final examinations 
in the local community hall. And so, for me, 1976 (in fact my schooling 
career) came to an abrupt end. I was again on my own, but satisfied with 
our (the students and my) contribution to democratic action and change 
in the country. 
What does democratic action involve? 
Callan (1997:73 and 221-222) makes a cogent case for democratic action 
as being constituted by at least the following aspects: cohesive identity, 
public deliberation, and responsibility for the rights of others. Firstly, 
democratic action, particularly in pluralistic free societies, makes urgent 
the task of creating democratic citizens who share a sufficiently cohesive 
identity – in our case a cohesive identity that bonded high school students 
together and inspired them to take collective action. By this he means that 
such a conception of democratic action ‘honours the sources of diversity 
that thrive within the boundaries of a strong common citizenship, and 
yet supports a judicious tolerance to ways of life that conflict with some 
of its demands’. The pursuit of a collective identity without discounting 
the differences of others could do much to prevent ethnic hatred and 
religious intolerance. My focus is on Callan’s view of democratic action as 
a way to prevent ethnic hatred and religious intolerance. (South) Africa’s 
history has been marred by ethnic violence and religious bigotry – Zulus 
fighting Xhosas, Afrikaners resenting English-speaking people in South 
Africa, Muslims and non-Muslims attacking one another in Nigeria, 
and the Zimbabwean government confiscating white farmers’ property 
and evicting them. It is here that teaching and learning can provide 
enabling conditions for democratic action, more specifically by pursuing 
a pathway to collective political identity. This implies that teachers should 
not merely listen attentively to students’ narratives, but that they should 
actively encourage a spirit of living together in diversity – that is, through 
dialogical action teachers and students together should establish dialogical 
opportunities that take into account people’s linguistic, cultural, ethnic 
and religious commonalities and diversities. The idea of finding a dialogical 
space for the sharing of different people’s commonalities is based on the 
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understanding that people need to learn to live with the otherness of others 
whose ways of being may be deeply threatening to their own. By creating 
a dialogical space – referred to by Benhabib (2002:127) as ‘intercultural 
dialogue’ – where people can enact what they have in common and at 
the same time make public their competing narratives and significations, 
people might have a real opportunity to co-exist. In this way, they would 
not only establish a community of conversation and interdependence 
(that is, they share commonalities), but also one of disagreement (that is, 
they do not share commonalities) without disrespecting others’ life-worlds 
(Benhabib,  2002:35 and 41). Put differently, when teachers and 
students are engaged in a conversation underpinned by interdependence 
and disagreement, they engage in democratic action with a collective 
identity – they share commonalities. And educating students to become 
democratic citizens involves creating civil spaces where they can learn to 
share commonalities and to respect the differences of others. Our political 
gatherings offered civil spaces where my fellow-students and I learned from 
one another through what we had in common and how and why we differed. 
Secondly, Callan (1997:215) favours a conception of public deliberation 
characterised by the distress and belligerence (that is, a rough process of 
struggle) of confrontation that will naturally give way to conciliation as 
moral truth is pieced together from the fragmentary insights of conflicting 
viewpoints. For him, the idea of public deliberation is not an attempt ‘to 
achieve dialogical victory over our adversaries, but rather the attempt to 
find and enact terms of political coexistence that we and they can reasonably 
endorse as morally acceptable’. Through public deliberation, participants 
provoke doubts about the correctness of their moral beliefs or about the 
importance of the differences between what they and others believe (a 
matter of arousing distress) accompanied by a rough process of struggle 
and ethical confrontation – that is, belligerence (Callan,  1997:211). If 
this happens, belligerence and distress eventually give way to moments 
of ethical conciliation, when the truth and error in rival positions have 
been made clear and a fitting synthesis of factional viewpoints is achieved 
(Callan, 1997:212) – this is an idea of public deliberation with which 
I agree, where no one has the right to silence dissent and all participants 
can speak their minds. In the words of Callan (1997:201-202), ‘real moral 
dialogue (as constitutive of democratic action), as opposed to carefully 
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policed conversations about the meaning of some moral orthodoxy, cannot 
occur without the risk of offence; an offence-free school would oblige us to 
eschew dialogue’. During our belligerent deliberations in Aunty A’s home, 
the students and I did not silence one another, nor did we abandon the 
project we eventually embarked upon. It does seem that some teachers 
listening attentively to students’ narratives become culpable of steering 
the conversation in a way whereby preference is no longer given to the 
substantiveness of articulated views. Rather, these teachers seem to focus 
on who the students are and not also on what they substantively have 
to say. I am sometimes inclined to listen to students’ claims about how 
difficult it is to write a section of a thesis. They sometimes attribute their 
incapacity to produce argumentative writing to not having been taught 
argumentation in their undergraduate studies. Of course, this might be 
true. But then, to have reached the stage of thesis writing, one should 
at least know what it means to write a lucid, substantiated and coherent 
argument. For this reason, it would not be inappropriate to confront and 
even offend students. Simply put, tell students that their writing is not 
good enough and that they could do something about improving it.1 
Thirdly, Callan (1997:73) does not merely call for recognition of and respect 
for others’ rights (whether civil, political or social) through democratic 
action, but he also stresses the importance of taking responsibility for the 
rights of others. In his words, taking rights seriously means ‘accepting 
appropriate responsibility for the rights of others, not just making a fuss 
about our own’ (Callan, 1997:73). For instance, people who champion the 
right to employment in South Africa also consider just as important the 
cause of others to take responsibility to meet the needs of those who are 
jobless. Such an understanding of democratic action could extend the mere 
recognition of, and respect for, others’ rights to a position where we assume 
appropriate responsibility for the rights of others. In South Africa, with 
the neo-liberal market economy influencing universities  – in particular 
coercing universities to offer inter- and transdisciplinary programmes – 
many departments and academics are beginning to work together under 
the guise of deliberative engagement. However, such collaboration is 
1 I recall my supervisor for my Master’s in Education once bluntly telling me that my writing is 
pedantic and muddled.
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mostly geared towards designing and developing programmes that have a 
market orientation with which graduates stand a better chance of being 
taken up in the competitive job market. What invariably happens is that 
students become more and more self-centred and narcissistic about their 
own individual futures and prospects at the expense of national interests, 
without deliberating about what their collective contributions can be in 
shaping the future of their country. Most of the students whom I have 
encountered in the Postgraduate Certificate in Education programme offer 
the following reasoning: ‘I want to be a teacher so that I can secure a job’. 
Very little is said about how prospective teachers ought to deliberate about 
improving schooling in order to produce better citizens, or what ought to 
be done about making schools into environments that are more conducive 
to learning and teaching. On the one hand, it seems as if university teachers 
produce materials mostly aimed at equipping students with universal skills 
that match the requirements of the world of work, while disregarding what 
it means to be educated in a transformative society. On the other hand, 
some students selfishly acquire formal qualifications which seemingly 
prepare them for the labour market, but do not instill in them qualities 
which can help build a better country – one free from social oppression 
(drug and alcohol abuse, gangsterism, and human rights abuses), 
economic marginalisation (unemployment is rife among the majority of 
the previously disadvantaged), and subtle forms of racist exclusion (the 
most lucrative jobs are still occupied by those who were privileged in the 
past). The point is that unless universities become havens of deliberative 
discourse aimed at producing a better  future for all South Africans, we 
would not have seriously engaged with the challenges of the unexpected – 
that is to say, our deliberative efforts have not been responsible enough. 
In fact, they have been biased towards perpetuating injustices. Therefore, 
we have acted irresponsibly. In this regard, Arcilla (2003:149) makes the 
point that teachers and students need to take more responsibility for the 
social context of their education. This is what the other students and 
I had in mind in 1976: taking responsibility for our education by making 
an appeal to the then apartheid government to liberate our schools and 
society at large. 
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Undemocratic and uncitizenship education as acts of storytelling
The building construction supervisor who insulted me for questioning 
him, and the white policeman who injured me (during a school protest 
march) with his sjambok (a Zulu word for rubber cane), represent two 
poignant moments in my life where I attempted to respond to the racial 
challenges I faced during my teens. To have acted in association with others 
(my fellow-learners) and to have experienced belonging to my native 
country (I desired to be recognised as a franchised citizen) were democratic 
encounters deeply remote from my very being. Yet, having been denied 
the right to engage and encounter the other at a very early moment in 
my life, as well as having been subjected to mental and physical ‘violence’, 
must have shaped my early conceptions of undemocratic citizenship 
education, which I attempted to share with others. My feelings of national 
rejection and denial of the opportunity to engage the perpetrators of the 
apartheid regime are lived experiences which foreground the cardinal sins 
of undemocratic and uncitizenship education. 
Yet, narratives (like the ones I have provided so far) can in themselves 
be construed as acts of democratic storytelling. Why? For a response to 
this question, I quickly turn to Iris Marion Young (2000). Young’s idea of 
inclusive democratic (inter)action attends to virtues or a set of dispositions 
of communication – greeting, rhetoric and narrative – in addition to 
the contents of arguments in order to achieve an ‘enlarged conception’ 
of democratic engagement (2000:79). Greeting, she claims, precedes 
the giving and evaluating of reasons in dialogue by participants publicly 
acknowledging and recognising one another. Simply put, greeting refers 
to those moments in everyday communication – that is, ‘Hello’, ‘How are 
you?’, as well as forms of speech – which lubricate discussion with mild 
forms of flattery, stroking of egos, deference and politeness such as hand-
shakes and making small talk before commencing with business (2000:58). 
In other words, greeting is a communicative moment of taking the risk of 
trusting in order to establish and widen the bond of trust necessary for a 
discussion to proceed in good faith (2000:60). This makes sense for the 
reason that, if teachers and students do not acknowledge and recognise 
one another as worthy of listening to, deliberation might be stunted (as 
was the case with my encounters with the building construction supervisor 
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and policeman) prematurely, because the parties refused to engage one 
another as dialogical partners. For instance, if teachers refuse to listen to 
students’ diverse views on an issue, the practice of presenting and evaluating 
arguments cannot begin to unfold.
Young (2000:79) claims that rhetoric should also accompany argument by 
situating the argument for a particular audience and giving it embodied 
style and tone. In other words, rhetoric concerns the manner in which 
arguments are made as distinct from the assertive value of the arguments. 
The good rhetorician is one who attempts to persuade listeners by acceding 
to others that they are the ‘judges’ of arguments, rather than claiming 
herself to ‘know’ (2000:69). For instance, in rhetorical style a teacher 
might request her students to carefully consider a view on justice and await 
some of their responses to the concept – a matter of producing alertness 
for the sake of ensuring democratic (inter)action. Of interest to this 
discussion are Young’s views on storytelling. Narrative or relating stories is 
considered to be a means of giving voice to kinds of experience which often 
go unheard. For instance, at the institution where I work, several non-
Afrikaans-speaking students often feel excluded and marginalised when 
some academics teach and provide class notes only in Afrikaans. In this 
case, storytelling by students to each other and to a wider public as to why 
such practices constitute an injustice with respect to their learning could 
enlarge thinking about the problem of language use at my institution. In 
this way, listeners (academics) can hopefully learn about how their own 
position and actions appear to others from the stories they tell (2000:76). 
I share Young’s view that practices of greeting, rhetoric and narrative 
can complement argument. I am also less sceptical about these virtues 
of communication devaluing or dismissing central normative concerns 
about argument in the sense that such forms of communication could 
be superficial, insincere and merely aimed at gaining the assent of others 
through flattery and not by reason. What concerns me more is that 
narrative in particular still requires people to articulate their experiences 
(and at times eloquently) in order that others should listen attentively to 
such experiences. The point I am making is that it seems rather unlikely 
that the individual testimony of a student who relates a sense of wrong 
without some manner of justification can resolve, for instance, the 
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language dilemma at my institution. For this reason, (democratic) action 
also requires that teachers in particular recognise the vulnerabilities of 
others (including the injustices students might experience) and not just the 
probative strength of students’ reasons. Put differently, although narrative 
(the way I told my story) can bring to the fore what would have remained 
muted and suppressed encounters with the other, had I not told my story, it 
does not adequately reveal my feelings of emotion and the way I have actually 
been traumatised by others who seemed to have been unperturbed by my 
solitary moments of victimisation and exclusion. The point I am making is 
that democratic citizenship education cannot be experienced freely if one 
does not also consider others’ emotional encounters with the other and 
their otherness – a discussion I wish to pursue in the following chapter. 
In sum, in this chapter I have attempted to (re) construct a notion of 
deliberation that involves engaging others through belligerence and 
storytelling. If one cannot create spaces for others to narrate their stories 
(about their life experiences) one would not have established conditions 
for deliberation – that is, listening and responding to the other. Similarly, 
if one does not begin to challenge others belligerently in order to provoke 
and engender better forms of engagement, one cannot establish conditions 
for deliberation at all. However, where I wish to extend arguments in 
defence of deliberation through belligerence and storytelling is in the 
construction of the stories one listens to. Sometimes people also encounter 
difficulties in articulating their views, yet they are encouraged to tell their 
stories. Of course, the one who listens to the stories actually constructs the 
stories. And, these constructions of people’s stories on the part of listeners 
are consistent with the spirit of the articulations. What I expected the 
building construction supervisor to have done when he encountered my 
teenage aggression, was actually to have constructed the deeper meanings 
behind my inarticulate speech. He failed to do so, because he did not want 
to establish conditions for deliberation. In essence, deliberation requires 
that people do not merely participate, but actually engage collectively. 
People’s engagements are shaped through belligerence and distress; they 
are attentive to one another’s stories and they deepen their understandings 
of others’ stories through their own constructions of what they imagine 
could have been told. 
CHAPTER
2 Democratic citizenship education through compassionate imagining
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Uncompassionate dismissal 
As a young teacher in my twenties (or perhaps I should rather say 
‘unqualified’ teacher, because I wasn’t in possession of a teaching diploma 
at the time), I had the privilege of teaching at a public high school in a 
township community in the morning, and in the afternoon I would teach 
Muslim pupils some of the basic tenets of the Islamic faith, including the 
recitation of the Qur’an at a local madrassah (private afternoon Muslim 
school). Practically my entire day was occupied in socialising with young 
people and initiating young minds into the discourses of science and 
religion. I remember vividly an incident when the principal of the local 
madrassah came with the message that three pupils should no longer be 
allowed to attend classes because their father was an affiliate member of 
an organisation deemed to be un-Islamic. Ironically, at least one of these 
youngsters attended the public school where I taught her science as well. 
In hindsight, I should have quitted the madrassah, but for some reason or 
the other (probably because I would have been branded as a sympathiser) 
I witnessed with disgust how innocent and vulnerable pupils were told to 
leave the madrassah they had become so fond of. I was particularly distressed, 
because some of our lessons had involved bridging the divide between 
science and religion. This stands out as one of the most uncompassionate 
moments that I have ever witnessed, particularly since the local police 
arrested these children because they refused to write examinations under 
the supervision of the police during the turbulent eighties in my country. 
Let me dwell a bit on the uncompassionate encounter I happened to 
have had – a callous act from which I too cannot be exonerated. At least 
I had the decency to explain to the parents what had transpired in our 
madrassah that afternoon. The fact is that young people’s vulnerabilities 
were unsympathetically exploited and nobody did anything about the 
situation. It is for this reason that I today find solace in the seminal work of 
Martha Nussbaum, particularly in her view of compassionate imagining. 
In defence of compassionate imagining
Martha Nussbaum (2001) raises the question of what positive 
contribution emotions such as compassionate imagining can make in 
guiding deliberation amongst teachers and students. Her main argument 
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in defence of compassionate imagining is that it ought to be the emotion 
which should be most frequently cultivated when people embark upon 
democratic action in public life (Nussbaum, 2001:299). Her view is 
that deliberative engagement ought to be occasioned by the impulse to 
treat others justly and humanely, that is, with compassion. Certainly in 
South African universities  – where diverse students of advantaged and 
disadvantaged backgrounds (black and white) are beginning to deliberate 
about matters of public concern such as crime, victimisation, homelessness, 
job discrimination, unemployment, domestic violence, abuse of women, 
poverty and lack of food, political alienation, alcoholism and drug 
abuse, and absence of good prospects – students must make certain 
practical judgements about these variants of their public and personal 
lives. Invariably, the judgements to be made will be based on students’ 
perceptions of others’ distress, undeserved misfortune, suffering, injustice, 
plight, disability and disease. It is in this regard that compassionate 
imagining becomes a necessary condition to deliberate about such matters. 
Compassionate imagining not only prompts in people an awareness of the 
misfortune or suffering of others, but also pushes the boundaries of the self 
outward by focusing on others’ suffering, which might have come about 
through no fault of their own – the madrassah pupils did nothing wrong 
to deserve such harsh treatment. 
Nussbaum’s understanding of compassion as painful emotional judgement 
embodies at least two cognitive requirements: firstly, a belief or appraisal 
that the suffering of others is serious and not trivial, and that they do not 
deserve the suffering; and secondly, the belief that the possibilities of the 
person who experiences the emotion are similar to those of the sufferer. 
I shall now discuss these two requirements of compassion in relation 
to the way that students and university teachers ought to deliberate 
rationally (which includes being good listeners), while also cultivating 
within themselves the concern to be just and humane towards others – to 
be compassionate. 
Firstly, in so far as one can become serious about the suffering of others, 
one believes them to be without blame for the kind of undeserved injustice 
they might have suffered, and one recognises that their plight needs to be 
alleviated. Many students, who are perhaps blameless for their inability 
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to pay university fees as a result of their parents not enjoying economic 
prosperity after decades of apartheid, require the compassion of others. 
In such circumstances, deliberation at universities should rather take the 
form of ascertaining what could be done to ensure that students who do 
not have the finances to study remain part of the university community, 
rather than finding ways to penalise or at times humiliate them. So, 
compassion requires blamelessness on the part of students who are unable 
to pay university fees, as well as on the part of onlookers who can make 
judgements about the need to expedite the flourishing of the students 
in question. Similarly, a university teacher has compassion for students 
with an impoverished schooling background not necessarily of their own 
creation (parents could not afford to send children to more affluent and 
organised schools, or to pay for the services of extra mural tutors, as is 
the case in South Africa). Such a university teacher recognises the need 
to find creative ways to assist disadvantaged students to come to grips 
with difficult concepts in their studies and at the same time acknowledges 
that the unjust education system which these students might have been 
exposed to is no fault of their own. One could argue that all students 
should be treated equally and that no student should receive preferential 
treatment in terms of additional pedagogical support. But this would be 
to ignore the undeserved unequal education many students, certainly in 
South Africa, have been – or might still be – subjected to. 
Secondly, compassion is best cultivated if one acknowledges some sort of 
community between oneself and the other, understanding what it might 
mean for one to encounter possibilities and vulnerabilities similar to those 
of the sufferer: ‘[One] will learn compassion best if he [she] begins by 
focusing on their sufferings’ (Nussbaum,  2001:317). Again, ‘in order 
for compassion to be present, the person must consider the suffering 
of another as a significant part of his or her own scheme of goals and 
ends. She must take that person’s ill as affecting her own flourishing. 
In effect, she must make herself vulnerable in the person of another’ 
(Nussbaum,  2001:319). What this recognition of one’s own related 
vulnerability means, is that students who might have a clear understanding 
of, say, concepts in a literature classroom and who become impatient with 
their peers for not grasping such concepts, should imagine what it would 
mean for them to encounter difficulty with concepts. Likewise, university 
38
EDUCATION, DEMOCRACY AND CITIZENSHIP REVISITED
academics teaching literature studies should become more aware of what it 
means for students to encounter epistemological difficulty. In the words of 
Nussbaum (2001:319), ‘the recognition of one’s own related vulnerability 
is, then, an important and frequently an indispensable epistemological 
requirement for compassion in human beings’. 
In essence, compassionate imagining brings to the fore the intellectual 
emotions of people in ethical deliberation. It is simply not sufficient to 
educate by just focusing on deliberative argumentation and narratives 
without also cultivating compassion. Deliberation and narratives prompt 
students and university teachers to question meanings, imagine alternative 
possibilities, modify practical judgements, and foster respect and critical 
engagement. Yet, it seldom brings into play those emotions of people that 
are necessary to make it worthwhile to continue the dialogical interaction. 
If one is going to ignore the pedagogical vulnerabilities of the weak, very 
little will be done in the direction of meaningful education. We also need 
compassionate students and university teachers. However, an overwhelming 
application of compassionate imagining in relation to democratic action 
could reduce the rigorous forms of argumentation that are required in 
deliberative engagement. For instance, it is one thing to recognise that 
some students have physical and epistemological (including articulation) 
vulnerabilities and that when they articulate their narratives university 
teachers ought to listen to their voices, but that does not mean that one 
should merely accept everything students have to say if they do not offer 
reasonable and sufficient justifications for their views. I  cannot imagine 
that university teachers in South Africa would accept feeble arguments of 
students to use violence against alleged racists. Likewise, I cannot agree with 
views that advocate the establishment of a Black Native Club movement 
which aims to advance the interests of only African blacks in academe 
to the exclusion of whites, coloureds and Indians. One ought to listen 
compassionately to the claims of some black academics who allege that 
they still encounter exclusion and marginalisation in the higher education 
sector, but establishing a movement on the basis of excluding others who 
might have similar common aspirations to rekindle the voices of the 
marginalised (vulnerable), would undermine democratic action – that is, 
as South African academics, we should collectively oppose exclusion and 
other forms of discrimination in higher education. However, university 
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teachers and students cannot do so just on the grounds of compassionate 
imagining – whereby we recognise the vulnerabilities of one another and 
others – without those forms of democratic engagement which bring to 
the fore our most substantive opinions and preferences.
Compassionate imagining as an instance of democratic 
citizenship education
Nussbaum’s compelling account of compassionate imagining articulates 
practical strategies which educators could employ to support and cultivate 
an education for democratic citizenship. Firstly, in Nussbaum’s (2001:426) 
view, compassionate imagining involves cultivating in learners the ability 
to imagine the experiences of others and to participate in their sufferings – 
to extend their empathy to more people and more types of people. This can 
already be done at an elementary level when learners learn their first stories, 
rhymes and songs, in particular through seeking out works that acquaint 
the learner with a sense of wonder – a sense of mystery that blends curiosity 
with surprise. Think of the song that begins, ‘Imagine there’s no people’. 
In learning the song, the learner learns to imagine what life would be 
without other human beings and thus psychologically develops a concern 
for people outside herself. Later on, she may also be encouraged to notice 
the suffering of people with a new keenness which might cause her to be 
exposed to other stories that display the vulnerabilities of human life – 
death, illness, rape, war, deceit and tragedy. As far as tragedy is concerned, 
Nussbaum  (2001:428) argues that tragedies acquaint learners with bad 
things that may happen in human life long before life itself does so, thus 
enabling a concern for others who are suffering what she has not suffered. 
For instance, through myth, story, poetry, drama, music and works of art, 
educators could acquaint learners with a wide range of possible calamities 
and other important things vulnerable to calamity, which can cause 
learners to become attentive and concerned about the distress that human 
beings can experience. Novels about the fate of a tragic and worthy hero, 
the trauma of young women raped in wartime, the murder of children, 
the experiences of the mentally disabled, and people who have suffered 
from the hatred of those in power, could be used by educators as powerful 
sources of ‘compassionate imagining’ (Nussbaum, 2001:430).
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Secondly, an education for compassionate imagining should also be a 
multicultural education. This involves an education (through the teaching 
of indigenous languages and literature, social sciences, and life orientation 
curricula in South Africa) which acquaints learners with a rudimentary 
understanding of the histories and cultures of many different people, that 
is, major religious and cultural groups, ethnic, racial and social majorities, 
and those with an alternative sexual orientation. Awareness of cultural 
difference is necessary in order to engender respect for one another, which 
is an essential underpinning for compassionate imagining. Moreover, 
education for compassionate imagining needs to begin early. As soon as 
learners engage in storytelling, they can tell stories about other nations and 
countries. Certainly in South Africa, they could learn that religions other 
than Christianity exist or -that people have different ways of thinking, 
traditions and beliefs. For instance, one such theme in life orientation for 
primary school learners could involve educating learners about African 
myths and folktales and the injustices perpetrated against Africans. By 
the time they reach university, they should be well-equipped to deal with 
demanding courses on human diversity outside the dominant Western 
traditions. The goals of such a theme could be threefold: to develop in 
learners a sense of informed, compassionate imagining as they enter the 
broader South African society of increasing diversity in terms of race, 
ethnicity, social class and religious sectarianism; to provide learners with 
an intellectual awareness of the causes and effects of structured inequalities 
and prejudicial exclusion in South African society; and to expand learners’ 
ability to think critically about controversial issues that stem from the 
gender, race, class, ethnic and religious differences that pervade our society. 
Nussbaum (2001:432) supports such a view when she claims: ‘Our pupils 
must learn to appreciate the diversity of circumstances in which human 
beings struggle for flourishing; this means, not just learning some facts 
about classes, races, nationalities, sexual orientations other than her own, 
but being drawn into those lives through the imagination, becoming a 
participant in those struggles’. In the next part of this chapter I shall deal 
with some of the principles I used in teaching a Philosophy of Education 
course for final-year Postgraduate Certificate in Education students at my 
institution, and which related to educating prospective educators about 
compassionate imagining. 
41
CHAPTER 2 • Democratic citizenship education through compassionate imagining
Educating prospective school educators about 
compassionate imagining 
Describing the method of data analysis for this discussion presents a bit 
of a challenge in that most of the data constructed involved my own 
self-reflective notes on classroom discussions and my reflexive reading 
of student journals and written assignments. In constructing data about 
prospective school educators’ pre-service training in Philosophy of 
Education, I asked myself important questions such as the following: How 
could students be led to inquire in new ways on issues of equity and redress, 
educational transformation, quality and equality in education, injustice, 
poverty, underdevelopment and unemployment in relation to practical 
(deliberative) reasoning and compassion? How would such issues affect 
students’ ensuing educational experiences in schools? How could I entice 
students to inquire into alternative ways of viewing teaching and learning 
in relation to compassionate imagining? My contention is that it would be 
difficult for learners (in schools) to learn about compassionate imagining 
if their educators are not appropriately skilled. As a university educator, 
I infused compassionate imagining into the Philosophy of Education 
course for final-year students about to become educators in schools. I now 
offer an account of this course (as taught during most of the late 2000s) 
and how its underlying principles suggest possibilities for educators to 
cultivate compassionate imagining as an instance of democratic citizenship 
education in South African public schools. From the beginning this course 
was informed by three decisions. The first was to put practical reasoning 
at the heart of the matter, which would awaken critical and independent 
thinking about values such as deliberative democracy, citizenship, equality 
and freedom, human rights, and socio-economic and political justice in 
relation to education in public schools. Students engaged in a lot of serious 
discussion of issues related to these themes. The clear focus of the course, its 
emphasis on lively debate and argumentation among students rather than 
simply the acquisition of facts, and deliberation on the above-mentioned 
themes in group discussions during which students report to the whole 
class all make this a reasonable course to elicit active critical engagement. 
The data students and I constructed from our journals and self-reflective 
notes were intended to help us learn about incidents in schools that struck 
42
EDUCATION, DEMOCRACY AND CITIZENSHIP REVISITED
us as troubling or exciting given our focus on practical reasoning and 
compassion. The questions we asked ourselves in classroom conversations 
became the lenses for analysing our data. We challenged each other to 
consider alternative interpretations for some incidents in South African 
schools on the basis of practical reasoning and compassion. We sought 
to understand through our reflexive notes and journals more about 
what was happening in the teaching and learning of students in schools. 
Some of the incidents on which we deliberated involved the prevalence 
of racism in some former Model C schools (schools formerly reserved 
for white students), withholding reports of students unable to pay their 
school fees, overcrowding of disadvantaged classrooms, non-appointment 
of teachers to vacant posts, as well as the apparent unpreparedness of 
teachers to implement the new curriculum and the accompanying new 
mode of assessment through Common Task Assessments (CTAs). Each of 
these aspects brought to the fore discussion among students in my class. 
In this way they did not only start questioning these incidents, but also 
themselves. Through my analysis of their stories, I realised what my own 
teaching role entailed and I came to dislike it in the sense that students 
were provided opportunities to explore their own thinking on incidents 
related to education in schools, but I was always in charge about the path 
they needed to follow. In a way I subjected their voices to mine, which of 
course undermines the discourse of practical reasoning I initially set out to 
cultivate in the classroom. However, as students began to find their own 
meaning of what practical reasoning is about, they somehow redirected our 
discussions in a way that would give voice to their thoughts and led them 
to be practical reasoners. Practical reasoning then was no longer about 
what I imagined, but what they found meaningful. On some occasions 
students directed our deliberations. They asserted their roles as practical 
reasoners as they caused me to take notice of their quest for deliberation 
and understanding of the incidents that transpired in schools.
The second decision was to focus on an area of diversity by selecting a non-
Western culture from among three African countries, namely Ethiopia, 
Kenya and Mozambique. Students had to raise critical issues about race, 
gender, ethnicity, social class and religious sectarianism. While critical 
discussion of cultural diversity in an African country enhanced students’ 
awareness of difference, it also ensured that they reflected dialectically on 
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the beliefs and practices of their own culture, while exploring a foreign 
culture. As I reflect on my teaching, I am vividly reminded of the complex 
discussions in class which centred on issues of race as they relate to public 
schooling. For instance, the class had read a newspaper article on racial 
conflict in an ex-Model C school. As we began to talk in class, I sensed a 
certain undercurrent that seemed resentful. Still, the discussions remained 
civil, if somewhat distant and academic. At one point, a student said that 
she understood the issues of racial discrimination, but could not see the 
need for equitable redress to continue specifically to establish conditions 
that would favour disadvantaged black learners. ‘When are they going to 
be equal to us (whites)?’ she asked. In order to push our thinking, I asked, 
‘Why do whites accept that black students and communities should be 
more advantaged than others?’ After the usual pause as students considered 
their options, one student offered her response, ‘Maybe because we (whites) 
haven’t begun to understand what it means to teach in a black township 
school’. This remark became a moment on which future discussions in the 
class would hinge. Some students contested why they should be teaching 
in black schools, while others felt it necessary to do so. It was interesting 
to note that for some students, dialogue about the issues of diversity and 
multiculturalism remained important, while for other students taking sides 
and airing uninterrogated opinion became part of the debates in class. Yet 
it was evident from their journals that all the students realised that every 
student has a responsibility to see that questions are raised and views are 
challenged. They understood their role as practical reasoners.
The third decision was to focus on a theme called ‘Poverty, famine and 
hunger’. Students learned to think about the relationship of poverty, 
hunger and famine to distress, undeserved misfortune, suffering, injustice, 
disability and disease on the African continent. They were also encouraged 
to teach after having qualified as teachers (educators) for at least a month 
at an African school, in countries such as Mozambique and Nigeria 
(which had been ravaged by civil war), Angola, the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Congo-Brazzaville, Sierra Leone and Burundi (in continuing 
turmoil), Rwanda (which suffered genocide), Ghana and Namibia (which 
had been subjected to liberation struggles with colonial powers), Ethiopia, 
Sudan and Somalia (which had experienced drought and famine). In this 
way, prospective educators would become obliged to encounter features 
44
EDUCATION, DEMOCRACY AND CITIZENSHIP REVISITED
of African life and one of their tasks should be to find ways to give voice 
to the suffering of people on the continent – a matter of listening to the 
voices of those who suffered the injustices perpetrated by the people who 
abused power and inflicted harm on the African continent. 
Our process of critical inquiry in relation to practical reasoning took a 
compassionate turn when students engaged in classroom discussions 
about the HIV and AIDS pandemic. Our discussions about the HIV and 
AIDS crisis in South African schools, particularly about many teachers 
being infected by the virus, brought to the surface of our deliberations 
unexamined issues that could be explored in relation to education. The 
data from students’ journals validated the view that the classroom should 
not only be a place where arguments are articulated in justifiable fashion – 
in this instance about the do’s and don’ts in relation to HIV and AIDS – 
but that we should begin to cultivate in ourselves a sense of ‘humanity’ 
(Nussbaum, 1997). This means nurturing within ourselves a concern for 
the other who might be experiencing a vulnerability such as the HIV and 
AIDS, perhaps through no fault of their own. When education institutions 
become intensely concerned about what Nussbaum (2001:403) refers to 
as ‘tragic predicaments and their prevention’ vis-à-vis HIV and AIDS 
in the country, such institutions embody compassion, since they rely 
on compassionate learners and educators to keep alive the essential 
concern to attend to the well-being of others – a matter of balancing 
their responsibilities and emotions. As one student wrote in her journal: 
‘Our community service as in-service teachers should be about finding 
imaginative and compassionate ways of serving the vulnerable people; 
those people suffering from hunger, poverty, unemployment, and HIV 
and AIDS’.
In summary of this section, our deliberations in the Philosophy of 
Education classroom are not over. In writing this chapter, I have realised 
that my exploration into practical reasoning and compassion is only 
beginning and that there is more to learn. A clear limitation of this work is 
to imagine what it means for pre-service or prospective educators in their 
final year of study, with little or no teaching experience, to go forth and 
implement practical reasoning and compassion in their own classrooms. 
Perhaps herein also lies the strength of this work: in particular exploring 
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the implications of practical reasoning and compassion in relation to a 
dominant outcomes-based education discourse in public schools, which in 
many ways prohibits creative and imaginative thought, since it lends itself to 
instrumentally justifiable manipulation and control (Waghid, 2003:245). 
Thus far I have argued that democratic citizenship education would most 
appropriately work in schools and universities if deliberative engagements 
among human beings are lived out belligerently yet compassionately  – 
that is, if these practices are not incommensurate, and in fact deepen the 
enactment of democratic citizenship education. Once again, with reference 
to the unfair dismissal of the madrassah pupils, we should have deliberated 
quite belligerently the decision to deny pupils access to the madrassah and 
we could have done so with profound compassionate imagining. Only if we 
were more compassionate towards the vulnerabilities of young madrassah 
pupils, proffering arguments as to why they should not have left the Muslim 
school, we might have sown the seeds of democratic citizenship education 
at a time in South Africa’s history when it was most needed. But of course 
we did not do so (and instead humiliated the pupils) and I would attribute 
this insensitive act to a lack of friendship amongst the staff members of the 
madrassah. This brings me to a discussion of friendship as human agency 
in the cultivation of democratic citizenship education in institutions. 
CHAPTER
3 Democratic citizenship education through friendship
49
CHAPTER 3 • Democratic citizenship education through friendship
Unfriendly supervision 
Considering the fact that I completed most of my postgraduate studies 
on a part-time basis (because I was a full-time teacher in a public school 
quite far from the university where I studied), I was privileged in my 
early thirties to have enrolled as a doctoral candidate in Philosophy of 
Education. I  was even more fortunate when the university decided to 
appoint three supervisors for my studies, primarily because of my interest in 
Philosophy of Education and Islamic conceptions of knowledge. I thought 
that I had been assigned some of the leading supervisors in the country 
as a consequence of their specific research interests – two philosophers of 
education and one Islamic scholar. What I did not know, was that, with 
them, I would experience some of the most unfriendly encounters during 
my three years of studies. This is not a diatribe against my supervisors. 
I wish only to point out moments of unfriendliness that surfaced during 
my studies: one of my supervisors took six months to give me feedback 
on a chapter (I was constantly told how busy this person was); another 
read my chapters and simply dismissed my work by scribbling on a page 
in the text, ‘I am stopping here’ (meaning ‘I have had enough and do not 
intend to read further’); and one supervisor met with me frequently, but 
seldom introduced me to the rigorous texts which I now continuously 
explore in Philosophy of Education. Despite the aforementioned blind 
spots during my supervision, I have to admit that I was supported by 
at least one supervisor who applied for a study grant on my behalf, 
offered me work as a tutor to supplement my monthly income, and even 
encouraged me to present a paper at a local conference and to publish my 
work. In fact, this supervisor took care in supervising me and commented 
painstakingly and meticulously on my work. But it is the unfriendly 
encounters which I wish to explore in relation to Nancy Sherman’s (1997) 
and Jacques Derrida’s (1997a) seminal contributions on friendship. I shall 
show how both Sherman’s and Derrida’s ideas of friendship can be used to 
nurture teaching and learning which involve taking risks. My argument in 
defence of taking risks through friendships is hopefully a move away from 
fostering deliberative democratic interactions among teachers and students 
which could potentially ignore forms of action that involve challenging, 
undermining and disagreeing with one’s friends.
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Friendship and mutuality 
Nancy Sherman’s (1997) Aristotelian account of friendship seems to 
be more compelling in developing forms of teaching and learning that 
connect plausibly with democratic citizenship education. Firstly, Sherman 
claims that friendship can take the form of mutual attachment – a matter 
of doing things together – where both teachers and students demonstrate 
a willingness to give priority to one another in terms of time and resources. 
In other words, when teaching and learning take place, teachers and 
students avoid being dismissive of one another, that is, they listen with 
interest and appreciation to one another. In this way, the possibility is 
enhanced that they correct one another and learn from the strengths 
and wisdom of one another in an atmosphere of trust, goodwill and 
mutual benefit (Sherman,  1997:206-207). When students and teachers 
attend to one another with interest and appreciation in an atmosphere 
of non-dismissiveness, they care for one another in such a way that 
their potentialities are developed. For instance, when students produce 
arguments, they are not afraid of being corrected by teachers and other 
students. They are also not concerned that their judgements will be 
dismissed by teachers. This situation gives rise to critical learning for the 
reason that students’ judgements are attended to and reflected upon with 
interest and, in turn, students have to give an account of their reasons, 
which will invariably be taken into systematic controversy by teachers and 
fellow students. In a different way, I find that my students become more 
critical if I become attached to them – that is, if I listen to their views with 
interest, appreciation and care. In turn, students expect to be corrected if 
their reasons cannot be justified. In this way, friendship is nurtured and 
the possibility of attending to the reasons of students in an atmosphere of 
respect and sharing becomes very important. 
Secondly, Sherman (1997:208) argues that friendship entails that people 
become mutually attuned to one another. In other words, they relax their 
boundaries and become stimulated by one another through argument. 
When students and teachers engage in argumentation on the basis that 
they relax their boundaries it seems rather unlikely that their deliberations 
would result in hostile antagonism and conflicts which could potentially 
thwart their dialogical engagement. However, my potential critic might 
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quite correctly claim that deliberative argumentation favours those 
students who are eloquent and that not all students could articulate 
their views in defence. I agree, and for this reason I want to complement 
Sherman’s idea of mutual attunement with Iris Marion Young’s  (1996) 
idea of listening to the stories of others (an idea developed in the previous 
chapter), irrespective of whether these narratives are recounted in ways 
that do not attend to strict rules of argumentation. If teachers do so, the 
possibility of mutual attunement would further be enhanced. Failing to 
create spaces for inarticulate, non-eloquent voices would not only exclude 
legitimate student voices from learning activities, but would also truncate 
critical learning – to openly and fairly evaluate the reasons of others, while 
at the same time showing respect for others’ points of view, no matter how 
inarticulate these might be. I cannot imagine students becoming critical if 
they are prematurely excluded from learning on the grounds that they lack 
certain levels of articulation.
Thirdly, Sherman’s idea of mutual action (1997:212) that will occur among 
teachers and students is in some ways linked to Hannah Arendt’s (1998) 
notion of initiating students into new ways of doing. This means that 
when teachers teach, they initiate students into new understandings and 
meanings not perhaps thought of before. Similarly, when students learn, 
they (de) construct meanings in ways that open up new possibilities for 
their learning. In this way, teaching and learning is continuous, because 
every initiative teachers and learners take is considered as opening up 
possibilities to see things anew – that is, meanings are always in rendering 
the outcomes of education inconclusive. What follows from such a view 
of teaching and learning is that the outcomes of education are always 
incomplete and the possibility of something new arising always seems 
to be there. Such a form of mutual action would give much hope for 
critical learning, on the basis that such learning is connected to something 
new arising. 
Sherman’s idea of friendship as mutuality would invariably sustain 
democratic citizenship education, more specifically teaching and learning, 
for the reason that democratic citizenship education has in mind that 
teachers and students connect with one another, engage deliberatively 
through argument and narrative, and (de) construct meanings which 
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are always inconclusive. However, such an account of friendship is not 
sufficient to ensure that teaching and learning remain critical. Why not? 
Mutual attachment can have the effect that teachers and students listen 
with interest and appreciation to one another; mutual attunement can 
create possibilities for deliberative engagement; and mutual action can 
ensure that the outcomes of education are inconclusive and the products 
of new initiatives. Yet, such forms of mutuality are not sufficient to ensure 
that teaching and learning is ongoing in the sense that new possibilities 
that can sustain criticality are opened up. For instance, when students 
learn to analyse, evaluate and modify arguments and judgements, the 
possibility exists that they abandon previously held preferences, opinions 
and views, and the desire to explore alternatives even if it means taking 
undue risks. Likewise, when teachers teach, they do not merely restrict 
their teaching to the achievement of expected or perhaps unexpected 
outcomes. This would mark the end of education, because teachers have 
not ventured far enough in pursuit of the unintended or the lucky find – 
that is, they have not taken sufficient risks and have thus limited their 
explorations. Such a situation in turn would also limit friendship, because 
it cannot last unless teachers have confidence in their students – friends – to 
take risks without knowing in advance what the outcomes might be – that 
is, without necessarily expecting something positive in return. It is for this 
reason that I am also attracted to the views of Jacques Derrida (1997a), 
who develops a conception of friendship which can positively contribute 
towards addressing some of the limitations of mutuality – in particular 
encouraging students to take risks. 
Towards a politics of friendship 
I shall now extend the idea of friendship as mutuality to a friendship of 
‘love’, as found in the seminal thoughts of Derrida. Derrida (1997a) raises 
the question of the positive contribution friendship can make in dialogue 
with others. For him, friendship is the act of loving (philia), rather than 
letting oneself be loved or being loved – what he refers to as ‘inducing 
love’ (Derrida, 1997a:8). Of course, it is possible that one can be loved 
without knowing it. But it is impossible to love without knowing it. 
Derrida (1997a:9) makes the claim that ‘the friend is the person who loves 
(and declares his or her love) before being the person who is loved’. And, 
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if one thinks friendship, one is to start with the ‘friend-who-loves’ not 
with the ‘friend-who-is-loved’ (Derrida,  1997a:9). Thus, when teachers 
and students regard themselves as friends, they willingly declare their love 
to one another to ‘the limit of its possibility’ (Derrida, 1997a:12). I feel 
myself loving my students when I care for them in a way that evokes their 
potentialities in order that they come up with possibilities that I might 
not even have thought of. Without being affectionate towards them, 
I cultivate in them the capacity to reach their own justifiable conclusions 
to which they are to be held accountable by and to others – referred to by 
MacIntyre (1999:83) as the ability to evaluate, modify or reject their own 
practical judgements. Only then can I consider myself to be a ‘friend-who-
loves’, since I do not expect being loved in return; that is, when students 
reach their own justifiable conclusions about educational issues, they do 
so without having to please me – without loving me in return. Similarly, 
when students come up with sufficiently good reasons for acting and 
imagining alternative possibilities so as to be able to re-educate themselves 
rationally about educational issues without having to please me, they can 
be said to be ‘friends-who-love’. It is this idea of friendship that can go 
some way towards achieving critical learning. 
Why? If I teach students, then I must first declare myself a ‘friend-who-
loves’, since I would not desire to be loved in return. Erich Fromm, in The Art 
of Loving, describes such a loving relationship as an attitude, an orientation 
of character, which determines the relatedness of a person to others in the 
context in which they find themselves (Fromm, 1957:36). In other words, 
loving relationships are ‘brotherly’ (sisterly) because they invoke a sense 
of responsibility, care and respect towards others (Fromm, 1957:37). This 
would imply that, as the teacher, I should create conditions where students 
learn authentically, which requires that the following moves be put in place: 
encouraging students to imagine situations in and beyond the parameters 
of their research interests, where things would be better – that is, to be 
caring towards students; democratising our interactions so that students 
can take the initiative to imagine possibilities not otherwise thought of – 
that is, to be responsible towards students; and connecting with students’ 
storytelling with the aim to discovering untapped possibilities – that is, 
to be respectful towards students. So, a teacher does not only connect 
with students, deliberate with them, and nurture activities in ways where 
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the outcomes are unintended, but also establishes possibilities whereby 
students can come up with meanings which they (the teachers) might not 
have expected. In other words, through their teaching, the possibility exists 
for students to come up with defensible meanings, irrespective of what 
their teachers might want. In order for this to happen, students should be 
encouraged to take risks (as teachers’ friends), because taking risks involves 
venturing into the unknown and unexpected and from which unforeseen 
possibilities might arise. So, teachers who ‘love’ their students as friends are 
concerned that learning should result in unimagined possibilities – ways of 
doing that teachers had not perhaps thought of before, nor expect students 
to come up with. For instance, this could happen when a student learns 
that the unexpected can be expected, that is, that he or she is capable of 
performing what is ‘infinitely improbable’ (Arendt, 1998:178). In doing 
so, a student not only announces what he or she does, has done and intends 
to do, but also seeks to do the unexpected (Arendt, 1998:179). One way 
of ensuring that one acts without knowing what to expect, can be to stand 
back or detach oneself from one’s own reasons and to ask if others’ reasons 
are in fact justifiable or not. One would not know what to expect if one sets 
out to evaluate, for instance, what one considers as master texts. And when 
one evaluates these texts (through engaging in systematic controversy with 
them), one would invariably set out to revise one’s own reasons, or abandon 
them, or replace them with other unexpected reasons (MacIntyre, 1999:91). 
In this way, one detaches oneself from one’s own reasons to revise or 
abandon them in the light of what others with whom one engages – in this 
case, the authors of texts – have to say. MacIntyre (1999:96) argues that we 
come to know when we are able not just to evaluate our reasons as better 
or worse, but also when we detach ourselves from the immediacy of our 
own desires in order to ‘imagine alternative realistic futures’ which might 
give rise to unexpected results. This implies that it would be inconceivable 
to read texts as master works which should not be engaged with and not 
to stand back from one’s rational judgements about one’s understanding of 
these texts. Detaching oneself from one’s own reasons in relation to one’s 
evaluation of texts suggests that these texts cannot be treated uncritically 
and uncontroversially. The mere fact that one acts through evaluation and 
detachment brings into question the underlying assumptions of texts that 
one reads and analyses. Only then can the unexpected be anticipated, 
which suggests than only then is one acting – and learning. 
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Thus far, I have argued that critical teaching and learning can best be achieved 
by means of mutuality and love – more specifically complementary forms 
of friendship. These forms of friendship have in mind what democratic 
citizenship education sets out to achieve: taking risks to cultivate sharing, 
deliberative engagement and the recognition that others’ rights have to be 
respected. I shall now explore how such a notion of friendship can bring 
about democratic justice in relation to teaching and learning. 
Democratic justice – a valuable ‘good’ of friendship
Amy Gutmann (2003) gives a compelling account of democratic justice 
which I argue can be achieved through friendship in teaching and learning. 
For Gutmann (2003:26-27), democratic justice involves three interrelated 
aspects: the capacity to live one’s own life as one sees fit, consistent with 
respecting equal freedoms of others – ‘to treat all individuals as equal 
agents’; the capacity to contribute to the justice of one’s society and one’s 
world; and the capacity of individuals to live a decent life with a fair chance 
of choosing among their preferred ways of living. Firstly, if one learns to 
respect the liberties of others as being equally as important as one’s own, 
then one recognises that others have similar freedoms to live their lives 
according to how they see fit. So, when South African students are taught 
to respect the freedoms of other students (say from their neighbouring 
countries or from communities that are different from their own), they do 
not become agitated when others present points of view perhaps different 
from theirs – they respect the views of others. However, this does not 
mean that they necessarily agree with everything others have to say. They 
also have the right to question, undermine and refute the judgements of 
others. At least the possibility of learning is there when students begin 
to scrutinise one another’s views critically in an atmosphere of mutual 
respect for one another’s different or at times conflicting judgements. 
When students respect one another equally, they are said to be critical, 
because criticality demands that we give due consideration to the views of 
others. A group of students once came to me to express their inability to 
grasp some of the key concepts in Philosophy of Education. When I told 
the other students about this in the classroom, they became agitated with 
the group (not necessarily homogeneous in terms of race and culture), 
because they claimed that these students had no legitimate grounds to 
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claim ignorance of the subject. I felt the majority of students were wrong 
to be dismissive of the group, because one aspect of critical learning is that 
we begin to connect with students who might encounter some difficulty 
in getting to understand aspects of the course – a matter of nurturing 
friendships. In this regard, equally respecting the rights of others in order 
to gain some understanding of what appear to be concepts that are difficult 
to grasp amounts to recognising that others have a legitimate voice that 
needs to be heard. Only then would the possibility of critical learning 
be enhanced. In this way, learning to recognise the different and often 
conflicting judgements of others seems to be a way in which to maximise 
critical learning. This is so because critical learning has some connection 
with considering the merit of the conflicting views of others – that is, 
whether these views make sense. 
Secondly, to learn how to contribute to the justice of one’s society and the 
world has some connection with critical learning. I remember a student 
who remarked that living in poverty is a choice which some people prefer 
to exercise. (This student specifically referred to the majority of blacks who 
live in squalor and abject poverty in informal settlements, better known 
as squatter camps in South Africa.) If the student means that some people 
are poor and therefore have little choice to determine where they live, then 
I agree with him. And, if he means (and I presume this is the case) that some 
people are poor and cannot afford to improve their living conditions, I also 
agree. But if he means that we should not be doing something (whether 
through protests or other means) about improving their precarious living 
conditions, then I disagree. In other words, one cannot claim to be a 
critical learner if one’s learning does not result in some form of action 
that could contribute to the achievement of democratic justice. I cannot 
imagine how students could be critical if their learning does not cause 
them to act anew – they need to act with a sense of justice to others. 
Likewise, students cannot be critical if their learning does not contribute 
towards their advocating for a just world – for instance, the reduction of 
extreme and unacceptable levels of poverty on the African continent or the 
eradication of high levels of political dictatorships and corruption. This 
does not mean that they merely call for recognition and respect of others’ 
rights (whether civil, political or social) within a critical learning agenda. 
Instead, they also stress the importance of taking responsibility for the 
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rights of others – a matter of taking others’ rights seriously or ‘accepting 
appropriate responsibility for the rights of others, not just making a fuss 
about our own’ (Callan, 1997:73). For instance, people who champion 
the right to employment in South Africa, also consider as important the 
cause of others to take responsibility to meet the needs of those who are 
jobless. Such an understanding of justice could potentially extend the 
mere recognition of, and respect for, others’ rights to a position where we 
assume appropriate responsibility for the rights of others as friends. 
Thirdly, to learn what it means to be decent or civil (to be democratically 
just) has some connection to being critical. To show civility involves 
demonstrating what Stephen Macedo (1990) refers to as a sense of  ‘public-
spiritedness’ – that is, demonstrating a conscious awareness of others and 
recognising that they have to be respected on account of their difference. 
In South African university classrooms, there are students from various 
cultural backgrounds, and when these students demonstrate civility, they 
connect with one another’s stories. They are acutely aware of one another’s 
differences and through their ‘public-spiritedness’ collectively share the 
stories of their lives. That is, they are critical. However, encountering 
one another’s differences does not mean that one merely listens to what 
others have to say without subjecting the truth of their claims to critical 
scrutiny. These students also question one another’s stories with the aim 
of gaining a deeper understanding of the texts of their lived experiences. 
I recall one student in my Philosophy of Education class who questioned 
another student’s bias towards Muslims in general. One student claimed 
that Muslims are bigots, whereas another student disagreed with this 
view on the basis that she lived in a Muslim country and her experience 
was that Muslims are generally moderate and respectful towards others 
(like herself ) who have different cultural backgrounds. The point I am 
making is that questioning and undermining the views of others does not 
necessarily mean that one is disrespectful towards others. Rather, critically 
questioning people’s unjustifiable assumptions about others is to treat 
them with honour, that is, not considering the unjustifiable views of others 
as ‘beyond the pale of critical judgement’ (Fay, 1996). In this way, one 
demonstrates a sense of decency (civility) – one is democratically just and 
therefore critical. 
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In essence, when students learn about democratic justice, they learn to 
recognise equally the freedoms of others, to contribute towards private and 
public justice, and to be decent. In this way, they learn to be critical, because 
criticality is linked to the realisation of a democratically just society on the 
grounds of having been exposed beforehand to texts which may enhance 
the possibility of achieving democratic justice. And, considering that 
the achievement of democratic justice can be enhanced through people 
deliberating together, taking risks and moving towards the unimagined, 
their friendships might stand a better chance of being sustained. 
CHAPTER
4 Democratic citizenship education through respect and forgiveness
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Forgiveness as a prerequisite for friendship 
The cultivation of friendship does not just suddenly happen. Friendships are 
nurtured over time as friends learn to experience one another in mutuality 
and as they endeavour to take risks. Yet, friendships do not emerge without 
conditions, although the friendship in itself should be unconditional. 
Here I wish to tell my story about the unconditional friendship I have 
been experiencing since joining the institution where I work in my late 
thirties. I narrate this story to illustrate how my unconditional friendships 
with colleagues in the faculty had to be determined by the prerequisite 
of forgiveness. On joining the faculty in the late 1990s, I  was soon 
reminded by one of the senior academics about the uncertain nature of 
my appointment as Director of the Centre for Education Development 
(CENEDUS or SENOUS): ‘This is a grand job,’ he said sarcastically, 
‘where you have to raise funds to secure your own employment.’ I said to 
myself that this was rather an odd welcome to the faculty.2 During that 
same morning (my first week at the institution) the chair of SENOUS’s 
governing body accompanied me to the faculty staff room to introduce 
this new appointee (with a PhD from a different university) to faculty 
members. At that time, two other black colleagues had also recently 
joined the faculty in junior positions. While we were preparing ourselves 
to be introduced to our new colleagues, we heard one of the white male 
academics remark: ‘Is this a foreign invasion or a state coup?’ We were 
stunned and immediately felt unwanted in the faculty (although most of 
the senior staff were very accommodating). The white colleague who so 
flippantly dismissed us was to occupy an office next to mine when I joined 
one of the departments (of four) in the faculty after a highly productive 
six months’ stint at SENOUS, during which I managed to publish two 
journal articles – a feat welcomed by the then dean of the faculty. 
Two years after my appointment as a senior lecturer in the faculty, 
I applied for an ad hominem associate professorship, which I got to the 
2 Although CENEDUS was situated in the faculty, its staff members participated in development 
projects and the work of the director was to administer project activities at a cost which would 
secure funding for the Centre’s sustainability. My position was a contract of three years with the 
possibility of an extension. CENEDUS’s budget was included in, but not determined by, the 
faculty’s budget. 
62
EDUCATION, DEMOCRACY AND CITIZENSHIP REVISITED
disappointment (or perhaps surprise) of some of my white colleagues 
in the faculty – not because it was their view that I did not deserve the 
promotion, but rather because some of them had been in the faculty for 
years and still occupied lower positions. Of course, my promotion could 
not have been an affirmative action initiative, because my academic record 
matched or even surpassed that of some of my senior colleagues. This 
promotion happened just after I had been constantly reminded by one of 
my white colleagues (who retired as a senior lecturer) about how difficult 
it was to gain promotion. My professorship came within a year when 
I had to apply for the position vacated by my mentor (a white man) in the 
department. I still attribute much of my growth and establishment in the 
faculty to the previous dean (a white man). At least, there were some white 
professors in the faculty who encouraged and supported me, and to whom 
I remain indebted. Despite the support of some colleagues, there were 
those who continuously reminded me how junior I really was and that 
I did apparently not know much about academic publishing – this at a time 
when my publications record surpassed those of all staff members in the 
faculty. Just before my promotion, I had a serious discussion with the dean 
about what I needed to do to gain promotion. After he informed me about 
the requirements for a senior academic position (perhaps he was telling me 
then that promotion would be premature for me), I felt greatly disheartened, 
because having perused most of my colleagues’ academic records, I knew 
that, comparatively  speaking, I  warranted promotion.Then I  lost my 
composure momentarily and asked: ‘Must a black person produce ten 
times more than his white colleagues to gain promotion?’ What I admired 
about him, was that he did not show any sign of resentment towards my 
outburst, nor did he later begrudge me for being so bold in his office (the 
same one I now occupy). In a way, I forgave him then for having done so 
much for me at the time. 
But my forgiveness was short-lived. On applying for the Rector’s Award 
for Excellent Research, I was told that my white colleague deserved it 
above me. This was a great disappointment, because as a black person 
I knew I was being watched with hawkish eyes by some of my colleagues, 
who I thought perhaps wanted to see a black person failing. I thought that 
nepotism was rife in the faculty, yet I did not become discouraged. I knew 
I had to forgive again, because my presence in the faculty was a calling and 
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I had to be here to be an instrument for transformation – transformation 
in the sense that black academics could not be looked upon as being 
incompetent and not deserving of higher academic appointments. For 
some years before my appointment as dean, I constantly pushed myself 
to ‘perform’, because the only way I thought I would prove to my white 
colleagues that I deserved to be in the faculty was to enhance my research 
outputs. Of course ‘performance’ was measured mostly against the quantity 
of research papers one produces. In hindsight such performativity, that 
of counting the quantity of journal articles, is not quite what I would 
encourage, because churning out publications (not that one should be 
unproductive), without having a longer intellectual project in mind, would 
in any case be a senseless, uneducative academic experience. One should 
rather work extensively on monographs or books than concern oneself 
with short pieces of writing that lack coherence and academic rigour. But 
let me continue narrating my journey of forgiveness. 
Becoming chair of the academic department a year after my professorship 
was, to me, some achievement – not only because of having been appointed 
as the first black professor in the faculty for almost one hundred years, but 
also because I was nominated as the first black chair in the faculty. The 
nomination here is important to note, because your colleagues ask you 
to represent them at faculty level. You also had to provide the academic 
leadership, which I did. This was fairly easy, because I was working in an 
academic department whose performance indicators were not what they 
should have been. Now that I occupy the deanship (the first black dean 
of education in the university ever), I have become acutely aware of the 
challenges to transformation in my institution. My (white) colleagues 
are extremely courteous – I have not encountered a blatant dismissal of 
my presence since my first visit to the faculty staff room and the above-
mentioned incident with one of my colleagues. But this should not be 
interpreted as an indication of approval – I know they would have preferred 
a white man (not necessarily woman) to have been in the deanship. But 
the university should be commended for having taken a meritorious 
decision in appointing what many considered as a deserving candidate for 
the position at the time (a position which I am happy to serve for only one 
term of five years). 
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For a black dean to draw on the support of his colleagues is a rather 
challenging task in this context. One cannot alienate oneself from others. 
Neither can one work with one’s black colleagues only, for that matter. 
I have made many friends in the faculty and have seldom encountered 
fierce resistance. This situation I would attribute to my (mostly) 
non-confrontational attitude towards staff. I say ‘mostly’, because during 
academic discussions I would be very belligerent (as my colleagues have 
come to know me), but I realised that robust confrontation would not be 
apposite for sustainable relationships in the faculty. This way of constantly 
‘keeping oneself in check’ is tantamount to a form of forgiveness which 
is an acknowledgement that one respects the ways of others (in this case, 
mostly my white colleagues), which might not always be consistent with 
the unkindness encountered during academic deliberations. Yet, this does 
not mean that my colleagues and I could do and say whatever we wanted to. 
Often, ill-conceived views are still challenged during sometimes unpleasant 
meetings. Often, during faculty board meetings, I observe some degree of 
irritation amongst my white colleagues when some black staff members 
articulate their views vigorously. I can understand this, because these 
black colleagues are used to the kind of anti-apartheid liberatory politics 
whereby, for instance, people have learnt to speak their minds regardless of 
whether their views might be distasteful to others. After more than three 
years as chair of the faculty board, I have also witnessed some conciliatory 
attitudes on the part of my white colleagues. For instance, the faculty 
board overwhelmingly supported the re-nomination of a black vice-dean, 
which indicates that people can think beyond colour in the faculty. In a 
way, I sense a kind of mutual respect that black and white colleagues have 
developed for one another. Let me now move on to a discussion of respect 
for persons, which I infer (from relations amongst staff in the faculty) 
ought to be a prerequisite for forgiveness.
Respect for persons, and forgiveness
What is it about ‘respect for persons’ that can engender defensible dialogues 
and subsequently establish conditions favourable for forgiveness? In the 
first instance, in a dialogue every participant wants to be recognised as 
someone with the same basic moral worth as another participant – that is, 
a person has something to say and wants to be heard. In other words, in 
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a dialogue people want to be seen as co-participants who share authority 
to determine how the dialogue ought to unfold. (This is what I encounter 
during meetings with the faculty executive.) This then requires participants 
in the dialogue to be prepared and willing to listen to what somebody else 
has to say. In short, every person wants to be respected for her worth – for 
the contribution she can make to the dialogue. Weale  (1985:28) notes 
three ideas of respect: 
The first is that persons have goals and purposes in their lives that 
are meaningful to them (they can contribute meaningfully to a 
dialogue). The second is that persons are capable of reflecting 
upon their circumstances and act on reasons that derive from these 
reflections. The third is that the goals that give meaning to people’s 
lives are the product of their self-reflection, so that their goals are 
in part self-chosen, and derive a portion of their value from that 
fact. Respect for persons therefore involves the claim that persons 
should be allowed to act on their own conception of what is good 
and valuable for them, and that in so far as they are doing this they 
are expressing their natures as rational and reflective beings. 
The point is, when people engage in a dialogue they show respect for one 
another when they allow one another to express themselves rationally 
– they are permitted to articulate meanings. In other words, as co-
participants they respect one another as equals; this respect implying that 
each person recognises others as capable and competent to articulate what 
they have in mind. The upshot of this is that people show respect for one 
another when they consider their judgements to have value, because these 
judgements are the expressions of how people have chosen to make sense 
to others – to make others know what they think and reflect on. This is 
certainly what unfolds in faculty board meetings – people are persuaded 
that others’ judgements ‘have value’ and are of interest to the faculty’s 
decisions and initiatives. 
The point about respecting people in a dialogue, is that every human being 
is considered by another as a source of value. This does not only mean that 
people have something to say, but more importantly, as pointed out by 
Hill (2000:77-80), that firstly, persons are capable of reflecting on their 
desires, setting their own ends, and rationally pursuing some means to 
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an end. This can only happen if they are allowed space and opportunity 
and even aided, to some extent, provided their means and ends are 
compatible with due respect to others. Secondly, people respect others as 
moral agents when they recognise others to reciprocate the moral standing 
they have imputed to others; that is, they recognise that others should 
not be ‘written off’ as creatures who can only respond to power, bribery 
and manipulation. Thirdly, respect for people involves considering them as 
particular individuals, whose identity is bound up with particular projects, 
personal attachments, and traditions. Fourthly, to respect is also to criticise 
if necessary; and finally, to respect means to appreciate the different values 
others have found in their groups. Thus, in a dialogue, if people are not 
recognised for having something worthwhile to say (that is, rationally), 
being excluded on account of their difference, and allowed to get away with 
unsubstantiated claims without being criticised or taken into systematic 
controversy, ‘respect for persons’ would no longer exist and by implication 
the dialogue will be short-lived. 
Respect and university classroom encounters
This brings me to the question: What seems to be a reasonable and 
respectful attitude to take in a (South African) university classroom 
dialogue? Firstly, our culturally diverse student population requires that 
both university teachers and students make an effort to understand and 
appreciate (as far as they can) features of their cultures that they cherish 
and deem to be important to their particular identity (for instance, through 
their literature, histories and folklore, and with the help of teachers who 
themselves might represent a particular cultural heritage). Nowadays 
it is not uncommon to find Xhosas, Zulus, Sothos, white Afrikaners, 
coloureds, Indians and English-speaking whites in the same university 
classroom. It would be respectful if students and teachers from these 
groups were to become informed about one another’s cultures: ‘Respect 
is blind if uninformed about relevant values and the reasons they provide; 
and it inevitably remains uninformed if nothing shakes us from our habits 
of seeing everything exclusively from our primary cultures’ perspective’ 
(Hill, 2000:83). 
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Secondly, respect calls us to confront our biases, to judge by comparing 
with our familiar patterns, to curb our arrogant bias towards others whom 
we hardly understand. That is, we require openness in confronting other 
cultures and in curbing our moral arrogance – after all, no single group 
can warrant confidence that it possesses the best, or most humane and just, 
moral system (Hill, 2000:83). Here I specifically think of majority groups 
from perhaps the same culture (say whites) in my university classroom, who 
often seem to alienate other minority (coloured) students – they hardly talk 
to one another. Some of these students even at times create the impression 
that others (coloureds) should be very grateful to study at a former white 
Afrikaner institution. Anecdotally speaking, I recall my encounter with 
a white colleague in the faculty corridors, when he equated some of my 
black colleagues’ presence in the institution with that of a ‘technician’ 
who has to repair the photocopying machine – such an attitude seems to 
be deeply dismissive of certain ‘classes’ of human beings and needs to be 
rejected. The point I am making, is that we can only show respect when 
we curb our moral arrogance – that is, stop looking at ourselves (as some 
white students and colleagues at my institution perhaps do) as being more 
privileged than others. Only then will dialogues in multicultural university 
classrooms begin to take a more critical, legitimate and democratic turn. 
Thirdly, respect demands that we listen appreciatively to the victims of 
apartheid. Some students in one of my postgraduate classes were given 
the opportunity to share with others some of their stories. What we heard 
from students mostly related to ‘deficiencies’ in South African society 
and how these adversely affected education in schools – most students 
were in-service teachers. What we heard mostly involved what South 
African civil society on the whole seems to grapple with in the domain of 
education – inequalities in schools;3 black students being ‘told’ that they 
3 Previously advantaged white schools remain privileged in terms of material and human resources – 
these schools can access substantial finances and can employ additional teachers in governing 
body posts in order to cope with overcrowded classes (disadvantaged black schools have teacher-
learner ratios of 1:90 and 1:70 in comparison with white schools with ratios of 1:25 or 1:40). 
White schools have superior teaching aids, more qualified teachers, and well-equipped classrooms 
and sports fields. 
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are unable to think theoretically and rigorously;4 racism in universities 
and schools;5 unemployment of thousands of school leavers; the obsession 
of school bureaucrats with the idea that education should meet national 
economic and technical needs;6 dominance of the transmission mode of 
teaching in schools, despite the fact that the new curriculum demands 
that critical students be ‘produced’; insecurity (gangsterism and drug 
trafficking) at some schools which threatens learners and neighbourhoods; 
and the continuous humiliation suffered by those who remain marginalised 
(especially women) and poor, and who live mostly in informal settlements. 
The point I am making, is that our dialogical interaction in relation to 
education in South Africa has engendered a sense of reflection, opening 
up to one another what Maxine Greene  (1995:116) calls ‘the texts of 
our lived lives’. In this way, by listening to the stories of those who were 
disadvantaged by apartheid education in one way or another, we (students 
and I, white and black) aroused one another’s interest. Likewise, we also 
heard some of the banal excuses of some white students who had been 
advantaged by apartheid education, claiming that they (in particular their 
white parents) were influenced by the rhetorical political views of the racist 
government. In other words, respect requires listening to many voices we 
like or dislike and deplore – that is, listening through active engagement.
Fourthly, in seeking to achieve respect, for instance, in the face of 
disagreement, we need to attend to the way people hold or express 
positions. For example, the way in which opponents should treat each 
other with regard to education policy issues, even when the policy debate 
ends in legislation and the state takes a position favouring one side of the 
dispute, needs to be grounded in principles constituting respect. In this 
4 Sometimes I hear colleagues in my own department speaking about how difficult it is for black 
students to articulate points of view or formulate arguments.
5 Although some changes have occurred in the demographic profiles of universities and schools 
since 1994, there are still institutions where prejudices and biases towards black, coloured and 
Indian students are unacceptably deeply rooted. 
6 Most of the students in the postgraduate class voiced their frustration with departmental officials 
(subject advisers and circuit school managers) about the uncritical implementation of South 
Africa’s outcomes-based education (OBE) curriculum. Teachers are not encouraged to engage 
critically with OBE and its assessment criteria. They slavishly have to make sure that marks are 
recorded and paperwork completed for external departmental moderations by school managers 
and subject advisers.
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regard it is worth referring to Gutmann and Thompson (1990:76), who 
claim the following:
Like toleration, mutual respect is a form of agreeing to disagree. 
But mutual respect demands more than toleration. It requires a 
favourable attitude, and constructive interaction with, the persons 
with whom one disagrees. It consists in a reciprocal positive regard 
of citizens who manifest the excellence of character that permits 
a democracy to flourish in the face of (at least temporarily) 
irresolvable moral conflict. 
In other words, respect should not merely be an unconditional acceptance 
of everything people say or propose – people should agree to disagree. 
University academics who support the government’s education policies 
do not show respect for politicians by simply accepting everything they 
say; politicians do not show respect for university academics merely by 
appointing them to serve on review committees. Fay  (1996:239) makes 
the following point about respect:
Respect demands that we hold others to the intellectual and 
moral standards we apply to our friends and ourselves. Excusing 
others from demands of intellectual rigor and honesty or moral 
sensitivity and wisdom on the grounds that everyone is entitled 
to his or her opinion no matter how ill-informed or ungrounded, 
or – worse – on the grounds that others need not or cannot live 
up to these demands, is to treat them with contempt. We honor 
others by challenging them when we think they are wrong, and 
by thoughtfully taking their (justifiable) criticisms of us. To do 
so is to take them seriously; to do any less is to dismiss them as 
unworthy of serious consideration, which is to say, to treat them 
with disrespect. 
If university teachers in a dialogue deny students the right to question 
freely or if education policy bureaucrats are unable to handle criticism of 
policy initiatives, their actions should not be ‘beyond the pale of critical 
judgment’ (Fay, 1996:239). Respect does also not mean that everything 
education policy officials do is ‘fine’, such as when they overtly attempt 
to impose curriculum restructuring on universities. Respect means 
70
EDUCATION, DEMOCRACY AND CITIZENSHIP REVISITED
that university academics should be held accountable to pursue policy 
restructuring on the basis of self-reflection and critique. In this way, 
respect does not simply mean acceptance of everything people do. Respect 
conceived as mere acceptance of everything people do or say negates 
dialogical interaction. According to Fay (1996:240), this understanding of 
respect ‘enjoins us to appreciate others but not to engage them in mutual 
critical reflection’. Once again, Gutmann and Thompson (1996:76) aptly 
explain mutual respect as follows:
Mutual respect manifests a distinctively democratic kind 
of character – the character of individuals who are morally 
committed, self-reflective about their commitments, discerning of 
the difference between respectable and merely tolerable differences 
of opinion, and open to the possibility of changing their minds 
or modifying their positions at some time in the future if they 
confront unanswerable objections to their present point of view.
Thus far, I have argued that showing respect in dialogues about education 
involves the following: firstly, make an effort to understand and appreciate, 
as far as people can, features of other people’s cultures; secondly, curb 
one’s arrogant bias towards others whom one might hardly understand; 
thirdly, listen appreciatively to the stories of others we may like, dislike 
or deplore; and fourthly, hold others accountable to the intellectual 
and moral standards we apply to our friends and ourselves. In essence, 
respect entails that one recognises that others have something worthwhile 
to contribute to the dialogue and that they are not excluded from the 
dialogue on the basis of their difference or one’s dismissive bias towards 
them. Furthermore, respect also allows one to challenge or criticise others 
if their reasons are not found to be persuasive or palatable enough. This 
brings me to a discussion of how these aspects of respect in dialogues can 
pave the way for the enhancement of forgiveness in South Africa.
Respect, forgiveness and classroom pedagogy 
In the main, demanding respect becomes a struggle against racial bigotry, 
gender oppression, and cultural imperialism (Hill, 2000:60). Small wonder 
Kant equates ‘respect for persons’ with that of human dignity – everyone 
has an equal worth, independent of social standing and individual merits 
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(Hill, 2000:62-64). This implies that people are to be regarded ‘as worthy of 
respect as human beings, regardless of how their values differ and whether 
or not we disapprove of what they do’ (Hill, 2000:69). The point I am 
making, is that even those who perpetrated acts of racial bigotry, gender 
oppression and cultural imperialism should be respected as persons. This 
would at least leave open the door for reconciliation among contending 
parties if the opportunity arises. If there is too much hatred, anger and 
resentment towards others, the possibility of reconciliation would be slim. 
In this sense, I agree with Hannah Arendt  (1998:240-241), who notes 
that ‘[f ]orgiving … is the only reaction which does not merely re-act but 
acts anew and unexpectedly, unconditioned by the act which provoked 
and therefore freeing from its consequences both the one who forgives and 
the one who is forgiven’. Put differently, respect opens the door for the 
enhancement of reconciliation; without respect, there is no recognition of 
human dignity and hence, the unlikelihood of reconciliation. According 
to Hill (2000:115), that ‘[a]ll moral agents should be respected as human 
beings should stand even for perpetrators of serious crimes and moral 
offences. Even they should not be seen as forfeiting all respect’. Of course, 
I know this is a highly contentious point: Should one respect the apartheid 
perpetrator of heinous and callous torture? I suppose I am arguing in the 
affirmative, because if one cannot respect the perpetrator as a person who 
has an innate sense of humanity, it would be difficult to forgive and begin 
anew. At least by respecting the person as a person, the possibility does 
arise for forgiveness. I am specifically thinking of Congolese militia (in 
Africa) who continue to maim and rape women and treat them as insects. 
If such militia could not be forgiven, then the possibility for dialogue 
would not be there. 
This brings me to the point of how we can cultivate reconciliation in 
university classrooms through the idea of respect for persons. Firstly, if 
we want to appreciate the stories of others whom we might consider as 
less important, it becomes imperative that we diversify our university 
curricula (especially those that reinforce cultural bias or at least fail to help 
students to develop their resources to fight it) in a serious and substantial 
way. Failing to do so would further entrench extreme conservatism and 
make impossible the practice of respecting students as persons, and hence, 
reconciliation. I have argued (Waghid, 2005:323-342) that through the 
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teaching of indigenous languages and literature, social sciences, and life 
orientation curricula in South Africa, students would be acquainted with a 
rudimentary understanding of the histories and cultures of many different 
people, that is, major religious and cultural groups, as well as ethnic, 
racial and social majorities and sexual minorities. Awareness of cultural 
difference is necessary in order to engender respect for one another, which 
is an essential underpinning for reconciliatory action. Moreover, education 
as reconciliatory action needs to begin early. As soon as students engage 
in storytelling, they can tell stories about other nations and countries. 
Certainly in South Africa they could learn that religions other than 
Christianity exist, that people have different ways of thinking, traditions 
and beliefs. For instance, one such theme in life orientation for primary 
school children could involve educating them about African myths and 
folktales, and the injustices perpetrated against Africans. By the time they 
reach university, they should be well-equipped to deal with demanding 
courses on human diversity outside the dominant Western traditions. The 
goals of such a theme could be threefold: to develop in students a sense 
of informed, reconciliatory action as they enter the broader South African 
society of increasing diversity in terms of race, ethnicity, social class and 
religious sectarianism; to provide students with an intellectual awareness 
of the causes and effects of structured inequalities and prejudicial exclusion 
in South African society; and to expand students’ ability to think critically 
about controversial issues that stem from the gender, race, class, ethnic and 
religious differences that pervade our society. In this way, students who, 
despite being embedded in perhaps different cultures, can enrich their lives 
by learning to appreciate values of another kind – or at least to respect 
those who do (Hill, 2000:86).
Secondly, as I have argued (Waghid,  2005:132-140), to forgive (and 
therefore to have respect) implies some form of intimacy and closeness 
one needs to establish with others; it entails engaging deliberatively with 
others. One cannot begin to understand the feelings of others, neither can 
others comprehend how one feels, if deliberation does not occur among 
us. Reconciliatory action is a ‘coming together’ whereby, in this instance, 
university teachers and students ‘engage in dialogues’ (Greene, 1994:25). 
When teachers and students engage in dialogue they ‘speak with others 
as passionately and eloquently as [they] can about justice and caring 
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and love and trust; all [they] can do is to look into each other’s eyes and 
squeeze each other’s hands’ (Greene, 1994:25). To act deliberatively and 
respectfully would go a long way towards promoting civic reconciliation, 
because reconciliation requires that we do not enter the dialogue with set 
and preconceived ideas about the past and present, but rather what grows 
out of the dialogue offers possibilities for people to reconcile. For instance, 
a university student does not enter into dialogue with others to run them 
down for the injustices that her parents might have experienced. Rather, 
she enters the dialogue in order to look for possibilities as to how the past 
injustices can be avoided and how the future can be imagined. I remember 
a white undergraduate student becoming agitated in class about a black 
student’s presentation regarding the racial prejudice experienced by 
her elder sister during her years of study at a white Afrikaans-speaking 
university. This seemed to have been a deliberate attempt on the part of 
the black student to provoke her classmates without considering that the 
white students in her class were not responsible for discriminating against 
the black student’s sibling in the past. In such a situation, possibilities for 
the future could not have been imagined, since the black student’s intent 
was to blame her classmates unjustly for an act for which they could not 
have been responsible.
Thirdly, those serious about forgiveness ought to become respectful, 
because respect requires of one not just to express oneself freely, but also 
responsibly. This means that free expression should not become what 
Gutmann  (2003:200) calls ‘an unconstrained licence to discriminate’. 
Only then does one act responsibly, that is, respectfully. In other words, the 
right to free and unconstrained expression ends when injustice to others 
begins. One can no longer lay claim to being respectful and therefore 
being responsible, critical and just, if one advocates a particular point of 
view that cannot be separated from excluding certain individuals – that 
is, discriminating invidiously against others (particularly those individuals 
in society most vulnerable and who lack the same expressive freedom as 
those who are excluding them) on grounds such as gender, race, sexual 
orientation, ethnicity and religion (Gutmann,  2003:200). For example, 
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if the Dan Roodts7 of this world continue to express themselves with 
unhindered freedom, making unsubstantiated claims about the supposed 
aggression and murderous instincts of (South African) blacks (all in 
the name of criticism), the possibilities for civic reconciliation would 
seriously be thwarted. The point I am making, is that such unconstrained, 
irresponsible expressions are in fact disrespectful and uncritical utterances 
which do not offer possibilities for civic reconciliation to be achieved 
in our fifteen-year-old democracy. Yes, becoming respectful would be a 
matter of constraining our irresponsible speech. Only then would we enter 
a field of more possibilities – of connecting with all South Africans in the 
quest to achieve civic reconciliation.
Thus far, I have argued that forgiveness and respect are preconditions 
for any form of democratic practice and sense of belonging to a group. 
People cannot begin to engage one another if they do not respect others 
as human beings – as persons. Nor can people begin to deliberate equally 
and compassionately as friends if they do not begin anew, that is, with 
forgiveness. So, an education for democratic citizenship should be premised 
on the virtues of respect and forgiveness. I cannot imagine that our 
university classrooms claim to cultivate democratic citizenship education 
without situating pedagogical practices in having respect for the other 
and, in turn, to open up the possibility for forgiveness – to explore the 
unimaginable anew.
7 Dan Roodt is an Afrikaner academic who champions the cause of white exclusiveness and 
Afrikaans in South Africa.
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Uncosmopolitan encounters 
As dean of a faculty, I am privy to many students’ stories about apparent 
racism and xenophobia they encounter at our institution. In a way, 
black students find comfort in sharing their stories about racism and 
xenophobia with a black dean. The stories which reached my office 
included the following: a black, elderly doctoral student alleged that she 
had encountered moments of extreme discomfort in her deliberations 
with her white supervisor; a postgraduate black student alleged that her 
white teacher had questioned her enrolment at this university which, she 
was told, is predominantly reserved for Afrikaans-speaking students; a 
doctoral student alleged that whenever he was in the presence of some 
white academics they would immediately excuse themselves from the 
conversation; and a postgraduate student from a neighbouring country 
complained that his lecturer did not treat his work with care. Even if these 
stories were not true, there is sufficient justification to consider the faculty 
to be a comfortable haven for white students who, at the undergraduate 
level, are in the majority. Not surprisingly, black students do experience 
feelings of alienation and exclusion, particularly at the level of language. 
I am not suggesting that racism is perpetrated only against black people. 
I  remember the story told by one of my doctoral students about some 
black students in residences deliberately disrupting hostels at night in 
order to anger white students. However, at the institution where I work, 
and where blacks are in the minority, it is more likely that they will feel 
excluded than the other way around. 
All the aforementioned stories suggest that there might be moments in 
which people’s rights are violated. This has led me to ask the question: 
How can education contribute towards minimising and eradicating such 
inhumane and unjust acts against humanity? As far as I am concerned 
(and the trend of thought throughout this book has been a confirmation 
of this), we should constantly educate societies to inculcate the important 
virtues of democratic citizenship in order to prevent such forms of 
injustice. In other words, the rationale for democratic citizenship education 
is the eradication of all forms of injustice people might encounter. If 
our societies can internalise the virtues of democratic citizenship, the 
possibility of injustices against human beings could be minimised or 
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even eradicated. Simply put, the possibility that inhumane and unjust 
acts against human beings can be reduced is highly likely if people are 
educated to be democratic citizens. This is so because education in the 
first instance requires that people connect with one another – that is, they 
engage deliberatively, compassionately, in a friendly manner, respectfully 
and forgivingly in pedagogical practices. Let me elaborate. As has been 
argued already, important virtues of democratic citizenship include, firstly, 
the capacity to deliberate as free and equal citizens in a democratic polity, 
and secondly, conducting such deliberations so that they are about the 
demands of justice for all individuals (Gutmann,  1996:68-69). If we 
deliberate as free and equal citizens, then we first of all give an account 
of what we do to others, who might find our reasons justifiable or not. In 
turn, we consider the reasons of others equally, which can lead us either 
to accept or reject their reasons or their understanding of our reasons or 
justifications. Such justifications and concomitant actions happen in an 
atmosphere of free and open expression and are only hindered when our 
reasons embody an injustice towards others. For instance, when students 
deliberate among themselves about the racial discrimination experienced 
by South African blacks under apartheid and begin to equate affirmative 
action with discrimination towards whites, then free expression can no 
longer remain unrestricted, because the majority black South African 
government is unjustly being accused of racial discrimination. I am not 
suggesting that governments should not be questioned critically, but 
rather that unjustifiable criticism should not be countenanced, because 
affirmative action is one way of equalising opportunities for all South 
Africans, especially those previously excluded from gaining employment 
opportunities under apartheid. I cannot imagine myself in an academic 
position today if it were not because of the equalisation of opportunities 
for all of the country’s citizens. For this reason, I agree with Gutmann, who 
claims that freedom of expression should not become ‘an unconstrained 
licence to discriminate’ and that it only be practised ‘within the limits of 
doing no injustice to others’ (Gutmann,  2003:200). So, when all Jews 
are accused of perpetrating acts of aggression against Palestinians, or if 
all Palestinians are branded as potential ‘suicide bombers’, then such 
potentially dangerous statements should not be condoned, because not 
only are people unjustly repudiated, but such irresponsible expressions 
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could also fuel already volatile relations in the Middle East. Similarly, if a 
young child in a South African school decides to dress in the military-style 
attire worn by, say, a ‘suicide bomber’, this cannot be condoned, because 
others might find it offensive as it might venerate ‘suicide bombers’ as 
heroes although they perpetrate heinous acts of violence against other 
human beings. In essence, educating people to be democratic citizens 
involves inculcating in them a spirit of openness and respect for the 
justifications of others, a recognition that others should be listened to, and 
that injustices should not be done to others under the guise of equal and 
free expression. 
Moreover, if democratic citizenship demands that people deliberate 
about the demands of justice for all individuals, then, as aptly put by 
Gutmann (1996:69), ‘doing what is right cannot be reduced to loyalty to, 
or identification with, any existing group of human beings’. Educational 
institutions should teach students, on the one hand, about their duties 
as citizens to advance justice and not to limit performance of these 
duties to some individuals or groups, and on the other hand, about 
their responsibilities as citizens to support institutional ways of moving 
towards better societies and a better world (Gutmann, 1996:71). In South 
Africa, the Department of Education envisages that students be taught 
‘social honour’ through the singing of the national anthem, displaying the 
national flag, and saying out loud an oath of allegiance which reads as 
follows: ‘I promise to be loyal to my country, South Africa, and do my 
best to promote the welfare and the well-being of all its citizens. I promise 
to show self-respect in all that I do and to respect all of my fellow citizens 
and all of our various traditions. Let us work for peace, friendship and 
reconciliation and heal the scars left by past conflicts. And let us build a 
common destiny together’ (DoE, 2001:59). There seems to be little wrong 
in educating for ‘social honour’ through advancing peace, friendship, 
reconciliation and the building of a collective common destiny. It is a 
matter of exercising one’s duty in doing what is right, particularly after 
the majority black population for decades suffered racial abuse, political 
exclusion and inhumane treatment at the hands of the apartheid regime. 
Reconciliation and justice are conditional upon all citizens who desire to 
live in peace and friendship, as is the recognition that all citizens should 
be respected for their human dignity. An individual or group can have 
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a moral edge over another only if that individual or group is more just 
than another. 
However, it seems as if the pledge of allegiance can also open up the possibility 
for individuals not to enact their civic responsibilities of moving towards a 
better society and thus a better world. Why is this so? Limiting one’s loyalty 
to one’s country and promoting the welfare of fellow citizens could exclude 
immigrants from gaining one’s support, particularly considering that many 
immigrants from Somalia, Sudan and Zimbabwe, who are currently fleeing 
their countries because of political instability and state harassment, now 
seek refuge in South Africa. Pledging one’s support for fellow citizens, while 
immigrants are considered as ‘foreign co-citizens’ or ‘resident aliens’, could 
intensify existing xenophobic prejudices towards immigrants on account 
of their being considered ‘outsiders’ who do not deserve our respect and 
civility. Often these immigrant communities are subjected to indifference 
and cruelty, and sometimes hatred and assassinations. For instance, some 
time ago, Somali shopkeepers were gunned down in the Khayelitsha area 
of Cape Town, apparently for jeopardising job opportunities for locals. 
Likewise, I sometimes hear my doctoral student from Malawi complaining 
of how he experiences moments of stigmatisation and isolation. The point 
I am making, is that educating students to promote the welfare of South 
African citizens only could be interpreted as not having to attend to the 
rights of immigrant ‘outsiders’, which could in turn kindle xenophobia 
and prejudice. Like Callan (1999:198), I contend that students should be 
taught ‘to see their neighbourhoods and the international community as 
arenas of civic participation’. 
In essence, educating for democratic citizenship does not only involve 
cultivating in people a sense of deliberating together freely and equally 
about their common and collective destiny. It is also about achieving 
justice for all, including those immigrants who are victims of religious wars 
(Sudanese and Somali immigrants) and political alienation and suppression 
(Zimbabwean immigrants). In the words of Gutmann (1996:69): 
[P]ublic education ought to cultivate in all students the skills 
and virtues of democratic citizenship, including the capacity to 
deliberate about the demands of justice for all individuals, not 
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only for present-day citizens of the United States [or any specific 
country]. Deliberating about the demands of justice is a central 
virtue of democratic citizenship, because it is primarily (not 
exclusively) through our empowerment of democratic citizens that 
we can further the cause of justice around the world. 
This brings me to a discussion of cosmopolitanism. 
Educating for cosmopolitanism
It seems as if the democratic citizenship education agenda is restricted in 
the sense that it considers action only from the vantage point of individuals 
or groups that need to respond towards other individuals or groups in 
a national context. So, the question remains: How can cosmopolitanism 
extend the democratic citizenship education agenda? Whereas democratic 
citizenship functions mostly within the boundaries of its memberships, 
emphasising citizens’ duties and responsibilities towards other individuals 
and groups, cosmopolitanism recognises the rights of others to ‘universal 
hospitality’. Simply put, others have the right to be treated hospitably. For 
Benhabib (2006:22), in a neo-Kantian sense, 
[H]ospitality is not to be understood as a virtue of sociability, as 
the kindness and generosity one may show to strangers who come 
to one’s land or who become dependent on one’s act of kindness 
through circumstances of nature or history; hospitality is a right 
that belongs to all human beings as far as we view them as potential 
participants in a world republic. 
Such a right to hospitality imposes an obligation on democratic states and 
their citizens not to deny refuge and asylum to those whose intentions are 
peaceful, particularly if refusing them would result in harm coming to 
them (Benhabib, 2006:25). So, if the intentions of Somali entrepreneurs 
are peaceful, it would be considered their right to be treated hospitably and 
it would be democratic citizens’ obligation to ensure that these immigrants 
enjoy such a right. 
What does such a cosmopolitan approach to education entail? Firstly, 
considering that cosmopolitanism involves the right to temporary residence 
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on the part of the ‘stranger who comes to our land’ (Benhabib, 2006:22), 
it follows that public schools in South Africa cannot deny access to 
children of immigrant communities. In most cases they are not refused. 
However, some children are excluded in subtle ways, considering that 
the language of instruction, for instance, is not in the mother tongue of 
these immigrant children. In fact, in the black township of Kayamandi (in 
Stellenbosch, South Africa) African children find it difficult to cope with 
non-mother-tongue instruction in public schools. Three Belgian teachers 
once requested a mediator to assist them in teaching children in Kayamandi 
to participate in art and cultural activities. And, taking into account that 
local school children find it difficult to cope with a different language, it 
would be extremely challenging for immigrant (say Somali) children to 
adapt to the public school life in their country of temporary sojourn. What 
cosmopolitanism thus demands is for immigrant children to be taught 
initially in their mother tongue before they are assimilated into the broader 
public school life. Or, alternatively, they should simultaneously learn the 
language of instruction and be supported in doing so. The point I  am 
making is that one should not take for granted that people with immigrant 
status would fit naturally into the public structures of their adopted 
countries or countries of temporary residence. They have to be initiated 
gradually into social and public life on the basis of a sense of obligation 
on the part of democratic states. Failing to do so, for example by denying 
immigrant children gradual access into public schools and thus depriving 
them from developing and exercising their capacities, would amount to 
treating others unjustly. The upshot of this view is that if my Malawian 
student’s children, who are attending the local Kayamandi school, are not 
treated hospitably by, for example, being initiated gradually into public 
school life by South African teachers and other learners, then the teachers 
and learners are not abiding by their obligation to treat others humanely 
– that is to say, justly. This unfavourable attitude towards immigrant 
others would not only retard interaction and cooperation among different 
people, but also impede the education for social justice project that the 
Department of Education (in South Africa) so dearly wants to implement 
in public schools. This is because the consequence would be that these 
immigrant children and their parents will invariably develop mistrust (as 
is seemingly the case with my Malawian student and his children) in the 
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public school sector – a situation which in turn increases their suffering 
(discomfort) and perpetuates what Iris Marion Young (2006:159) refers to 
as ‘structural social injustice’. 
Secondly, ‘the right to have rights’ prohibits states from denying individuals 
citizenship rights and state protection against murder, extermination, 
enslavement, deportation and other inhumane acts such as persecution 
(whether political, cultural or religious) (Benhabib, 2006:25). So, if Somali 
immigrant children wish to wear their head scarves in South African public 
schools, following ‘the right to have rights’ notion, these children cannot 
be discriminated against if they wish to do so. Asking these children to 
remove their scarves, which they might consider as important to their 
religious and cultural identity, would constitute unjust treatment on the 
grounds that their right to be different would be undermined. Similarly, 
for the South African government to have deported a Pakistani national 
on the grounds of unreasonable suspicion that he might have been a terror 
suspect caused much humiliation and insult to his family (including his 
children at school), especially seeing that after more than six months 
the Department of Foreign Affairs has not yet produced any evidence 
of this person’s alleged al-Qaida connections. In this case, the political – 
more specifically, cosmopolitan – rights of a human being have been 
seriously compromised. Similarly, for French authorities to have passed 
a law preventing Muslim women and girls from wearing the head scarf 
is discriminatory and unjust. I cannot imagine how the head scarf in fact 
encroaches on French liberties. If some Muslims claim that wearing the 
head scarf is a religious or cultural practice and the scarf does not cause any 
harm to any person, then who are we to say that such a practice violates 
French liberties? In my view, denying Muslim women the right to wear the 
head scarf is tantamount to denying a people to exercise what they claim 
to be their religious and cultural right. Hence, such treatment would cause 
them to feel that they are being treated unjustly – that is, inhospitably. 
In essence, cosmopolitanism and its concomitant agenda of hospitality 
which ought to be afforded other human beings (especially from immigrant 
communities) in many ways complement the duties and responsibilities 
associated with the activities of democratic citizens. Unless countries and 
their peoples recognise the rights of others to be treated with dignity and 
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respect, without having their rights suppressed, the achievement of justice 
will remain remote from the minds and hearts of people. I have argued 
that South African public schools can do much to promote these norms, 
which would inevitably consolidate and extend the just actions linked to 
the implementation of a democratic citizenship agenda. 
Of course, it might seem as if my argument in defence of cosmopolitanism 
lends itself to a notion of citizenship which does not invoke legal 
entitlements on the part of ‘citizens’, particularly immigrants and other 
marginalised communities. Simply put, my defence of cosmopolitanism 
might seem to have only moral value and that all ‘citizens’ would not 
necessarily benefit from the rights granted by nation states. In other words, 
immigrants and other marginalised communities do not politically/legally 
have access to rights. Of course one way out of such a predicament would 
be to argue that universal human rights discourses ought to be coupled 
with a cosmopolitan conception of citizenship. In other words, universal 
human rights might provide a theoretical underpinning for cosmopolitan 
citizenship. For instance, it might be quite apposite to claim that a 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (as advocated by the United 
Nations) might be one way in which marginalised ‘citizens’, from nation 
states, might secure political/legal entitlements. Although such a view 
may seem to be untenable, because human rights cannot logically be a 
theoretical underpinning for cosmopolitan citizenship on the grounds 
that human rights discourses are located within a universalist frame of 
reference, in contrast to that of citizenship, which is located within a 
more particularist frame (Kiwan, 2005:37), I tend to hold the view that 
justice for all ‘citizens’ would reasonably be secured if universal human 
rights could be used by nation states to engender defensible forms of 
cosmopolitanism. In contrast to Kiwan’s view, I believe that in this way 
the implementation of human rights discourses might not necessarily be 
conceptually distinct from cosmopolitan citizenship, and the conflating of 
human rights with citizenship might not be as conceptually incoherent. 
In fact, a Universal Declaration of Human Rights might enhance the 
empowerment and active participation of individual citizens in the context 
of a political community. Such a view makes sense on the basis that if 
marginalised ‘citizens’, particularly immigrants, are granted ‘hospitality’ 
on the grounds of a Universal Declaration of Human Rights (for instance, 
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that they cannot be excluded from political participation), the chances that 
cosmopolitan citizenship could be realised would seem highly likely. This 
is so, because a Universal Declaration of Human Rights would obligate 
nation states to respect the rights of all citizens. 
This brings me to a discussion of some of the strategies that can be 
used in a university classroom to educate for democratic citizenship 
and cosmopolitanism.
University pedagogy, democratic citizenship and cosmopolitanism 
Firstly, I invited my doctoral student from Malawi to teach our postgraduate 
students who were to become teachers in public schools the following 
year. He taught them ‘Diversity and Inclusivity in Education’, one of 
twelve modules for a Postgraduate Certificate in Education programme. 
At first, I started off as a co-teacher with him, but after that he taught 
the class entirely on his own. Because almost 50% of the class of about 
ninety students were Afrikaans-speaking, it was extremely difficult for 
him to connect with all students in their mother tongue. So, I decided to 
join him occasionally only to clarify concepts in Afrikaans. However, he 
did most of the teaching and also marked the English-speaking students’ 
assignments, tests and examinations. Some of the students actually started 
to complain to me about him, in particular (according to them) about 
his seemingly inadequate teaching style, lack of communicative skills (in 
Afrikaans) and inability to clarify difficult concepts. Although some of 
these concerns were legitimate, especially the language issue, I found it 
hard to believe that he was a bad teacher, especially given the time he 
took to prepare his lectures and the discussions we had before lectures 
on the concepts related to multiculturalism, deliberative democracy and 
diversity. Consequently, he requested students to communicate with him 
(in English) via email correspondence. Quite surprisingly, many students 
did, but there were also some students who preferred to communicate 
directly with me. In the end, these students completed assignments, wrote 
tests and examinations and performed considerably well. I think what was 
at play here was that, initially, most students did not accept my student 
as someone who had the right to be a participant in the same university 
classroom, on the grounds that he came from a neighbouring country 
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and that he did not share a common language of communication with 
some students. Also, it seems as if some students were unwilling to be 
taught by one whom they considered to be a ‘stranger’. It could also be 
that some (a very small minority of students) might even have projected 
xenophobic attitudes.8 I specifically remember his encounter with one 
particular student, who unjustifiably accused him of never being available 
after lectures, yet he was the one person in our department who was always 
at hand to talk to students. However, as the situation turned out, especially 
after many students had recorded good marks in their assignments, the 
students realised that he was not going to ‘disappear’ and that he had a 
legitimate right to teach them. In my view, educating for cosmopolitanism 
involves making students recognise and accept that those whom they 
consider as ‘outside strangers’ have the right to participate in a university 
classroom and that we (South African students and teachers) do not have 
sole proprietorship of pedagogical spaces. 
Secondly, for this particular course our mode of teaching involved 
deliberation. We gave an account of why we included topics such as 
democratic citizenship, diversity and multiculturalism,9 and, in turn, 
students could give an account of why they thought it necessary or not to 
discuss these topics in relation to their own understanding and experiences. 
In the first instance, students had to read texts and make analytical 
summaries and presentations to the class. The idea was that students would 
feel free to articulate their views in an atmosphere of mutual trust. They 
could relax their boundaries without being concerned that others would 
8 Recently in South Africa, there have been several xenophobic assaults on refugees: Firstly, fourteen 
Rwandese school children from the Bon Esperance refugee shelter in Philippi were tied up and 
assaulted on their return from school; and secondly, a Burundian refugee, who works in the 
country as a security guard, was stabbed in the head. He later dropped charges against his attacker. 
Currently 35,000 asylum seekers live in the Cape metropole alone. 
9 The rationale for this course is to introduce students to pertinent theoretical concepts on deliberative 
democracy, citizenship, cosmopolitanism and universal justice, with the aim, firstly, to make sense 
of what it means to integrate discussions on democracy, social justice, equality, non-racism and 
non-sexism, ubuntu (human dignity), an open society, accountability (responsibility), the rule 
of law, respect, and reconciliation into the public school curriculum – all values related to the 
Department of Education’s Manifesto on Values, Education and Democracy (2001); and secondly, 
to introduce students to discussions about genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, 
in particular by examining how educating for democratic citizenship and cosmopolitanism can 
minimise and eradicate such crimes. 
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dismiss their interpretations. Although some students felt insecure about 
their presentations and did not want to be criticised by their peers, the 
majority of them accepted that, if their interpretations were indefensible, 
they would concede or even attempt to produce more persuasive arguments 
in defence of their views. I want to relate a specific incident that sparked 
much heated debate and controversy. During a discussion about the 
political uncertainty in Zimbabwe, most students agreed that the crisis in 
Zimbabwe can be attributed to the dictatorial regime of its president and 
felt that the opposition is being instigated by outside forces who want to 
see the demise of Robert Mugabe. However, one coloured student argued 
that the only way one could achieve political justice in Zimbabwe is for 
Mugabe to continue to confiscate white farmers’ land and that the same 
should happen in South Africa. This statement immediately led to a lot 
of disagreement and even resentment of the student’s claim about what 
ought to happen in South Africa. In line with the process of deliberative 
engagement, it was not my task to limit debate, but rather to facilitate 
argumentation, which I did. But then a white student remarked: ‘Africa 
is ruled by blacks and look at the political turmoil on the continent.’ 
This statement brought about a turning point in deliberations. Although 
students felt free to express themselves, some felt that controversy should 
be avoided. I thought that controversy should be encouraged and asked 
students to produce counter-arguments to this statement. For a while 
belligerence and distress dominated our deliberations, until one white 
student convinced others that the statement was an expression of injustice 
towards others, because blacks were being falsely accused of bringing about 
political instability on the African continent, whereas colonisation by 
white settlers brought much harm to Africa. The point about deliberation 
is that it can be distressful. Students should recognise that belligerent 
argumentation should not lead to dismissing others unjustly and that 
free expression can never be unconstrained, especially if wrong is done 
to others. 
Thirdly, for a compulsory assignment, students had to identify a controversial 
issue that related to democratic citizenship and cosmopolitanism, and 
then had to make presentations in groups to the class. I have selected only 
the following three issues that three groups presented, as these issues will 
clarify some of my claims about educating for democratic citizenship and 
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cosmopolitanism: The first group chose to write and speak about the work 
of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in South Africa; the 
second group introduced the inhumane treatment of people in the Darfur 
region in Sudan (Africa); and the third group raised the issue of America’s 
‘war on terror’. I shall now explore some of the unintended pedagogical 
outcomes of this project.
Unintended pedagogical outcomes: Narratives in the making
The pedagogical outcomes of educating for democratic citizenship and 
cosmopolitanism have not been concluded in advance, for that would have 
signalled the end of education. In fact, our interactions have been framed 
by a notion of freedom whereby I aroused students’ interests ‘to go in search 
of their own’ – that is, to provoke students to reach beyond themselves, to 
wonder, to imagine, and to pose their own questions. Greene (1998:12) 
aptly describes such a view of freedom:
Individuals (students) can be provoked to reach beyond themselves 
in their intersubjective space. It is through and by means of education 
that they may become empowered to think about what they are 
doing, to become mindful, to share meanings, to conceptualize, 
to make varied sense of their lived worlds. It is through education 
that preferences may be released, languages learned, intelligences 
developed, perspectives opened, possibilities disclosed. 
This ‘dialectic of freedom’ seemed to have existed among students and 
between students and me. In other words, as an educator I  felt the 
pedagogical need to distinctively orientate my students in such a way that 
they (students) would take the initiative, discover new possibilities, look 
at things as they could be otherwise, and move beyond with the awareness 
that such overcoming can never be complete. When students are taught 
to think about what they are doing and to share meanings with educators 
or their critical friends, it is unlikely that their learning would be frivolous 
or of little value. Thus, when students are taught to conceptualise in order 
to search for undisclosed possibilities and alternative meanings – to look 
at things as they could be otherwise – the potential is there on the part of 
students to engage scrupulously and carefully with texts and even to take 
texts into systematic controversy. In short, freedom implies that students 
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have developed the capacity to imagine alternative possibilities and that 
their educators have succeeded in establishing spaces where meanings 
could be shared, understood, reflected on, and contested. This implies 
that freedom does not become a preoccupation with self-dependence 
or self-regulated behaviour, but rather an involvement with others – a 
relationship. The upshot of this ‘dialectic of freedom’ in a relationship 
between a student and his or her educator, is that students would develop 
a passionate desire ‘to speak and write their own words’, and an educator 
would carefully and respectfully evaluate the work (assignments) of his 
or her students. In other words, students and educators are not merely 
functionaries in an instrumental system geared towards turning out 
theses (products) that meet the standards of quality control, but rather 
free participants in a highly esteemed academic enterprise – one in which 
students and educators mutually assert their autonomy and ‘prepare the 
ground for what is to come’ (Greene, 1988:3). These are the pedagogical 
spaces which my students hopefully acquired and which I invariably 
associate with educating for democratic citizenship and cosmopolitanism 
in a university setting.
Thus far, I have developed a notion of democratic citizenship education 
which provides the premise for cosmopolitan education. Of course, 
it appears as if I set up these types of education as elitist and beyond 
questioning. That is certainly not my intention. In fact, I rather emphasised 
those particularities of democratic citizenship and cosmopolitan education 
which can engender deliberation, compassion and justice. However, my 
potential critic might take issue with me for assuming that all communities 
require cosmopolitan education, for instance, and that such universalist 
ideals could undermine the cultural norms of particular societies. In fact, 
I am not arguing for a reduction in local cultural norms, rather that the 
universal (cosmopolitan) and the local be integrated. Failing to do so would 
in any case undermine the cosmopolitan education agenda – that is, not 
to violate the local, which can result in doing an injustice to indigenous 
communities. As it turns out, cosmopolitan education can in fact secure 
that the local and cultural be legitimately and justly recognised. 
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Introduction to the professoriate 
Quite ironically, my interview for the vacant professorship in Philosophy 
of Education happened just a day after 9/11. I remember that one of my 
colleagues bumped into me on my way to the interviewing room and 
wished me well, especially considering that there might be some vexing 
times ahead for me and all other Muslims. I would like to believe that 
she wished me well instead of casting some form of admonition towards 
me. As if I were not reminded enough of my religious status, one of the 
questions posed by an interviewer related to whether there is a difference 
between doing philosophy and practising a religion – as if the terrorist 
attacks had some connection with the way I am practising religion. Just 
prior to my appointment to the post, a senior academic in the faculty 
requested me to provide information that I was practising ‘a moderate 
kind of Islam’ – an Islam which apparently cannot be associated with the 
practices of al-Qaida. Of course, I provided information to this person of 
certain sermons I once rendered in a mosque and which would probably be 
interpreted as ‘liberal’ views. By and large, the fuss about my appointment 
to the professoriate was short-lived. Of course, I do not deny that it must 
or must not have been quite a big step for the university to have appointed 
me to this position. After all, I was appointed professor at a time when 
the Minister of Education was also Muslim (or perhaps had some Muslim 
lineage). Be that as it may, I felt as if I now had a different challenge at hand: 
to convince my colleagues that I did not advocate for violence in any form 
of human action. At that time, South Africa was rife with the activities of 
People Against Gangsterism (PAGAD), and to have cast aspersion on me, 
some might have thought, would not have been unfounded. Today, as a 
democratic citizen, I cannot see how the concept of democratic citizenship 
can be associated at all with violence. It is to such a discussion that I now 
turn my attention. 
Dialogue and the limits of violence 
I shall now explore some of the limitations of violence, in particular focusing 
on how it can possibly be undermined by dialogical action – a constitutive 
practice of democratic citizenship education. Firstly, I argue that, although 
violence is at times justified by some people, its disrespectful use against 
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innocent others makes it illegitimate and therefore un-dialogical. Secondly, 
the use of violence is considered by some as circumstantial and restricted 
to the achievement of short-term goals. However, I argue that such action 
would lead to more violence and therefore should at all times be abandoned 
and conditions be established that are more favourable for dialogical action. 
Thirdly, violence ought to be prevented through the practice of responsible 
(respectful) action – action which takes into account non-instrumentality, 
impartiality and deliberation.
The fateful events of 9/11 posed many challenges to human relations and 
security in the world. Dialogue, or rather a lack thereof, is considered 
by many as having contributed significantly to the current tensions and 
ambiguities that exist in world affairs, whether at the political, economic, 
cultural (especially religious), or social levels. For instance, the ‘war on 
terrorism’ is justified as a pre-emptive violent measure to curb the terrorism 
of alleged radicals, who have been portrayed as a group of religious bigots 
who are intolerant and resentful of the economic prosperity, political 
democracies and social liberties of the West. These radicals are said to have 
been educated in the madrassahs, or traditional Islamic schools, where the 
focus (it is claimed) seems to be overwhelmingly on moral prescription 
and blind indoctrination, which could possibly lead to the breeding of 
hatred against the West. In turn, these radical groups see themselves as 
liberators fighting against the occupiers in lands such as Palestine, Kashmir, 
Iraq, Afghanistan and Chechnya, who through self-destruction (‘suicide 
bombings’) defend themselves violently against foreign aggression. They 
assert that through martyrdom they would be rid of the human indignity 
suffered at the hands of the ‘infidels’. 
The point I am making, is that it seems as if people pursue activities 
justified on the basis of particular truth claims based on their vantage 
points, whether as perpetrators or victims of violence. For me, these 
activities seem to emanate from people’s understanding of why they act in 
specific violent ways – that is, their reasons for why they do certain things. 
Violent activities, whether through military invasion, ‘suicide bombings’, 
protest actions, bullying, or domestic abuse of women and children, 
have some connection with the reasons people offer for perpetrating the 
violence. In other words, some people’s violent actions are guided by their 
95
CHAPTER 6 • Democratic citizenship education without violence and extremism
understanding of why they respond the way they do – their violence stems 
from the reasons they offer to justify their actions. If one considers the 
Arendtian notion of violence, that is, ‘acting without argument or speech 
and without counting the consequences’ (1969:65), then it follows that 
violence is a non-dialogical activity, because dialogue is linked to the 
articulation of justifiable reasons for action – that is, argument and speech. 
A non-dialogical activity does not necessarily take into account what 
someone else has to say – that is, her reasons. In this way, perpetrating 
violence seems to be unconnected to dialogue. But acting violently is itself 
an activity which can be rationally justified – for instance, terrorists do give 
an account of their violent acts. They justify the ends of violence without 
considering its consequences. However, considering the offering of, say, 
implausible reasons alone as a sufficient justification for a rational activity, 
is questionable. Why? Violence, unlike dialogue, relies on action (say with 
reasons) independent of giving plausible justifications through ‘argument 
and speech’ and without considering its consequences. This makes violence 
a non-dialogical activity, since it minimises the potential for necessary 
human interaction with those considered as ‘other’. In short, violence and 
dialogue cannot be seen to co-exist, since dialogue is constituted by action 
based on giving an account of reasons, whereas violence constitutes action 
without ‘argument and speech’. 
Now my potential critic might legitimately claim that dialogue and 
violence can work together: For instance, I might be subjected to domestic 
abuse and engage in a discussion with my spouse about the matter. Yet, 
I  can experience unacceptable aggressive behaviour towards me while 
engaging in discussion with him. And, on the basis of this, one can claim 
that discussion does not necessarily deter violence against one, and that 
it can co-exist with violence. But this is not the kind of dialogue I  am 
referring to. The dialogue I have in mind, is one that creates opportunities 
for people to listen to others and to be persuaded by reasons. What I have 
in mind, is dialogue as deliberation (as has been argued for previously), 
whereby people can act dialogically, listen to what co-participants in the 
dialogue have to say, be persuaded by a justifiable account of others’ points 
of view, and more importantly, can restrain their anger through respecting 
the dignity of the other person. In this way, the possibility of acting 
violently is curtailed by the very likelihood that what someone else has to 
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say or what someone else might have done (albeit wrongly) does not afford 
one sufficient reason to act violently towards that person – one at least 
exercises self-restraint on the basis that one respects the human dignity of 
others, that is to say, one curbs one’s aggression and resentment towards 
others for the sake of respecting others’ dignity. Of course I do not discount 
that blind hatred, racism and even nihilism do exist – acts which might 
not necessarily encourage reasoned argumentation in order to prevent 
violence. However, even those blinded by racism, for instance, should at 
least come to some realisation that one cannot always oppress and exclude 
others (as was the case in South Africa under apartheid), but that one 
can only co-exist humanely with others under conditions where dialogue 
and hence the exercise of respect for human dignity is possible. The point 
I am making, is that if conditions for dialogue were not possible in South 
Africa, civil war (including violence and disrespect towards human dignity) 
would have ensued because of unacceptable racism towards the majority 
of vulnerable people in the country. Also, the fact that some people are 
racist is an indication that they might not necessarily want to connect with 
or have knowledge of other people’s culture and situation. Often, their 
blind racism is a matter of ignorance about others rather than a rational 
decision to discriminate against others – I am reminded of a colleague 
(white Afrikaner male) who once told me that if he had known more about 
blacks, he might not have discriminated against them in the past. 
On the non-justification of the limited use of violence 
At the outset I hasten to caution that any initiation of violence against 
people would be at odds with an important goal of dialogue – the 
achievement of desirable humane engagement in relation to human 
interdependence. Human co-existence – irrespective of the diversity of 
cultures, religions, ethnicities and nationalities – is desirable if people want 
to enjoy security, non-violence, non-discrimination and peace. Hence the 
desirability of any type of education, whether in Western institutions or 
the Islamic madrassahs, to cultivate understanding, reason, non-repression 
and non-discrimination. 
The importance of dialogical action for non-violence is based on an 
understanding that any distorted or unfavourable human situation can 
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only be resolved through argument – that is, giving a justifiable account of 
one’s reasons and finding others’ reasons persuasive after having gone into 
systematic controversy with some of their reasons, which might result in 
rejecting, adjusting and modifying one’s own reasons (MacIntyre, 1999). 
The problem is that one might not always be willing and prepared to 
evaluate one’s reasons on account of the arguments others have to offer. 
This situation of not considering the reason of others as convincing enough 
has the potential to result in an impasse. Of course, this is not necessarily 
bad, because people can again reflect on their reasons in relation to the 
reasons of others and then, at a later stage, come up with better arguments 
(Benhabib, 1996). Yet even such a reflexive approach to the articulation 
of reasons might not always result in desirable agreement – I say desirable, 
because it might enhance the chances of improving human interaction. In 
this situation, deadlock would in any case result in an undesirable situation, 
since people would by then have exhausted most pathways to gaining 
some common understanding in terms of which human interaction and 
interdependence could be enhanced. For instance, during the Rwandan 
civil conflict in the 1990s, genocide could possibly have been prevented 
through desirable human engagement amongst Hutus and Tutsis. Yet the 
genocide took place, which suggests that somehow other potential pathways 
to argument and speech had not been explored, which in turn resulted in 
violent military United Nations intervention in order to prevent genocide. 
The point I am making, is that violence might not have been necessary in 
order to remedy an undesirable situation. So it seems as if violent action 
has been used as a temporary response to defuse an undesirable situation 
(NATO intervened violently to curb the genocide of Bosnian Muslims 
on the part of the Serbs; the Allied forces took temporary violent action 
against the Nazis to halt the Jewish holocaust). 
What I have argued for thus far is that the use of violence in order to 
resolve an undesirable situation might not have been necessary, since not 
all potential pathways to argument and speech had been explored. I agree 
with Arendt, who claims that ‘the practice of violence, like all action, 
changes the world, but the most probable change is to a more violent 
world’  (1969:80). In this sense, although the temporary use of violence 
had been justified, it does not make violence legitimate. Why not? In 
the first place, the use of violence against people can have the effect of 
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innocent bystanders losing their lives. This means that the perpetrators 
of violence disrespect the lives of others who might not necessarily have 
been responsible for an undesirable situation. I cannot imagine that all 
people in the New York Twin Towers, the London tubes, the Oklahoma 
World Trade Centre, and Baghdad were responsible for an undesirable 
situation which some people found offensive and worthy of violent self-
destructive actions, that is, ‘suicide bombings’. And, seeing that those who 
were subjected to violence and who suffered such human indignity, torture 
and aggression were innocent, the use of violence cannot be considered as 
legitimate. In support of this view, Hannah Arendt (1969:52) posits that: 
Violence can be justifiable, but it never can be legitimate. Its 
justification loses in plausibility the farther its intended end 
recedes into the future. No one questions the use of violence in 
self-defence, because the danger is not only clear but present, and 
the end justifying the means is immediate. 
What seems to be important to bear in mind is that violence as an act 
of aggression perpetrated against people might be justifiable, but its 
legitimacy can be questioned on the basis that the very act of violence 
aims to annihilate, destroy, hurt, and cause some sort of discomfort to 
people whom one might find unwilling as partners to engage in dialogical 
action. In other words, the act of causing physical and emotional harm 
to any people cannot be legitimate, because violence is meant to let the 
other experience suffering and pain. I say this, because legitimate action 
has some connection with what others agree should happen to them. In 
this way, by not agreeing to be violently assaulted, their human dignity 
somehow remains intact. This kind of violence is different from violence 
used in self-defence, as noted by Arendt. If I defend myself against 
those who perpetrate violence against me, then my violent retaliation 
or defence becomes legitimate only if I am willing to cease my defence 
once the perpetrator of violence against me decides to end the violence. 
In other words, legitimacy only has currency if I defend myself against 
violent acts and restrain my actions once others have ceased their violent 
ones. Consequently, the argument that violence can never be legitimate 
is a conditional one: self-defence against acts of violence is justifiable and 
legitimate when I restrain myself after the initial perpetrator of violence 
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has ceased all acts of violence against me. For instance, when the armed 
wing of the African National Congress (Umkhonto we sizwe) defended 
itself against the political killings of the apartheid state, their violent self-
defence was only justifiable, and hence legitimate, until the apartheid 
government ceased the perpetration of violence against members of the 
liberation movement. 
What follows from this, is that if institutions encourage people solely to 
use self-destructive ways of ending the lives of others to instill fear in the 
hearts and minds of those left behind, then such use of violence becomes 
illegitimate. This is so because fear, control and compliance are the intended 
ends of such violent acts that are undesirable for any form of human 
interaction and interdependence, and to which very few people would 
agree. If they do so for the sake of self-defence against a violent perpetrator, 
then their responses become conditionally legitimate. Therefore Arendt 
is correct when she states that ‘violence is by nature instrumental; like 
all means, it always stands in need of guidance and justification through 
the end it pursues’ (Arendt, 1969:51). In this way, the use of violence in 
itself remains illegitimate, but its use as self-defence makes it conditionally 
legitimate on the grounds that self-defence will end once acts of violence 
perpetrated against one have ceased. For instance, Umkhonto we sizwe 
ended its violent campaign once the apartheid state agreed to enter into 
dialogue with its ‘enemy’. This brings me to a discussion of what some 
have perceived to be the circumstantial use of violence and the desirable 
use of dialogical action.
Dialogical action as a means to transcend violence 
I have already alluded to the fact that the use of temporary violence is 
sometimes necessary, particularly in self-defence. This makes violence 
conditionally legitimate. I shall now argue that this temporary use of 
violence is also circumstantial; that is, its use depends on the conditions 
which have led to its initial use. I shall then make a case for dialogical 
action (with reference to Nussbaum’s view of human capabilities) as a 
desirable way of preventing ensuing acts of violence. 
The Bush administration convinced many of its allies that pre-emptive 
military intervention could prevent future violent activities on the part of 
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radicals. Unfortunately, this policy has not prevented radical groups from 
causing havoc and indulging in more violent terrorist acts in Israel, Palestine, 
Indonesia, Turkey, Spain, Iraq and Saudi Arabia (Hashim,  2005:131). 
Some might argue that the ‘war on terrorism’ is a way of settling the ‘scales 
of justice’ (Arendt,  1969:65). However, when violent military action 
contributes to an escalation of retaliatory violence – as seems to be the case 
in Afghanistan, Iraq and Chechnya – then one needs to question whether 
the ‘war on terrorism’ would actually be curbed on the basis of violent 
military action only. One can argue that initiating the ‘war on terrorism’ 
had some intended end in mind – the elimination of terrorists. But when 
such a means of curbing violence has not actually yielded the desired results 
(terrorists remain at large), then one needs to question whether persisting 
with violent military action against others should not be abandoned for 
other ways of settling the ‘scales of justice’. Amy Gutmann  (2003:170) 
makes a similar point when she states that ‘some demand that violent 
aggression be resisted by proportional violence if necessary, and others 
demand that violence not be met with violence’ – I share the latter view. 
Here I find Martha Nussbaum’s (2000) advocacy of ‘capability’ approach 
as a possible way in which the unlimited use of violent action can be 
restricted and the ‘war on terrorism’ be given another slant. The question 
that needs to be asked is not whether the ‘war on terrorism’ has achieved 
its desired ends, but rather whether the people against whom such violent 
action is directed are actually capable of abandoning, or in a position to 
abandon, terrorist activities or not. Terrorists would claim that they actually 
have no alternative but to respond violently to imperialist aggression. But 
then their violent actions have made very few, if any, gains, with the result 
that by far the majority of moderate Muslims have distanced themselves 
from terrorism. So, the question that terrorists need to ask is not whether 
their actions have succeeded, but rather what others against whom they 
wage violence are in a position to do. For instance, Hamas’s ascendancy 
to political power in Palestine does not have the support of Israel, because 
it is claimed that Hamas has not renounced its violent stance towards 
Israel – that is, Hamas does not recognise the state of Israel as legitimate 
and would like to see (and ensure) its demise. In turn, the government of 
Israel refuses to enter into political negotiations with Hamas, which they 
believe poses a threat to Israel’s safety and security. Simply put, Hamas 
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is viewed as a terrorist group, despite its rise to political power through 
democratic procedures. Following my earlier line of argument, what Israel 
needs to ask is what Hamas is capable of doing now that it has political 
authority in Palestine and, in turn, what Hamas should be asking is what 
Israel is capable of doing, now that it has replaced the Palestinian authority 
as the legitimate political power that should ‘govern’ the territories of the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 
The point I am making, is that one needs to ask about people’s capabilities. 
Nussbaum  (2000:78-80) claims that each person is a worthy human 
being on the basis of the fact that the person is able ‘to imagine, think, 
and reason – and to do these things in a truly human way’; ‘to form a 
conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection’; ‘to live with 
and toward others, to recognise and show concern for other human beings, 
to engage in various forms of social interaction – to be able to imagine 
the situation of another and to have compassion for that situation (and) 
to have the capability for both justice and friendship’; ‘to be treated as a 
dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others (which) entails, at 
a minimum, protections against discrimination on the basis of sex, race, 
sexual orientation, religion, caste, ethnicity, or national origin’; ‘to work as 
a human being, exercising practical reason and entering into meaningful 
relationships of mutual recognition with other(s)’.
At the core of the capability approach is the recognition that every person 
has the capability to reason, to show concern for another and to engage in 
meaningful relationships. Put differently, every person has the capability 
to offer respect to other persons. What is it about ‘respect for persons’ that 
can engender defensible dialogues and subsequently establish conditions 
favourable for non-violence? In the first instance, in a dialogue every 
participant wants to be recognised as someone with the same basic moral 
worth as any other participant – that is, a person has something to say and 
wants to be heard. In other words, in a dialogue people want to be seen 
as co-participants who share the authority to determine how the dialogue 
ought to unfold. This then requires participants in the dialogue to be 
prepared and willing to listen to what somebody else has to say. In short, 
every person wants to be respected for her worth – for the contribution 
she can potentially make to the dialogue. And this is where both Hamas 
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and the state of Israel can begin to recognise one another’s capabilities 
towards a peaceful settlement in the Middle East and not to wait until 
Hamas pursues its strategy of attacking Israel, and Israel, in turn, persists 
with its military strategy of ‘taking out’ the political leaders of Hamas. In 
another way, both these political authorities need to respect one another. 
When people engage in a dialogue, they show respect for one another 
when they allow one another to express themselves rationally – they 
are permitted to articulate meanings. In other words, as co-participants 
they respect one another as equals; this respect implies that each person 
recognises others as capable and competent to articulate what they have in 
mind – they simply do not choose the path of blind hatred and exclusion. 
The upshot of this is that people show respect for one another when they 
consider their judgements to have value, because these judgements are the 
expressions of how people have chosen to make sense to others – to make 
others know what they think and reflect on. And this can only be done 
if dialogues ensue between different and even conflicting people, such as 
what happened at the Kempton Park negotiations between the ANC and 
the then apartheid Nationalist government in 1992 (two years prior to 
South Africa’s first ever democratic elections). 
Since the ‘war on terrorism’ began, many nations have overtly challenged 
minority practices in their attempts to curb radicals: Turkish soldiers 
intercept students wearing hijabs or turbans when they enter Istanbul 
University, and the French and Singaporean governments banned the 
wearing of headscarves in public schools. Only when we begin to engage 
in dialogical action with those who are other and different (especially the 
radicals), then will the looming dangers of violent action be seriously 
diminished. Moreover, respect (as has been argued for previously) 
demands that we listen appreciatively to those engaged in violent action, 
whether perceived as ‘victim’ or ‘perpetrator’. The film Paradise Now 
clearly illustrates the need to engage with the reasons of potential ‘suicide’ 
bombers – that is, understanding why they have made particular choices 
to want to blow themselves up in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. In this film, 
potential ‘suicide’ bombers cite reasons such as having suffered human 
indignities at the hands of Israeli occupation, and the honour bestowed on 
martyrdom for a ‘just’ cause – as if blowing up others in a shopping market 
or a moving bus is indeed justice. Likewise, the film Munich depicts the 
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need to understand why Israel is so intent on eliminating the ‘enemy’: 
reasons such as protecting the Promised Land and protecting the people of 
Israel against Palestinian aggression come out clearly in defence of ‘Israeli 
retaliation’, or at times as justification for the pre-emptive use of violent 
force. In this way, listening to the stories of those subjected to violence 
could potentially lead to arousing their interest in preventing violence at 
all costs. In other words, respect requires listening to many voices we like 
or dislike and deplore – that is, listening through active engagement with 
the aim of preventing violent action. 
This brings me to a discussion of responsible action as a means to curb 
violent action. Why? To act dialogically with respect for the dignity of 
others alone would not ensure non-violence – that is, peace, stability 
and human security in this world. There is sufficient empirical evidence 
to suggest that dialogue on its own cannot guarantee non-violence. The 
United Nations, widely perceived as a forum for dialogical action, could 
not prevent the war in Iraq. Similarly, dialogue among Sunni and Shi’i 
factions in Iraq cannot on its own prevent the ongoing conflict in that 
country. We also need what Hannah Arendt  (1977) refers to as people 
who can take responsibility for the world – those who can prevent 
wars, conflict, and other forms of violence if opportunities for peace are 
envisaged. What does such kind of responsible action involve? For me, 
responsible action aimed at minimising and preventing violence should 
at least be constituted by three interrelated activities: non-instrumentality, 
impartiality and deliberation. I shall now explore how each of these acts of 
responsibility could reduce violence.
Firstly, to act non-instrumentally means that one is not just concerned 
about achieving completeness in what one does, more specifically how 
one can reach an end rather than why that end should be what one aims 
for. For instance, if agreement has been reached between different and 
rival factions about attaining a ceasefire, such an agreement should not 
be considered as complete and final without considering why a ceasefire 
is crucial. If one acts with the understanding that a ceasefire is a necessary 
condition in order for dialogue to proceed, then one acts responsibly. In 
other words, one acts non-instrumentally because one is not just intent 
on achieving some kind of agreement (in this instance a ceasefire between 
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contending factions), but more importantly, that a ceasefire could lay 
the grounds for dialogical action to occur whereby possibilities for non-
violence can be explored. In this way, one acts responsibly.
Secondly, to act impartially means that one makes one’s understanding of 
the world and events that occur in it known to others without any form of 
bias. It is always difficult for people to see things in impartial, unbiased ways 
(especially when they represent rival traditions). For instance, some citizens 
speak patriotically about their political leaders even when they know their 
leaders might be guilty of some acts of violence against people – Saddam 
Hussein continued to receive support from some Iraqi factions although 
there is sufficient evidence that he ordered the massacre of many Kurds. 
Likewise, Miroslav Milosevic gained unbridled support for his role in the 
Bosnian genocide. These citizens are acting with partiality – and hence, 
less responsibly. So when one engages in dialogues about possibilities for 
peace and reconciliation (as happened in South Africa with the work of the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission in the 1990s) one has to learn what 
it means to act impartially even if it means going against oneself or against 
those whom one loyally supports. 
Thirdly, to act deliberatively means that one has developed the capacity to 
listen to the voices of others, to respond critically to them, and to consider 
others’ justifiable criticism of one’s views. In South Africa, perpetrators of 
violent crimes against others listened to their victims, responded critically 
to overzealous claims about their alleged apartheid crimes, and also 
listened to their victims’ justifiable criticism of them – these deliberative 
acts became the seedbeds for reconciliation in South Africa. To my mind, 
having acted deliberatively with others, both perpetrators and victims of 
apartheid crimes moved towards responsible action – those actions which 
can make possible what by now seems highly improbable, that is, peace 
and human security in this world of ours. This brings me to my next point 
on how to cultivate non-violence in educational institutions through the 
means of responsible action. 
Against violence: Cultivating responsible action 
I am sympathetic towards Arendt’s claim that ‘much of the present 
glorification of violence is caused by severe frustration of the faculty of 
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action in the modern world’ (1969:83). In Arendt’s view, to act means to 
disclose oneself through word and deed, and action is constituted of the 
following meanings: Firstly, to act means to begin by taking the initiative – 
to set something in motion (Arendt, 1998:177). Students are said to act 
when they initiate speech, and question and challenge without having to 
be told or asked by their teachers to do so. Following Arendt, by taking 
the initiative, students are initium, newcomers or beginners by virtue of 
their having been prompted into action. Secondly, when a person acts, 
then the unexpected can be expected, that is, she is capable of performing 
what is ‘infinitely improbable’ (Arendt, 1998:178). In doing so, a student 
announces what she does, has done and intends to do. For instance, a 
student who has not spoken a word in class decides to talk, which might 
come as a surprise to her teacher. She communicates to the class how she 
has felt excluded at times for not having said a word in earlier discussions, 
and then commits herself to engaging in future deliberations with fellow 
students – a matter of doing the unexpected. Thirdly, a student who 
acts never does so in isolation. Instead she acts in the presence of others 
(Arendt, 1998:178). In other words, an ‘actor always moves among and in 
relation to other acting beings, he is never merely a “doer” but always and 
at the same time a sufferer’ (Arendt, 1998:190). If my reading of Arendt is 
correct, then a person who acts has the capacity and willingness not only 
to disclose her inner voice through speech, but also to drive herself towards 
listening and responding to others without being inhibited in doing so. 
She recognises that her audience has a right to be heard and listened to. 
If this happens, then the act of deliberation can be understood as willing 
and unhindered dialogue. Fourthly, action has the effect of the outcome 
of, say deliberative argumentation, being unpredictable and irreversible 
(Arendt, 1998:220). When the outcome of deliberation is unpredictable 
and irreversible, then the possibility of the dialogue lasting is very likely. 
Such a situation in turn would enable students and teachers to engage in 
durable deliberations that make improbable the end of, and unpredictable 
the result of, argumentation. And if students and teachers act in this way, 
they would want their stories to be told, because what seems to be the 
end of a story marks the beginning of something else – the possibility 
of recognising the inner voices of others becomes more and more likely, 
because unknown voices can only be heard while deliberations are durable. 
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Although I agree with most of Arendt’s views on action, I think she is 
wrong to suggest that action ought to be unconstrained and that its effects 
are irreversible. For instance, there is much outrage in the Muslim world 
over the publication of cartoons in Danish newspapers that ridicule and 
denigrate the prophet Muhammad. Published under the utility of freedom 
of speech, these cartoons seem to have offended many Muslims. There 
have consequently been peaceful protests on the part of some, as well as 
in a few instances violent actions on the part of others. In fact, radicals’ 
recourse to violent action was spawned by what was perceived to be an 
assault on Islam. Of course, expressing disgust at the cartoons through 
peaceful means is justifiable. However, violent protests as a means to 
retaliate could spark more unacceptable violence (embassy burnings) 
and hence such action seems to be illegitimate. Therefore, my concern 
is: Should the Danish cartoons, which by far the majority of Muslims 
find offensive, have been published in the first place? In other words, can 
one just say, under the pretext of freedom of speech, what one wants to 
say, even though others might find it unjust and hurtful? In this respect, 
freedom of speech (as of action) cannot be unconstrained, because doing 
an injustice to others – that is, offending others’ religion and their prophet 
– amounts to irresponsible speech. Why? Apart from the fact that radicals 
might use such actions as a platform to initiate further violence in the 
guise of being defenders of their faith, such unconstrained actions could 
deepen the growing rift between Islam and the West.
CHAPTER
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Ubuntu moments
In the first few years after I became a full professor in the faculty, I received 
several invitations to do development work in black schools and amongst 
my black colleagues at other universities. What I remember quite glowingly, 
is that on all occasions I was treated with the utmost dignity and respect 
– so much so that I felt somewhat uncomfortable about what seemed to 
be highly humane moments. If such magnificent occurrences were to be 
associated with ubuntu, then I have every reason to believe that, if it were 
enacted in relation to pedagogy, it could greatly enhance the way students 
and teachers learn. Moreover, why would there then exist so much racial 
tension and xenophobia in several educational institutions in South Africa? 
One thing I am convinced of is that ubuntu (literally ‘I am because we are’) 
is not ubiquitously practised, yet it has enormous potential to enhance 
democratic citizenship education. Let me explore.
Towards an exposition of ubuntu
The concept ubuntu is found in almost all African languages although 
the same word is not always used, which suggests that the notion must 
have had currency amongst Africa’s people in the past. For instance, in 
Kenyan languages such as Kikuyu and Kimeru, the words used in referring 
to this concept are umundu and umuntu; in kiSukuma and kiHaya of 
Tanzania, ubuntu is referred to as bumuntu; in shiTsonga and shiTswa of 
Mozambique, the word is vumuntu; in Bobangi, spoken in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, it is called bomoto; and in kiKongo of Angola, 
ubuntu is referred to as gimuntu (Kamwangamalu, 1999:26). I shall show 
how the challenges posed by educational institutions (in Africa) can be 
addressed by the notion of ubuntu – more specifically how ubuntu can 
engender a form of democratic citizenship education. Ubuntu (a form of 
communal engagement which allows space for criticality, non-domination 
and ensuring that human relationships flourish) is apposite to address a 
lack of democratic citizenship. The practice is specifically of relevance to 
African societies because of its history of colonisation, racial oppression 
and segregation, and economic, political and social instabilities, insecurities 
and complexities. 
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I draw on the views of Letseka  (2000:179), who identifies the ‘notion 
of botho or ubuntu (humanism)  … as pervasive and fundamental to 
African socioethical thought, as illuminating the communal rootedness 
and interdependence of persons, and highlighting the importance of 
human relationships … as an important measure of human wellbeing or 
human flourishing in traditional African life’. He treats botho or ubuntu 
‘as normative in that it encapsulates moral norms and virtues such as 
kindness, generosity, compassion, benevolence, courtesy, and respect and 
concern for others’ (Letseka, 2000:180). Then he suggests ‘that educating 
for botho or ubuntu, for interpersonal and cooperative skills, and for 
human wellbeing or human flourishing, ought to be major concerns of an 
African philosophy of education’ – more specifically Africanisation. The 
question arises: What is the particular standing of ubuntu in Africa? My 
reading of the concept is that it offers both a general philosophical position 
as to how people should co-exist organically, and a way of how Africa can 
contribute to global culture – a matter of reconciling the local (ubuntu) 
with the global (deliberative democracy). 
As a philosophical position, ubuntu has in mind the co-existence of people 
along the lines of having respect for people together with recognising 
peoples’ vulnerabilities and actually doing something about changing 
people’s situation. When people respect one another, they allow one 
another to live their lives according to what might be good for them. 
They do not impose their understanding of the world and what is good 
for them on one another. For instance, Hutus and Tutsis from Rwanda, 
or Zulus and Xhosas from South Africa, respect one another without 
imposing their understanding of reality and what constitutes the good life 
on one another. Tribal rivalries, which often erupt in many regions on 
the African continent in the form of violent clashes (Kenya is the recent 
example in case), demonstrate that ubuntu is not always practised amongst 
these people, yet it is a philosophical position with its roots in African 
culture. Of course, there are places (such as in Namibia) where people co-
exist in peace and harmony. In fact, ubuntu evolved over many centuries 
in traditional African culture and was expressed in the songs, stories, 
customs and institutions of people (Schutte, 2001:9). Some instances in 
which ubuntu was lived out in Africa are reflected in Nyerere’s concept of 
ujaama (namely that a person becomes a person through cooperation with 
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others), and unhu (that is, a way of confirming one’s humanity in relations 
with others). 
Of course, critics of ubuntu might argue that the practice is not new, 
because in Western societies communality and human interdependence 
have been part of people’s practices for a long time, and that respect for the 
other, generosity, kindness and compassion are virtues which are not new 
at all. I agree. However, acting in relation to others also has a contextual 
dimension – that is, engaging with one another in post-colonial African 
societies will invariably be different to human interaction in other non-
African societies. For instance, having compassion for people suffering 
from famine and poverty in the Darfur region of Sudan is distinctly 
different from showing compassion to some working-class European 
families who might be temporarily unemployed. The point is, on the one 
hand, that compassion in the sense advocated by ubuntu requires that 
people recognise the vulnerabilities of others brought about by ethnic 
conflict and political struggle in post-colonial societies and actually do 
something to minimise this. On the other hand, having compassion 
for unemployed working-class families because of insufficient job 
opportunities in perhaps highly flourishing economies which have never 
been subjected to pernicious forms of colonialism are quite different from 
exercising ubuntu. Put differently, practising ubuntu is exclusively linked 
to cultivating human cooperation and interdependence in post-colonial 
Africa intent on subverting forms of racism, exploitation and domination. 
It is in this regard that I share Pityana’s (1999:148) view that ubuntu is 
logically connected to the preservation of human dignity, the achievement 
of equality, the enhancement of human rights and freedoms, and the 
enhancement of the common good (more specifically, the subversion of 
racism, exploitation and domination). 
The question arises: How can the afore-mentioned view of ubuntu 
contribute towards engendering democratic citizenship education? In the 
first instance, ubuntu does not abandon the idea that human relationships 
should be subjected to deliberation. It is commonly accepted in many 
African cultures that the authority of people in leadership positions should 
not be challenged. This viewpoint is evident from the behaviours of several 
of my students from Southern African countries who seem to be hesitant 
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to challenge university professors at the institution where I work as a mark 
of respect for academic authority. I remember one student telling me that 
she once had the inclination to question the chieftain of her tribe, but 
refrained from doing so as a mark of respect for his leadership. This, she 
claimed, happened because ubuntu implies respect for the human dignity 
of others. Such a view of ubuntu is restricted in the sense that challenging 
someone else cannot be associated with disrespect. Such an idea of ubuntu 
also assumes that human beings do not have differences and that they 
constitute a homogeneous society. In fact, my argument is that human 
relations are constituted by ambivalence and conflict and that deliberation 
invariably happens when one person wants to justify his points of view 
and another person takes somebody else’s view into critical scrutiny. 
Moreover, following Gyekye (1997) and considering Africa’s history and 
culture, people ought to be less formal in deliberative conversations. If my 
reading of Gyekye is correct, then it means that conversations should not 
only be confined to articulating points of view in a logically defensible 
way through rigorous argumentation and debate whereby points of view 
are challenged and undermined, or where persuasion and the quest for 
the better argument become necessary conditions for deliberative inquiry 
to unfold. I agree, since illiteracy and the lack of eloquence amongst 
ordinary citizens would exclude them from the deliberative conversation. 
Gyekye  (1997:27) contends that African colonial and postcolonial 
experience has had enduring effects on the mentality acquired by many 
Africans – a colonial mentality that engenders ‘apism’, that notion which 
enables people to look for answers to Africa’s problems outside Africa, and 
more specifically within European culture. It is this same ‘apist’ attitude 
on the part of most of Africa’s people that leads them to suppress their 
own opinions in preference to the wisdom of sages. I do not think that 
Gyekye would dismiss the wisdom of sagacity in deliberative discourse, 
since the individual’s inclinations, orientations, intuitions and outlooks 
are important to philosophical inquiry (Gyekye,  1997:12). However, 
Gyekye’s view suggests that ways should be found to make the less 
eloquent, illiterate and seemingly inarticulate person express his or her 
thoughts. For this reason his call for the application of less formal rules 
in deliberative conversation seems to be valid. In this regard, I  have a 
suspicion that Gyekye’s emphasis on the application of a minimalist 
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logic in deliberative conversation has some connection with allowing 
Africa’s people to articulate their oral narratives about their beliefs, values, 
folktales, drama and cultural traditions without having to convince others 
of their orientations. This makes sense for the reason that many of Africa’s 
people do not necessarily know the logical reasons for the beliefs and 
values bequeathed to them by their ancestral past. When I asked a Master’s 
student of the Ovambu tribe in Namibia about his father’s polygamous 
marriages, he did not entirely convince me when he told me that his father 
treats all spouses equally justly. However, if I were to have countered him 
on the apparent ludicrousness of polygamy, our conversation would not 
have continued for long. So, the idea of asking for a minimalist logic would 
establish conditions that would include rather than exclude people from 
the deliberative conversation. In fact, including them in the conversation 
might open up possibilities for them to begin to challenge and question 
their own positions self-reflexively. 
In essence, practising ubuntu has the potential of harnessing critical 
inquiry and deliberative forms of teaching and learning. For me, the 
Africanisation of educational institutions does not mean that deliberations 
have to lead to the non-questioning and silencing of academic authority. 
Instead, ubuntu means to uphold respect for the human dignity of others 
through deliberation, which invariably involves questioning and the 
challenging of academic authority. If educational institutions are serious 
about Africanising, they should restore processes of deliberation whereby 
opportunities would be created for people to engage with one another and 
concomitantly develop respect for the views of others as persons. It is a 
sign of disrespect towards the other person if her views are not subjected to 
critical scrutiny. This brings me to a discussion of how ubuntu can become 
more influential in advancing democratic justice in and beyond African 
educational institutions. 
Ubuntu and democratic justice
Of course, one of the limitations of ubuntu is that the practice assumes 
that people need to take collective responsibility for actions. But this is 
not always forthcoming, as is evident from the HIV and AIDS epidemic 
and escalating levels of crime in (South) Africa for which, it seems, no 
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one really wants to assume responsibility, because it is erroneously 
thought that individual responsibility cannot happen as ‘a person is only 
a person through other persons’. Similarly, overextending ubuntu through 
deliberative democracy which invokes belligerence and distress could cause 
people to become alienated, because their collectivity through ubuntu might 
be undermined and some people even excluded. For instance, students at 
one higher education institution in South Africa, where campus violence 
erupted because of students’ refusal to pay their debts, feel alienated and 
excluded because of management’s attitude to deal with them (in dialogue) 
in an antagonistic fashion. More recently, in Chad and Kenya, mistrust 
and refusal to engage with the other is a vindication that ubuntu alone 
cannot contribute to resolving the political crises in these countries unless 
conditions are put in place whereby people can feel the need to co-exist 
through ubuntu and deliberative democracy. Simply put, the local value of 
ubuntu can only have real currency if people see the need to cooperate and 
co-exist peacefully. 
CHAPTER
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Towards a communitarian conception of democratic citizenship 
education in South Africa 
Having been in a deanship for more than three years, I am no stranger to 
difference of opinion or even conflict. I recently experienced yet another 
volatile period in the history of my beloved country, South Africa. I have 
just taught a postgraduate class on the serious implications of hate speech, 
of which the ANC Youth League’s President, Julius Malema, had been 
found guilty by the court, in particular in view of his singing the liberation 
song, ‘Kill the Boer, Kill the Farmer’ on public platforms at political rallies. 
The ANC leadership argued that Malema was honouring the liberation 
song, while others said that he was inciting black people to violence, which 
included killing farmers. On 3 April 2010, Eugene Terre’Blanche, the 
leader of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) – a movement which 
racially champions only the cause of white Afrikaners in post-apartheid 
South Africa – was allegedly killed by two black youths, aged 15 and 28. 
Whereas the government called for calm not to inflame political tensions, 
the AWB vowed to avenge their leader’s brutal killing. President Jacob 
Zuma said the following on national television: ‘It is our responsibility 
to denounce the crime and stay away from statements that might reverse 
nation building and racial cohesion.’ The ANC has faced pressure to ban 
the song, which has been blamed for motivating the murder.10 At the 
same time, the two workers who had been arrested claimed that they had 
killed the leader because of a R600 wage dispute. They also alleged that 
Terre’ Blanche was a bad employer who used to abuse them physically and 
verbally and that he had ‘pushed them too far’. It is unacceptable for young 
black men to consider killing another person to settle a wage dispute and 
it should be condemned. If AWB members were to threaten South Africa’s 
seemingly fragile democracy, it would further polarise racial groups in the 
country. Hence, the need to educate for democratic citizenship becomes 
increasingly important, because of the parochial and blind views espoused 
by both the ANC Youth League and the AWB leadership. 
In line with the aforementioned need to educate for democratic citizenship, 
I shall explore how instances of liberal and communitarian conceptions of 
10 Violence on farms is high, with 1,248 farmers and farm workers killed between 1997 and 2007.
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democratic citizenship theory underscore education in South Africa. My 
contention is that democratic citizenship education as it evolved through 
‘Values, Education and Democracy’ policy discourses seems to resemble 
instances of liberal and communitarian conceptions of democratic 
citizenship theory. Yet, aspects of such a democratic citizenship education 
also seem to be at odds with liberal and communitarian conceptions. My 
contention is that a communitarian conception of democratic citizenship 
education, which invokes expansive patriotism, has the potential to 
enact educational transformation in institutions. Consequently, I argue 
that democratic citizenship education initiatives in South Africa need to 
take seriously the notion of expansive patriotism so that students may 
become thinking, deliberative, forgiving, reconciliatory and peaceful – a 
precondition, as I argue, for educational transformation to occur.
Since the establishment of the country’s new democratic system of 
government in April 1994, every education policy initiative has been 
linked to the democratic principles enunciated in the Constitution and 
Bill of Rights of 1996. It is not surprising that the national Department 
of Education (DoE) initiated the Tirisano Project (‘Tirisano’ meaning 
‘Working together’) in 1999, with its strategic goals being to ensure that 
the country’s new outcomes-based education system (OBE) could be 
successfully implemented in accord with a spirit of democracy, respect for 
human rights, justice, equality, freedom, nation building and reconciliation 
– key features listed in the Preamble of the Constitution. 
After the second democratic elections in 1999, Kader Asmal was appointed 
Minister of Education to confirm and accelerate the transformative 
work done by his predecessor, Professor Sibusiso Bengu. The year 1999 
also welcomed in the then President, Thabo Mbeki, whose watchword 
was ‘accelerated delivery’ (DoE  1999:7). In his State of the Nation 
address to Parliament on 25 June 1999, Mr Mbeki identified education 
and training as a critical priority for meeting the broader challenge 
of creating a democratic and prosperous society (DoE,  1999:11). On 
27  July 1999, after vigorous discussions with the major stakeholders in 
the educational arena, the Minister of Education launched what he called 
‘a national mobilisation for education and training’ under the slogan 
Tirisano, ‘Working together’, where he called upon all South Africans, in 
119
CHAPTER 8 • Democratic citizenship education and educational transformation
the spirit of Tirisano, to join hands with the Ministry to tackle the most 
urgent problems in education. More specifically, the Tirisano Project 
announced the following as its goals: establishing cooperative governance 
in educational institutions; making schools ‘centres of community and 
cultural life’;  attending to and preventing the physical degradation of 
schools; developing the professionalism of teachers; cultivating active 
learning through OBE; creating an education and training system which 
could meet the socio-economic demands of the country; reconfiguring 
higher education in line with the imperatives of a global market economy; 
and dealing purposefully with HIV/AIDS (DoE, 1999). 
In essence, the goals of the Tirisano Project stressed the Ministry of 
Education’s commitment to producing ‘good’ citizens who, on the one 
hand, can contribute towards achieving the political stability and peace 
necessary to ensure the growth of a competitive labour market economy 
and, on the other hand, can combat the crime, corruption and moral 
decadence endemic to South African society. 
Two Tirisano moments of democratic citizenship education
In modern times interest in democratic citizenship has been sparked 
by a number of political events and trends throughout the world – 
increasing apathy and long-term welfare dependency in the United States, 
the resurgence of nationalist movements in Eastern Europe, the stresses 
created by increasingly multicultural and multiracial populations in 
Western Europe, the failure of environmental policies that rely on citizens’ 
voluntary cooperation, disaffection with globalisation and the perceived 
loss of national sovereignty (Kymlicka, 2002:284). These events indicated 
that the stability of modern democracies depends not only on the justice of 
their institutions – for instance, in the case of South Africa, its Constitution, 
Bill of Rights, Constitutional Court and multiparty democratic system 
– but also on the quality and attitude of its citizens: for example, their 
sense of identity and how they view potentially competing forms of 
national, regional, ethnic or religious identities; their ability to tolerate 
and work with others who are different from themselves; their desire to 
participate in the political process in order to promote the public good and 
hold authorities accountable; their willingness to show self-restraint and 
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exercise personal responsibility in their economic demands and in personal 
choices which affect their health and the environment. Without citizens 
who possess these qualities, democracies become difficult to govern, even 
unstable (Kymlicka, 2002:285). 
The point I am making, is that South Africa’s democratic education system 
would not necessarily function effectively in the absence of an especially 
responsible and accountable citizenry. Individuals cannot just pursue their 
own self-interest without regard for the common good; neither would 
procedural-institutional mechanisms such as a Constitution, Bill of Rights 
and multi-party democratic system of government be enough. Citizens 
also require what Galston (1991:217) and Macedo (1990:138) refer to as 
some level of civic virtue and public-spiritedness. In other words, effective 
education policy implementation relies on responsible citizenship. For 
instance, the state would be unable to provide a basic education if citizens 
do not act responsibly with respect to their own education in terms of 
attending school (both teachers and students), eradicating the vandalising 
of school buildings, and fostering communal involvement in school 
activities. Attempts to implement policy would flounder without the 
cooperation and self-restraint of citizens, that is, the exercise of civic virtue 
– citizens’ willingness to participate, ability to trust, and giving expression 
to their sense of justice (Kymlicka, 2002:286). 
In South Africa, two strategic moments spearheaded by the DoE sum 
up the country’s commitment to implementing democratic citizenship 
education: (1) The Report of the Working Group on Values in Education 
(DoE, 2000), which culminated in the Saamtrek Conference on Values, 
Education and Democracy (DoE, 2001a); and (2) the Manifesto on Values 
in Education (DoE, 2001b), which was generated by the former. This brings 
me to a discussion of the main aspects associated with these moments.
Firstly, following the 1994 elections, the transformation of the education 
system became the top priority of the new government. According to 
Minister Asmal, the democratic values as enshrined in the Constitution 
had to be developed and internalised by South Africans, and schools were 
the most convenient point of embarking upon this project. As stated 
earlier, President Thabo Mbeki identified education and training as a 
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critical priority for meeting the broader challenge of creating a democratic 
and prosperous society. His position was that the transformation of the 
education system required a fundamental reassessment and rethinking 
in order to prepare people for ‘citizenship’ and ‘nationhood’. Therefore, 
small wonder that Minister Asmal, in his Tirisano Implementation Plan, 
focused on ‘developing people for [democratic] citizenship’. Minister 
Bengu announced on his appointment in 1994 that all schools and 
education institutions were open and without racial barriers of any kind, 
as promulgated in the 1993 Interim Constitution. The South African 
Schools Act of 1996 created the nation’s first national and non-racial 
school system (DoE,  1999:63). On the one hand, however, a South 
African Human Rights Commission study on racial integration in schools 
found that racism was still extremely prevalent in some schools. On the 
other hand, another question being debated was whether the DoE should 
focus on ‘race’ alone as a form of discrimination: ‘Race may be the most 
obvious and historically potent of the issues on which discrimination 
occurs, but racial intolerance is commonly associated with other forms of 
prejudice and bigotry, towards women, gays, foreigners, the disabled, and 
other religious traditions’ (DoE, 1999:66). 
It was during an informal discussion on religious education for the Tirisano 
Plan that the idea of a ‘Values, Education and Democracy’ project, following 
the international trend of ‘education for democratic values and social 
participation’, was born. Out of this broader concern for social solidarity 
and cohesion, the practice of peace, and civic participation in democratic 
institutions, Minister Kader Asmal requested that a  working group on 
‘Values, Education and Democracy’ be established in February  2000 
(DoE, 1999:66-67).11 
11 The members of the Working Group on ‘Values, Education and Democracy’ were appointed by the 
Minister of Education, Kader Asmal, in their individual capacities. Headed by Professor Wilmot 
James (ex-Dean of Humanities, University of Cape Town), the other members were: Dr Frans 
Auerbach (retired educator, South African Jewish Board of Deputies); Prof. Zubeida Desai 
(Chairperson, Pan South African Language Board; Dean of the Faculty of Education, University 
of the Western Cape); Prof. Herman Giliomee (former Professor of Political Studies at the 
University of Cape Town); Dr Z Pallo Jordan (Minister of Parliament); Ms Antjie Krog (author, 
poet and journalist); Mr Tembile Kulati (Special Advisor to the Minister: Higher Education); 
Mr  Khetsi Lehoko (Deputy Director-General in the DoE); Dr Brenda Leibowitz (Director: 
Centre for Teaching and Learning, Stellenbosch University); and Ms Pansy Tlakula (Member of 
the South African Human Rights Commission) (DoE, 2000:53).
122
EDUCATION, DEMOCRACY AND CITIZENSHIP REVISITED
Under the auspices of the Working Group, a school-based research project 
was conducted in October 2000 by a consortium of research organisations 
led by the Witwatersrand University Education Policy Unit to explore 
the ways that teachers, students and parents think and talk about values, 
education and democracy. Provincial officials chose ninety-seven schools 
across five provinces to represent the range of schools in their province. 
Questionnaires were distributed to all the teachers and principals. Three-
hour participatory workshops were conducted separately with teachers, 
students and parents in thirteen schools (DoE, 2000:4). After a process of 
research and debate, this working group presented a report on its findings 
and recommendations, entitled ‘Values, Education and Democracy: Report 
of the Working Group on Values in Education’, in April 2000. According 
to the Report of the Working Group (RWG), the democratic Constitution 
and Bill of Rights accepted in 1996 provide the frame of reference for a 
democratic educational philosophy. The RWG outlines the importance of 
achieving the following in education: 
1. Developing the intellectual abilities and critical faculties of students; 
2. Establishing a climate of inclusiveness in institutions whereby students 
do not feel alienated and excluded; and 
3. Equipping students with problem-solving abilities (DoE, 2000). 
The Working Group proposed the promotion of six ‘values’ which they 
contended would contribute towards producing an inclusive, critical 
student population capable of problem solving. These values include: 
equity, tolerance, multilingualism, openness, accountability and social 
honour (DoE, 2000). A brief analytical summary of these values and their 
purposes as understood by the Working Group now follows: 
•	 Equity is considered as a means to eradicate the inequalities in 
education, experienced mostly by Black students and teachers; 
•	 Tolerance is considered as a priority in cultivating in students the 
capacities for mutual understanding, reciprocal altruism and the 
recognition of difference, particularly in managing and supporting 
the linguistic, religious, cultural and national diversity of the South 
African community of students and teachers (DoE, 2000:22); 
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•	 Multilingualism seeks to equalise the status of the eleven official 
languages as announced in the Constitution of 1996. These languages 
are:  Sepedi, Sesotho, Setswana, siSwati, Tshivenda, Xitsonga, isiNdebele, 
isiXhosa, isiZulu, Afrikaans and English. Two values are promoted in 
the area of language: firstly, the importance of studying in the language 
one knows best, or as this is popularly referred to, mother-tongue 
education; and secondly, the fostering of multilingualism, that is, since 
South Africa is a multilingual country, students are encouraged to be 
at least bilingual, but preferably trilingual (DoE, 2000:30-33); 
•	 Openness is considered as a direct challenge to rote learning and the 
slavish repetition of information which characterised the apartheid 
system of education, where asking questions was discouraged and where 
an authoritarian attitude to learning and social conduct was expected of 
teachers. Cultivating openness principally has to do with engendering 
in students the capacities to be open and receptive to new ideas, such 
as the ability to ask good and penetrating questions, and being willing 
to debate to arrive at quality decisions (DoE, 2000:36-39); 
•	 Accountability aims to foster in teachers and students a capacity for 
diligence, commitment to teaching and learning, and responsibility 
so desperately lacking in many dysfunctional black schools 
(DoE, 2000:42-45); and 
•	 Honour is aimed at instilling in students and teachers a sense of 
‘common loyalty’ to the state or to national symbols, which was 
lacking before 1994 (DoE, 2000:48-50). 
The understanding of democratic citizenship education as espoused in 
the aforementioned six values seems to resemble a liberal conception of 
democratic citizenship as propounded by Rawls  (1971), which  places 
an emphasis on people possessing a set of rights and obligations they 
enjoy equally as citizens; for instance, having a right to personal security 
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and freedom of speech. Certainly the attainment of equity12 implies 
that everyone has a right to education, whereas the promotion of 
multilingualism recognises the right of people to communicate in the 
language of their choice. Moreover, values such as tolerance, respect, 
openness, accountability and social honour can be related to the liberal 
view that people need to uphold the rule of law and generally not to 
interfere with others’ enjoyment of their rights. In other words, a liberal 
conception of democratic citizenship aims to inculcate in people a sense of 
moral virtue or ‘public-spiritedness’ to respect the rule of law, to cultivate 
socio-economic justice and to promote commonality amongst themselves 
(Miller,  2000:83). Hence, the RWG seems to be aligned to a liberal 
conception of democratic citizenship education. 
However, on taking a closer look at Rawls’s ideas, the value of ‘equity’ as 
espoused by the RWG does seem to be at odds with a liberal conception 
of democratic citizenship. In presenting Rawls’s ideas, I shall first expound 
on his ‘general conception’ of justice: ‘All social primary goods – liberty 
and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect – are 
to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all of 
these goods is to the advantage of the least favored’ (Rawls, 1971:303). 
Rawls ties the idea of justice to an equal sharing of social goods, but he 
adds treating people as equals does not mean that one has to remove all 
inequalities (as suggested by the RWG), especially when the presence of 
such inequalities favour the least advantaged. For instance, if giving poor 
citizens a better pension allowance than wealthy citizens actually promotes 
the welfare of the poor without disadvantaging the living conditions of the 
wealthy, then inequality is allowed. 
12  According to figures supplied by the Department of Education, 4.3% of young adults and 17% 
of youths are illiterate (45% of adults are functionally illiterate); 4,407 schools are in ‘poor’ 
or ‘very poor’ condition; close to half of South Africa’s schools have a shortage of classrooms 
(almost 65,000 classrooms are needed); 2.3 million students attend schools without water within 
walking distance; 6.6 million students attend schools that have no toilets; and only some 10% of 
primary schools and around a third of secondary schools have recreational facilities (Christiansen 
Cawthra, Helman-Smith and Moloi, 2001:88). Moreover, the South African Statistics Income 
and Expenditure Survey of 1995 showed that the poverty rate for Africans was slightly above 
60% compared to 1% for whites; 60% of female-headed households fell under the poverty line 
compared to around 30% of male-headed households; and the poverty rate in rural areas was 
some 70% compared to almost 30% in urban areas (Christiansen Cawthra, Helman-Smith and 
Moloi, 2001:80).
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Rawls breaks down this ‘general conception’ of justice into two principles:
First Principle – Each person is to have an equal right to the most 
extensive total system of equal liberties compatible with a similar 
system of liberty for all.
Second Principle – Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged 
so that they are both:
a. to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, and
b. attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of 
fair equality of opportunity (Rawls, 1971:56). 
According to these principles, equal liberties take precedence over equal 
opportunities, which take precedence over equal resources. But central to 
both principles is the idea that an inequality is allowed if it benefits ‘the 
least advantaged’. In contrast to such a Rawlsian idea, the RWG suggests 
that inequalities in education be eradicated. If the distribution of resources 
in South African schools favours the least advantaged, then the unequal 
resources of advantaged schools could be allowed in a Rawlsian sense. 
In his more recent work, entitled Political Liberalism, Rawls still endorses 
his two principles of justice: the liberty principle, which guarantees every 
citizen equal basic liberties; and the difference principle, which requires 
an equal distribution of resources except where inequalities benefit the 
least advantaged people. Yet, it is his argument for the liberty principle 
that has changed. Rawls’s conception of liberty is no longer merely limited 
to providing equal basic liberties to individuals, but it entails that liberty 
(freedom) must be interpreted in terms of an individual’s capacity to form 
and revise his (her) conception of what it means to do good. Rawls (1993:30) 
makes the following statement: ‘As free persons, citizens claim the right to 
view their persons as independent from and as not identified with any 
particular conception of the good, or scheme of private ends’. For instance, 
according to this Rawlsian idea of ‘political liberalism’, every individual 
affiliated to a particular religious group has the right to exercise his (her) 
rights, and in so doing attempts to restrict or eliminate group-imposed 
hindrances that would nullify such private individual rights. In other 
words, groups cannot limit the basic liberties of their individual members, 
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including their right to be non-religious or to question and revise inherited 
conceptions of the good (Kymlicka, 2002:238). What Rawls’s ‘political 
liberalism’ involves is not only giving to individuals certain formal legal 
rights to revise their understandings of what it means to do good, but also 
knowledge of these rights, as well as the educational and legal conditions 
required, which would enable individuals to exercise such rights in an 
autonomous way (Kymlicka, 2002:239). What seems to be at variance 
with such a Rawlsian idea of political liberalism is the RWG’s emphasis on 
cultivating ‘honour’ in students. Instilling ‘a common loyalty’ in students 
would certainly restrict or nullify students’ private individual rights, 
including their right to be non-loyal or to question and revise the RWG’s 
and DoE’s conception of ‘honour’. 
Secondly, the resolutions of the ‘Values, Education and Democracy’ 
(VED) Conference13 related to implementing a discourse of democratic 
citizenship education that had three dimensions: 
1. Promoting anti-racism through the teaching of a new history 
curriculum, which requires that teachers be upgraded appropriately;
2. Integrating the aesthetic performing arts subjects and African languages 
into the curricula; and 
3. Incorporating civics education into the curricula with an emphasis on 
people engaging critically in intersubjective deliberation (DoE, 2001a). 
13  The publication of the Report of the Working Group on ‘Values, Education and Democracy’ was 
made possible by the Royal Netherlands Embassy in 2000 and presented for public deliberation. 
The issues raised by public debate in newspapers, academic journals, letters and submissions to the 
Ministry culminated in a national conference at the National Botanical Institute, Kirstenbosch, 
Cape Town on 22-24 February 2001. This conference was called “‘Saamtrek’: Values, Education 
and Democracy in the 21st Century”. More than 400 of South Africa’s leading education 
specialists, researchers, politicians, intellectuals and members of non-governmental organisations 
gathered to deliberate the issues in an attempt to formulate a ‘Values, Education and Democracy’ 
policy and to deliberate on its implementation in schools. The following were the conference 
themes and discussions: rooting the new patriotism in the Constitution; the role of teachers; 
the question of equity; governance and institutional culture; the question of language; infusing 
schools with the values of human rights; the oral tradition as a carrier of values; the value of 
history; the value of arts and culture; religion education vs. religious education; the role of sport; 
values and technology; the role of the media; sexual responsibility and HIV/AIDS; and gender 
and schooling (DoE, 2001a).
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Certainly the anti-racist agenda propounded at the conference resembles 
a liberal conception of democratic citizenship whereby people’s rights, 
irrespective of race, colour, belief and ethnicity, cannot be violated. Yet 
the resolutions of the conference, which culminated in the generation 
of the Manifesto on Values, Education and Democracy (MVE)  (2001b), 
put a great deal of emphasis on citizens engaging actively with others 
in shaping the future of South African society through deliberation – 
an idea which seems to be attuned with a communitarian conception 
of democratic citizenship espoused by Macedo  (1990), Galston  (1991) 
and Kymlicka  (2002). Put differently, a communitarian conception 
of democratic citizenship emphasises people’s commitment to public 
participation, respectful dialogue, or critical attention to government; 
that is, ‘the need for people to be active citizens who participate in 
public deliberation’ (Kymlicka,  2002:293). Such an understanding of 
communitarian democratic citizenship education is aptly supported by 
Nussbaum14  (2002:293-299), who offers a threefold account of what it 
means: firstly, communitarian democratic citizenship education engenders 
the capacity for critical examination of oneself and one’s traditions; 
secondly, it urges that people should see themselves as human beings 
who need to respect diversity; and thirdly, to imagine the ‘Other’, that 
is, the ability to imagine what it might be like to be in the position of a 
person different from oneself. Thus one finds that the MVE announces 
the achievement of the following ten communitarian values in educational 
institutions: democracy, social justice and equity, equality, non-racism and 
non-sexism, ubuntu (human dignity), an open society, accountability, the 
rule of law, respect and reconciliation (DoE, 2001b). I shall now explore 
these ten values announced in the MVE, specifically focusing on their 
resemblance with liberal and communitarian conceptions of democratic 
citizenship education. 
14 My potential critic might refer to Nussbaum as a prominent liberal. I agree. However, considering 
that communitarianism is in fact a variant of liberalism, it would not be inappropriate to 
refer to Nussbaum as a communitarian, as some of her most recent writings suggest. Liberal 
communitarians, of whom Martha Nussbaum is a distinguished representative in recent political 
philosophy, holds that there are many valuable ways of life which people may choose to pursue 
in an autonomous way after reflecting on alternative ways of the good life. Although this sounds 
very Rawlsian, the communitarian twist occurs when Nussbaum argues that both the availability 
of a plurality of ways of life and the capacity for autonomous choice depend upon a communal 
background and restricting certain individual rights (Nussbaum, 2001).
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To my mind, being democratic necessarily firstly implies that in deliberation 
with others one not only becomes critical of one’s own position, but also 
through openness begins to respect the view that there are others who are 
different from one. In this regard, Quane  (2002:316-319) argues quite 
correctly that people need to develop competencies such as communicating, 
being able to live together, critical thinking, being able to change and 
adapt to change, and creativity in nurturing ‘[democratic] citizenship and 
participation in community life’. Since both liberal and communitarian 
conceptions of democratic citizenship aim to achieve a sense of deliberative 
democracy, the MVE’s reference to the value of democracy seems to 
resemble such conceptions of democratic citizenship. Barber’s (1984:219) 
argument in defence of strong (deliberative) democracy through citizenship, 
and Young’s (1996:121) notion of communicative deliberative democracy 
whereby citizens come together to talk about collective problems, goals, 
ideals and actions, vindicate liberal and communitarian moments of 
democratic citizenship. 
Secondly, if one begins to imagine what it might be like to be in the shoes 
of someone different from oneself, then the possibilities for becoming 
socially just, equitable, egalitarian, non-racist, non-sexist, respectful, 
law-abiding, accountable and reconciliatory could be enhanced, since 
one invariably exhibits a sense of human dignity (ubuntu) towards the 
‘Other’  – what Nussbaum  (2002:301) refers to as having a ‘cultivated 
humanity’. It follows that a strong case could be made for a communitarian 
view of these values as they unfold in the MVE since these values demand 
strong communal participation in societal matters. If we truly wish to 
accommodate communitarian conceptions of the self, then we must be 
willing to provide some exemption for communitarian groups from the 
rigorous enforcement of individual liberties (Kymlicka,  2002:240). The 
point is that people cannot just engage in societal practices (family life, 
religious observance and educational discourse) and political institutions 
(Parliament and voting), unless there are groups of people in society who 
engage in such practices and institutions. Moreover, as Miller (2000:102) 
asserts, the individual’s capacity to exercise his (her) autonomous choice 
and to reflect critically upon any particular way of life is not something 
that people are natively endowed with, but it is a capacity that is nurtured 
by ‘autonomy-supporting practices and institutions whose existence 
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cannot be taken for granted’. Put differently, people cannot be socially 
just, equitable, egalitarian, non-racist, non-sexist, respectful, law-abiding, 
accountable, reconciliatory and dignified without engaging with others in 
society – it is a matter of being socially situated. 
Now that I have argued that the realisation of democratic citizenship 
education in educational institutions can engender transformation, I need 
to point out two dilemmas which could thwart the implementation of the 
MVE of the DoE.
Two dilemmas: ‘Blind’ patriotism and ‘Safe expression’
The Manifesto considers the value of ‘social honour’ as central to the 
development of South Africa’s democratic citizenship education agenda. 
The Working Group suggested that learners could achieve ‘social honour’ 
through singing the national anthem, displaying the national flag, and 
saying out loud an oath of allegiance which reads as follows: ‘I promise to 
be loyal to my country, South Africa, and do my best to promote the welfare 
and the wellbeing of all its citizens. I promise to show self-respect in all that 
I do and to respect all of my fellow citizens and all of our various traditions. 
Let us work for peace, friendship and reconciliation and heal the scars 
left by past conflicts. And let us build a common destiny together’ (my 
italics; DoE, 2001:59). This kind of blind patriotic expression seems to be 
constituted by two dimensions: commitment to country, and promotion 
of the welfare of ‘insiders’ (fellow citizens). What seems to be so pernicious 
about such a view of patriotism? Firstly, loyalty to one’s country has nothing 
to do with building democracy and achieving reconciliation. During the 
apartheid past, elections occurred democratically among white citizens. 
The white minority South African citizens adopted a stance of what Kahne 
and Middaugh  (2006:602) refer to as ‘unquestioning endorsement of 
their country – denying the value of critique and analysis and generally 
emphasising allegiance and symbolic behaviours’. For instance, the 
majority of white South Africans believed that questioning the apartheid 
state was ‘unpatriotic’ and that criticising the state for its racist policies was 
an act of betrayal. More recently, some cabinet members of the African 
National Congress (ANC) government felt that criticising the policies 
of the new democratic state is tantamount to expressing unpatriotic 
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sentiments. Of course, questioning and criticising the policies of the 
new ANC government does not imply disloyalty to the country. In fact, 
patriotism is not inconsistent with criticism. One can be critical about the 
economic policies of one’s government, but this does not necessarily mean 
that one is unpatriotic. Proclaiming one’s loyalty to one’s country does 
not necessarily imply that one should be intolerant of criticism. For this 
reason, a commitment to country in a parochial sense such as entailed in 
the pledge of allegiance is problematic, because, if taught, it could result in 
learners becoming ‘blind patriots’ or that they could fail to recognise the 
value of reasoned debate, analysis and critique as ‘engines of improvement’ 
(Kahne and Middaugh,  2006:602). In any case, during the apartheid 
years, patriotism to the state was parochial on the basis that not all citizens 
were considered to be equals in a democratic polity (blacks were excluded 
from the franchise), people did not deliberate together to advance social 
justice, and the dignity of blacks was disrespected. 
Secondly, for learners to be taught that patriotism implies doing their best 
‘to promote the welfare and wellbeing of all its [South Africa’s] citizens’ is 
tantamount to saying that those people who are not citizens of the country, 
yet with temporary residential status, do not warrant one’s support and 
forbearance. I specifically think of the many non-South Africans from 
neighbouring countries such as Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, 
Somalia and Nigeria, who often encounter xenophobic prejudice towards 
them on account of their being considered as ‘outsiders’ who do not deserve 
our respect and civility. Often these immigrant communities are subjected 
to indifference and cruelty, and sometimes hatred and assassinations. 
This brings me to a discussion of why it would not be credible to say that 
blind patriotism engenders peace, friendship and reconciliation. From the 
above discussion it seems as if the ‘oath of allegiance’ could undermine 
the need for learners to be critical about their country, and the rights 
of ‘outsider’ immigrants to enjoy the respect and civility of citizens in a 
democracy. Why is this situation possibly a dilemma for the cultivation 
of peace, friendship and reconciliation? In the first place, peaceful human 
co-existence and non-aggression would not be possible if democratic 
citizens were not engaged in relations of friendship. Unlike the ‘oath of 
allegiance’, friendship does not imply that people act uncritically, without 
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questioning one another, or that they exclude or marginalise the other. 
To my mind, it would be possible to realise reconciliation in a country 
still suffering from the scars of apartheid discrimination and segregation if 
learners were taught what it means to act with trust, an appreciation of the 
other, and to open up opportunities to start anew – what Arendt (1998) 
refers to as forgiveness. But because the ‘oath of allegiance’ lends itself to 
stimulating a blind patriotism, it would be very unlikely that learners would 
learn to nurture their qualities of attending to the other, to act with trust, 
and to do things anew – a situation which could make reconciliation very 
unlikely. I shall now focus my attention on the Manifesto’s call for learners 
to be taught to engage in dialogue in an atmosphere of ‘safe expression’. 
The Manifesto offers as one of its educational strategies the promotion 
of the values of the Constitution through the nurturing of a culture of 
communication and participation in schools, which function as a ‘space of 
safe expression’ (DoE, 2001:40). I agree with the Manifesto that nurturing 
a culture of dialogue should not happen at the expense of muting the 
voices of participants in the dialogue through what I would refer to as 
irresponsible expression. Those teachers and learners who are serious about 
cultivating forgiveness ought to become respectful, because respect requires 
of one not only to express oneself freely, but also responsibly. This means 
free expression should not become what Gutmann  (2003:200) calls ‘an 
unconstrained licence to discriminate’ – only then does one act responsibly, 
that is, respectfully. In other words, the right to free and unconstrained 
expression ends when injustice to others begins. One can no longer lay 
claim to being respectful and therefore being responsible, critical and just, 
if one advocates a particular point of view that cannot be separated from 
excluding certain individuals – that is, discriminating invidiously against 
others (particularly those individuals in society who are most vulnerable 
and who lack the same expressive freedom or capacity as those who are 
excluding them) on grounds such as gender, race, sexual orientation, 
ethnicity and religion (Gutmann, 2003:200). But responsible expression 
is not the same as ‘safe expression’. For me, responsible expression has to 
do with taking risks through belligerent action, whereas safe expression 
tries to avoid causing distress and discomfort to the other. I think the 
Manifesto promotes the idea of ‘safe expression’ because it is thought 
that teachers and learners should avoid belligerence and distress in their 
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classroom deliberations. Such a view of ‘safe expression’ could undermine 
what deliberations ought to involve. Simply put, ‘safe expression’ – such 
as avoiding confrontation and discomfort – could reduce the impact of 
deliberations, for instance by preventing participants from taking risks. 
If dialogical partners are too concerned about ‘safe’ speech, they would 
not necessarily take risks such as when teachers and learners confront one 
another through deliberation.
In defence of educational transformation: Towards 
expansive patriotism
Thus far, I have developed the argument that educational transformation 
(in schools) would not necessarily be realisable through the advocacy 
of blind patriotism and safe expression, on the basis that such practices 
could counteract critique, deliberation and reconciliation. I now offer an 
account of expansive patriotism as a way to resist the damaging effects of 
parochial patriotism. 
Drawing on the ideas of Sigal Ben-Porath  (2006:118), I contend that 
patriotism would be unwarranted if informed by belligerent citizenship 
which ‘reinforces national identities rather than demonstrating broader 
democratic interests’. For Ben-Porath  (2006:31), belligerent citizenship 
‘challenges democracy through its emphasis on a growing sense of patriotic 
unity, a growing support for security measures even when they conflict with 
civil liberties, and a reduced tendency for deliberation’. How evident is the 
call for belligerent citizenship in the outbursts of the CEO of the AWB and 
the president of the ANCYL? Whereas the AWB leader demands increased 
security on farms (even to the extent of re-arming the right-wing group 
against black intruders), the ANCYL president insults and expels a BBC 
journalist from a news conference as a vindication of his opposition to 
deliberation. These moments of blind patriotism are potentially dangerous 
to the shared destiny of democratic citizenship education in South Africa. 
Hence, I propose a kind of expansive patriotism that would seriously 
threaten those emerging aspects of belligerent citizenship in South Africa. 
Patriotism that is grounded in the concept of expansive education (that is, 
expansive patriotism) is attracted to the cultivation of open-mindedness, 
pluralism, deliberation, connecting with the other, and peace-building 
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(Ben-Porath, 2006:121-129). To be open-minded is to orientate oneself to 
a multiplicity of views and interpretations – unlike the AWB. Similarly, to 
endorse pluralism is to be exposed to a variety of perspectives, affiliations 
and understandings. Likewise, to connect with the other is ‘to share the 
other’s experiences’ (Ben-Porath,  2006:126), and to strive for peace is 
to begin to question the basic assumptions of conflict, as well as to do 
something about preventing it. Expansive patriotism would thus enable 
citizens to connect deliberatively with one another without the possibility 
of conflict, and where conflicting groups can begin to ‘envision actual 
futures of peace, including the challenges they generate and possible ways 
of overcoming them, together or apart’ (Ben-Porath,  2006:128). The 
educational process is central to the cultivation of expansive patriotism, 
because it is the ‘site where citizens (learners and teachers) learn to examine 
their common grounds ... where different views of history are presented 
and debated and different visions of the common future are explored’ 
(Ben-Porath, 2006:129). 
CHAPTER
9 Democratic citizenship education as a sceptical encounter with the other
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Throughout this book it could be inferred that I have depicted democratic 
citizenship education as some form of essentialist notion which unfolds 
in practices in exactly the same way. Rather, I offer a philosophical 
position which (re) considers the situation of the self in relation with 
others. What I shall put forward in this chapter is an extension of Seyla 
Benhabib’s  (2006) view that the self and others should iteratively and 
hospitably engage in deliberation. Although I agree with Benhabib that 
iterations (as arguing over and over again and talking back) are worthwhile 
in themselves, reconsidering democratic citizenship education, I  find 
Stanley Cavell’s  (1979) idea of ‘living with scepticism’ – particularly, 
acknowledging humanity in the Other and oneself – as more apposite 
to extend the theoretical premises of the notion. Although the practice 
of democratic citizenship education can be lived out differently amongst 
people, I want to add to the diverse ways in which the concept can both 
disrupt and offer ways as to how challenges of human conflict and violence 
can possibly be resolved. 
Towards a Cavellian stance on democratic citizenship education
In my extension of the philosophical premises of democratic citizenship 
education, I refer to the situation which involves the Interahamwe, the 
Hutu militias from Rwanda (about 7,000 in number), who control 40% 
of East Congo, in particular the area around Bukavu. They are descendants 
of those responsible for the genocide of the Tutsi in 1994 and are now 
living outside of Rwanda, where a Tutsi government is in place. It will 
be recalled that more than four million people were killed directly or as a 
consequence of the genocide. The Congolese population is now the victim 
of these militia: women are raped (more than 4,000, though officially only 
few cases are reported), and, as a consequence of that, rejected by their 
own group. Mothers are supposed to either kill the children they have 
given birth to or disappear. The hate of the Interahamwe towards the Tutsi 
is kept alive through indoctrination. They call the Tutsi ‘inyenzi’, which 
means cockroaches, in other words insects which have to be destroyed. 
The militias, who also ‘regulate’ about 25,000 Hutu citizens, cannot be 
controlled, notwithstanding the 17,000 soldiers of the peace-keeping 
force of the United Nations. So, what does a Cavellian view of democratic 
citizenship education have to offer to resolve this dilemma on the 
African continent? 
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Following Cavell (1979:440-441) ‘living with skepticism’ is in fact to live 
one’s life with suspicion (distrust) about oneself in relation to the other 
(from both one’s own vantage point and the other’s point of view). By this 
Cavell means that one can be ‘imperfectly’ known to others and at the 
same time be a ‘stranger’ to them (1979:443). Similarly, one can partially 
know others (which suggests that one cannot completely know others) and 
at the same time be disappointed in one’s knowing of the other – that is, 
not really know them. Cavell (1979:46) uses the example of human pain or 
suffering. At the same time one can know the pain of others on the basis of 
their behaviour, yet one would not really know their pain on the basis that 
their feelings would be deceiving. It is for this reason that Cavell (1979:45) 
aptly makes the point that ‘our relation to the world as a whole, or to others 
in general, is not of knowing, where knowing construes itself as being 
certain. So it is also true that we do not fail to know such things (that is, 
to know that we do not always know)’. I consider ‘living with scepticism’ 
as a way to acknowledge humanity in the Other and oneself as salient 
to extend the theoretical premises of democratic citizenship education, in 
particular to avoid universalist notions of the concept developed thus far 
with reference to deliberative iterations. 
Part(s) of the discourse on the Other and of otherness seems to us to 
ignore the importance of what Benhabib called ‘an articulation of the 
normative basis of cosmopolitan republicanism in an increasingly decentred, 
fragmented world, depicted in an anti-metaphysical philosophy’. Though 
Benhabib’s position is certainly attractive, it may, with its insistence on the 
normative basis of cosmopolitan republicanism, expose us to the danger of 
going too far in the opposite direction, that is, it may lead to an undesirable 
kind of universalism – one which I want to move away from in reconsidering 
democratic citizenship education. Moreover, the fact that democratic 
citizenship education is considered by most people as a practice which 
is morally good for society, and considering what might be perceived as 
good for society is always in the making, democratic citizenship education 
ought to be continuously subjected to modifications and adaptations. 
For instance, it may be morally good for society to engage in belligerent 
encounters at some stage in its history – and we may want to decide this 
in advance. But when hostility among people arises that make interactions 
develop into such distressful confrontations possibly resulting in the 
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exclusion of the Other, we may want to suggest that peoples’ distressful 
encounters be curbed. That is, our practices should be about what is 
desirable for society, with the possibility or readiness to depart from such 
practices, which means that belligerence in deliberations might not always 
be desirable for the public good. By implication, democratic citizenship 
education cannot be considered as something fixed and monolithic which 
has to be imposed on people, but rather as a practice of remaking and 
reimagining as the life experiences of people change and as new challenges 
arise. This brings me to my threefold argument:
Firstly, I see myself reflected by the Other, which makes the Other a 
mirror that casts my image towards me, suggesting that there is some 
interconnectedness between the Other and me. In a Cavellian sense 
(1979:438) being a mirror image of the Other makes me ‘answerable for 
what happens to them’ – that is, enacting my responsibility towards them. 
The Other – the actual Other as well as the Other in myself – confronts 
the self and thus she is turned back upon her own self; thus the Other 
is not simply the friend, but becomes the teacher, the possibility of self-
transcendence. It is not surprising to note that Cavell (1979:440) makes 
the point that ‘the other is like oneself, that whatever one can know 
about the other one first has to find in oneself and then read into the 
other  ... (that is) conceive the other from the other’s point of view’. If 
Hutu militia can see in Tutsis mirror images of themselves as human 
beings (and not treat them as cockroaches), the possibility for murder, 
rape and enslavement might be thwarted – a situation which invokes a 
form of sceptical democratic citizenship in the sense that Hutu aggressors 
destabilise and confront themselves with a readiness to depart from their 
violent behaviour and in fact be for the Other (Tutsis) what the Other is 
for them (human beings). Of course, this is not denying the Cavellian 
position that some humans (say Hutus) do not regard other human beings 
(say Tutsis) as human at all. Instead Hutus treat Tutsis indifferently, that is, 
‘monstrously’ and ‘unforgiveably’, but do not disregard them being humans. 
In fact, like Cavell, we acknowledge that Hutu aggression towards Tutsis 
is an unjust ‘human possibility’ (Cavell,  1979:378). And, considering 
that Cavell (1979:376) takes issue with certain human beings considering 
other human beings as slaves, we too take issue with Hutus who seem to be 
disconnected from Tutsis, whom they (Hutus) continually humiliate and 
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punish. The point we are making, is that the relationship between Hutus 
and Tutsis, albeit a violent one, is in fact a human relationship which opens 
up the possibility for humans to be answerable to the Other – in this case, 
violent Hutus finding some way as to live out their responsibility to Tutsis 
as humans. This is what democratic citizenship in the first place demands – 
an acknowledgement of a human encounter which makes the dominant 
(violent) answerable to the one against whom violence is perpetrated (the 
Tutsi). Thus, acting as an assemblage or multiplicity of people cannot 
happen under the name democratic citizenship if such actions turn violent 
towards another. 
Secondly, central to one’s connection with the Other is the notion that one 
has to acknowledge humanity in the Other – and the basis for such action 
lies in oneself: ‘I have to acknowledge humanity in the other, and the basis 
of it seems to lie in me’ (Cavell, 1979:433). Considering the unimagined 
hatred Hutus have for Tutsis, what Hutus ought to begin to acknowledge 
would be the humanity in those people whom they seemingly have no 
regard for as human beings – they fail to acknowledge the humanity in 
Tutsis, as they fail to acknowledge the humanity in the Congolese women 
whom they rape. In doing so Hutus, in a Cavellian sense, need to proceed 
from the point of acknowledging their own humanity, that is, their own 
feelings, emotions and compassion towards those who are vulnerable and 
whom they only want to harm. Unless their own humanity is brought 
to the fore, they would inevitably show no remorse when violating the 
sanctity of others’ lives. This is what I think Cavell means when he states 
that hedging one’s acknowledgement of humanity in others is hedging 
(protecting) one’s own humanity (Cavell, 1979:434). Hedging one’s own 
humanity and in turn not acknowledging humanity in the Other actually 
places a limit on one’s humanity; this is described by Cavell as ‘the passage 
into inhumanity (of which) its signal is horror’ (Cavell, 1979:434). This 
makes sense considering the serious restrictions Hutus place on their 
own humanity, which led to the atrocities and acts of horror perpetrated 
against hapless Congolese women. These Hutus simply do not consider it 
important and respectful to recognise the humanity in the Other – that is, 
they feel that they do not owe others respect simply as human beings – a 
situation referred to by Cavell as ‘the failure of which (humanity within 
others) reveals the failure of one’s own humanity’ (Cavell, 1979:434). The 
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point is that if Hutus consider Congolese women as persons whose dignity 
needs to be upheld, they need to acknowledge themselves as persons who should 
consider others as being worthy as persons. In other words, acknowledging 
others as human beings worthy of respect, one should simultaneously 
acknowledge oneself as a person who should exercise respect. This is what 
I think Cavell has in mind when he claims: ‘(A)nother may be owed 
acknowledgement simply on the ground of his humanity, acknowledgement 
as a human being, for which nothing will do but my revealing myself 
to him [her] as a human being, unrestrictedly, as his or her sheer other, 
his or her fellow, his or her semblabale’. So, democratic citizenship does 
require of a person to treat another person with hospitality in the sense of 
not violating the personhood of the other person. The very act of treating 
another person with hospitality determines the personhood of the Other 
and simultaneously gives another a passage into one’s humanity – that is, 
seeing one as a human being who merits being treated hospitably. 
Thirdly, following Cavell  (1979:269), democratic citizenship as virtue 
must leave itself open to repudiation – that is, the possibility that unvirtue 
might arise. It provides the possibility for others to exercise their rights, 
but it cannot be everything. ‘It provides a door through which someone 
alienated [Hutus who are rapists] can return by the offering of and the 
acceptance of explanation, excuses and justifications, or by the respect one 
human being will show another who sees and accepts the responsibility 
for a position which he himself would not adopt [Hutu rapists who 
accept forgiveness]’ (Cavell, 1979:269). In this way, the possibility exists 
for democratic citizenship to be unrelated to virtue, and hence, related 
to unvirtue or a practice which might not always be consistent with 
what is required of someone who acts as a democratic citizen. Such an 
unvirtuous encounter with others is only possible because we consider 
democratic citizenship not to be beyond reproach, as is certainly not 
the case when it comes up against what Cavell refers to as ‘the newest 
evil’ – that is, forgiving the unforgivable. As Cavell argues, invoking 
morality by deciding what might be good for others should at the same 
time establish the possibility for its repudiation. It is with such a view 
in mind that encounters with the Other through democratic citizenship 
should not be seen as a new form of universalism, but rather as an opening 
which creates opportunities both for attachment and detachment, that 
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is, acknowledgement and avoidance. Thus, as philosophers of education 
concerned with illuminating, identifying and solving major problems 
in our societies, we are now confronted with having to acknowledge the 
wrongs in our societies and simultaneously with the challenge to put into 
place ways as to how such ills can be avoided. 
Derrida and Arendt on imaginative action: On forgiveness, hospitality 
and (non) violence
I started by referring to the situation of the women of East Congo and 
mentioned the injustice that is done to them and, more generally, by the 
Interahamwe to the Tutsi. My argument for democratic citizenship should 
not be seen as a new kind of universalism, which defines how the Other 
should live, not only now, but in the future as well. It should rather be read 
as an amended version of the position Benhabib developed and which is 
so correctly argued for by Cavell, who draws our attention to the idea of 
encounter. It is time for philosophers of education to embrace a similar 
position and thus not to produce an alibi (even unwillingly) for those 
who clearly abuse the other in the name of cherishing otherness as just 
difference. In the main, my argument in defence of democratic citizenship 
through the Cavellian notion of sceptical encounters is constituted by 
three moral positions: forgiveness, hospitality and non-violence. Drawing 
on the seminal thoughts of Jacques Derrida  (1997b) and Hannah 
Arendt  (1969), I shall now examine in further detail what such moral 
positions can offer democratic citizenship in order to ensure that the 
practice remains (re) imagined.
Firstly, Derrida (1997b:33) argues for a view of forgiveness which builds on 
the premise ‘that forgiveness must announce itself as impossibility itself … 
(and that) it can only be possible in doing the impossible’. ‘Doing the 
impossible’ for Derrida (1997b:33) implies forgiving the ‘unforgivable’. In 
his words, ‘forgiveness forgives only the unforgivable’ – that is, atrocious 
and monstrous crimes against humanity, which might not be conceived 
as possible to forgive (Derrida, 1997b:32). Derrida (1997b:44) explicates 
forgiveness as ‘a gracious gift without exchange and without condition’. 
Amongst crimes against humanity Derrida (1997b:52) includes genocide 
(say of Hutus against Tutsis), torture and terrorism. This notion of 
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forgiving the ‘unforgivable’ is spawned by the view that forgiveness is 
an act without finality – that is, the fault and the guilty (the one who 
perpetrates the evil) is considered as being capable of repeating the crime 
without repentance or promise that he or she will be transformed. And, 
forgiving the ‘unforgivable’ takes into consideration that the crime might 
be repeated, which makes forgiveness an act (of madness) of the impossible 
(Derrida,  1997b:45). Now a conception of forgiveness which makes 
possible the act of forgiving the ‘unforgivable’ makes sense, because if 
Tutsis are not going to venture into forgiving the ‘unforgivable’ genocidal 
acts of Hutus, these two different tribal communities might not begin 
to connect with one another and a process of inducing transformation 
within a Congolese or Rwandan society might not begin to take place. 
Such a Derridian view of forgiveness is grounded in an understanding that 
‘nothing is impardonable’ (Derrida, 1997b:47) and, that ‘grand beginnings’ 
are often celebrated and redirected through amnesia of the most atrocious 
happenings – a point in case is South Africa’s democracy, which grew out 
of forgiving those ‘unforgivable’ racial bigots who committed heinous 
crimes against those who opposed the racist state.
Secondly, Derrida (1997b:20) draws on Kant to develop a two-pronged 
approach to hospitality: every person has a right to universal hospitality 
without limits, and the right to hospitality is limited to the right of visitation 
(that is, temporary residence). On the right to universal hospitality, 
Derrida limits such a right to innocent people (perhaps not guilty of a 
major crime) who seek refuge or asylum in another country and who want 
to escape ‘bloody vengeance’. Surely, innocent Tutsis who are subjected to 
Hutu torture, rape and enslavement have the right to seek and be granted 
asylum in another country. Following Derrida, these Tutsis (asylum 
seekers) cannot be considered as resident aliens in another country whose 
state and people ought to treat them hospitably – that is, without question. 
Such a situation is possible on the grounds that every person is endowed 
with a status of ‘common possession of the earth’ (Derrida, 1997b:20). 
Moreover, the right of visitation is granted on the basis that a peaceful 
treaty between states and their peoples are encouraged. So, for Tutsis to 
seek asylum in another country ought to be a temporary arrangement, on 
the grounds that Tutsis should have the right of return to the country of 
their origin. In other words, the possibility should not exist that they could 
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be declared as permanent refugees in another country. What follows from 
this is that such an understanding of hospitality would take the form of 
states offering temporary residence rights to people subjected to violence 
in their own countries, and that these people should not be denied the 
right to hospitable treatment by another state. 
Thirdly, following Arendt’s (1969) analysis of violence, it can be considered 
as a phenomenon whereby people impose themselves on others, making 
others the ‘instruments’ of their will (Arendt, 1969:56). In other words, 
violence is an instrumental means of coercion (Arendt,  1969:44). So, 
Hutu militia murder, torture, rape and maim Tutsi women and children 
because they use such instrumental acts in order to terrorise Tutsis. Non-
violence can counteract violence, because unlike violence, non-violence 
is capable of speech acts – that is, ‘violence itself is incapable of speech, 
and not merely that speech is helpless when confronted with violence’ 
(Arendt,  1963:19). Unlike violence, which is determined by silence 
(Arendt, 1969:77) (such as the silence of both victims and perpetrators 
of torture in Nazi concentration camps), non-violence draws on the 
authoritative voice of speech. It is here that non-violence can begin to tackle 
the genocide of Hutus by Tutsis. Like Arendt, we contend that there is no 
legitimate justification for violence and that the use of violence will only 
result in more violence. Yet, following Cavell and Arendt, we sometimes 
require a disruption of existing practices of violence through violence. Is 
it conceivable that non-violent resistance will always be met with non-
terrorisation and peace? I do not imagine so. If Hutu militia were to be 
resisted non-violently, massacre and submission of Tutsis will be the order 
of the day. Thus, in a Cavellian sense, we require a momentary breakage 
from non-violence in order to ensure lasting change in the Congo – that 
is, a condition ought to be set up whereby speech could become dominant 
in an attempt to resolve conflict. What this argument amounts to, is that 
democratic citizenship, with its insistence on speech acts, can temporarily 
create conditions for violence to counteract the destructive force of more 
violence. What I have argued for thus far, is that the notion of democratic 
citizenship is in fact a form of moral imagination which ought to be worked 
towards. And, such a moral imaginative experience can engender possible 
changes on the African continent through an emphasis on forgiveness, 
hospitality and non-violence. 
CONCLUDING 
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In this book, my arguments in defence of democratic citizenship education 
are situated within an ethical framework of concepts such as deliberation, 
compassion, friendship, forgiveness, respect, non-violence, human dignity, 
engagement, transformation and scepticism. Understandings of these 
concepts remain inexhaustible, as has been shown throughout the 
evolutionary discourse of philosophy of education. Like these concepts, 
democratic citizenship education has not attained conclusiveness, because 
societies are ever-evolving and constantly in the making. So, I  am not 
offering an exhaustive account of democratic citizenship education,but 
rather a moment within the discourse of philosophy of education where 
people can recognise practices that are aimed at enriching their engagements 
and experiences of the other. 
Of particular importance to the cultivation of democratic citizenship, 
I have argued, is the notion of education. Hence, my defence of democratic 
citizenship education involves establishing conditions of equality, non-
violence, justice and scepticism as important practices to ensure that 
deliberation, compassion and friendship are ongoing and inconclusive. 
In fact, at the core of my arguments is the notion that teaching and 
learning in and beyond higher education institutions are seedbeds for the 
cultivation of what it means to be a good citizen. I use ‘good’ here in the 
sense that citizenship and democracy are plausible ways as to how students 
and teachers can best engage with one another in order to ensure that 
their education leads them to do morally worthwhile activities that can 
build societies. In quite a neo-Aristotelian way, I suggest some ways as to 
how one can make sense of democratic citizenship and its implications 
for education. 
Finally, to have entitled this book Education, Democracy and Citizenship 
Revisited: Pedagogical Encounters is apposite in the face of serious threats 
that confront us today: global warming, poverty, violence and war, nuclear 
proliferation, racism and ethnic hatred. And the severity and complexity 
of human problems will demand from our educational institutions 
inclinations, dispositions and knowledge that will shape our social 
identities, ideological outlooks, moral preferences and attitudinal priorities 
differently. Through the teaching and learning of democratic citizenship 
education, I contend, our institutions can offer renewed possibilities to 
reconsider what education can mean for an educated human being in the 
twenty-first century. 
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